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Abstract. In my thesis, I address the question \What normative status does logic
have?’, to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining
power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion
of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and
whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the
bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly
with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles.
Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with
respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter;
it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and
discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The
second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical
studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a
descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in
the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter,
addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how
the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic
has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has
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What normative influence does logic have on our reasoning? How do, and how should,
logical norms influence our rational thought? The normativity of logic has been the
object of extensive study, and from the very beginning of modern philosophy it has
been questioned whether the laws of logic are descriptive or normative. Famously,
Frege (2013) answered that they are both, as logical laws describe the order of things
(i.e. logical facts) and they also prescribe how we should think in order for our
reasoning to be faithful to the order of things. The view that logic has both a
descriptive and a prescriptive function was widespread for a long time after Frege,
and it has often been joined by the assumption that the laws of classical logic fit the
role. However, in the last century, two big changes in perspective have concurred to
bring about a reevaluation of the role of logical laws on reasoning.
First, non-classical logics became more and more popular especially over the second
half of the last century, and the confidence that the laws of classical logic were
descriptive of logical facts became weaker, along with the faith that they could be
prescriptive for correct reasoning.
Second, in the last decades of the twentieth century, the paradigm of rationality
has progressively taken into account non-idealized agents and reasoning under un-
certainty, and so better models of the actual conditions of real agents. The anti-
idealistic revolution in the theory of rationality has been the effect of, among other
things, experimental studies in psychology that showed that reasoning doesn’t always
conform to the laws of classical logic. In addition, consideration of human limita-
tions in terms of cognitive powers, memory, information completeness, and time,
led to the development of alternative models of rationality, which were meant to be
closer to the common way people attribute rationality to other people’s behaviour
and decisions.
Far from turning off the light on the normative role of logic, the two conceptual
revolutions vivified the interest in pursuing the investigation further, turning it into
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a real challenge. In fact, portraying agents as deductively, cognitively, and epistem-
ically infallible had made the question of logical normativity nearly redundant, and
at the same time it had made the rationality requirements deriving from the ideal-
agent model unattainable for real agents. On the other hand, it wasn’t until Harman
(1986) that real agents were really taken into account as philosophically relevant,
and that logic and rationality were explicitly acknowledged as bearing different and
sometimes conflicting norms.
The issue of the normativity of logic is the main topic of the thesis. It is organized
as a collection of self-contained chapters with each chapter addressing a different
issue and laying the ground for the final chapter, where the problem of normativity
is addressed more specifically.
As the main question in this thesis is \What normative status does logic have?’, the
thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks
whether logic is a priori and can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently,
the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic with informal reasoning is
addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the
bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of
logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth
chapter; it starts with the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents
and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The
second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by empirical studies
in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive
point of view, providing support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth
chpater. The third criticism (in the sixth and final chapter) addresses the normative
role of logic (intended in a certain way, as we will see) from an a priori point of view,
showing how the epistemic paradoxes are critical for determining what normative
import logic has on rational reasoning.
In more detail, the thesis proceeds as follows:
the first chapter introduces the notion of logical validity and presents the accounts of
validity on the market, namely model-theoretical, proof-theoretical, deflationist, and
primitivist accounts. In the chapter, I address especially Field’s primitivist account,
which explains validity’s role in terms of how it constrains our beliefs, and I argue
that it doesn’t offer any clear reasons why it should be preferred over the other
theories of validity.
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The second chapter enters the debate about whether logic is a priori, presenting
both the a priori and the empiricistic accounts of logic, and analyzing the arguments
in favour and against them, respectively. In particular, in the chapter it is asked
whether logic can provide a priori norms for thought,1 and the issue of what grounds
and justifies our application of logical laws is specifically addressed. The chapter
concludes that the approach to the apriority of logic that seems to make better sense
is a light apriorism, according to which we are entitled by default to apply logical
laws.
The third chapter discusses the normative accounts of logic and the bridge principles
that have been presented to specify what ties formal logic to informal reasoning.
The chapter delves into MacFarlane’s approach, that can be considered as the most
detailed attempt to explain the normative import of logic. In addition, the chapter
provides a discussion of the deontic operators used in the bridge principles, and
clarifies how the deontic operator \has reason to’ can be expressed formally.
The fourth chapter treats the study of rationality from a realistic point of view,
drawing especially from the work of Harman and Cherniak. The chapter emphasizes
that to characterize a standard of rationality, we should take into account the cogni-
tive, memory and temporal limitations of human agents, and it highlights that these
considerations are in fact kept in mind when we judge other people’s decisions. The
chapter closes with a discussion of Peirce’s distinction between logica docens (i.e.
logic we are taught at school) and logica utens (i.e. our pre-scientific argumentation
theory), that is beneficial to explain in what sense logic could fit into the model of
rationality provided in the earlier part of the chapter. The last section also compares
logica utens to mental logic as it is described in chapter five.
The fifth chapter discusses the empirical results in the psychology of reasoning, and
it includes an overview of the main theories of reasoning in the psychological liter-
ature. The chapter is devoted to the conclusions that have been drawn from the
experimental results, especially from the selection task, where conditional reasoning
is analyzed. There, it is argued that it cannot be concluded from the experimental
results that human agents apply consistently a certain kind of conditional, and that
the selection task really seems to disconfirm a theory of reasoning that is particularly
tied to logical normativism.
1Whether the a priori norms should be obligations, recommendations, or other types of norms is
left aside in the chapter.
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The final chapter focuses on the normativity of logic more directly, with the help of
a classification of norms that is used as a matrix to assess what kind of normativity
logical norms belong to. The chapter discusses the prescriptions that logical norms
seem to impose on rational thinking, drawing expecially from some accounts of the
normativity of logic already presented in the third chapter. Logical norms are put
to the test against the epistemic paradoxes, to evaluate whether they prescibe a
plausible course of action or not. In light of the results of the test, it is argued that
logical norms are much weaker than we would expect and that they belong to the
realm of prima facie norms, a sort of norms that we are entitled to apply by default
but that can be overridden when they are in conflict with other epistemic norms.
Some of the material in the sixth chapter overlaps with material in chapter three.
In particular, the sixth chapter comes back to the bridge principles discussed in full
detail in the third chapter, and briefly explains them again so the reader doesn’t
need to go back and read the third chapter again.
In the thesis, chapters one to five are steps towards the analysis of the normative
power of logic, which is addressed in the last chapter. At the same time, they
can be seen as relatively independent from each other, as they tackle very different
issues. There is a reason for this: the normativity of logic is a topic that needs to
be addressed with a broad knowledge of many adjacent topics. As it is immediately
clear, one can’t approach this study with little or no knowledge of the work in the
general theory of normativity on the one hand, and in formal logic and theories of
validity on the other. These two topics constitute the basics for pursuing any research
whatsoever into the normativity of logic.
Then, there is the question about what it is that logic imposes its normative con-
straints on. Obviously, the answer is \reasoning’, but it is not easy to define what
\reasoning’ amounts to: that is where Harman’s work and the studies in the psy-
chology of reasoning become relevant. There is still a question left, and it is: why
should we take logic to be normative with respect to reasoning? Here, the answer is:
for rationality’s sake. But \rationality’ is not defined in the same way by everyone:
there are views of rationality (especially the less recent views) that hold that be-
lieving/acting rationally is no less than believing what an ideal agent would believe
or acting like an ideal agent would. There are other views of rationality that take
into account that an ideal-agent account of rationality is unattainable, so we need
to contemplate the actual limitations of real agents to shape a more realistic theory
of rationality. That is where knowledge of the accounts on rationality is needed.
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As I said, I take the question \What is the normative role of logic?’ to be redundant
in an ideal-agent approach, as ideal agents have perfect cognitive and deductive
powers, which we clearly don’t have. My interest is therefore turned to the question
on what it means for logic to be normative when real agents are in the picture, and
I think that in general the topic of the normativity of logic becomes philosophically




Abstract. Validity is a central logical notion and it has traditionally been defined
mainly in two ways, namely, model-theoretically and proof-theoretically. Recently,
the unassailability of these two accounts of logical consequence has been called
into question. In particular, Field has questioned whether the model-theoretical
and proof-theoretical accounts of validity provide frames in which logical revision
is possible. Field (2009), Field (forthcoming) has argued that logical consequence
needs to be left undefined (although this is not a novelty in the philosophy of logic,
as Etchemendy (1990) supported a primitivist view about logical validity) and has
provided an account of validity in terms of degrees of belief, which incorporates
requirements about rational belief. I will argue that the primitivist account of
validity encounters some important problems and conclude that there are no clear
reasons to prefer Field’s account of validity over reductionist accounts.
1.1. Introduction
To introduce the main topic of the thesis, i.e. the normative role of logic, we need
first to make clear what philosophers usually understand by \logic’ and how logic is
defined from a philosophical point of view. In particular, this chapter will analyze
Field’s account of validity, since it seems to fit well with later discussion on the
requirements that logic imposes on rational thinking. Although Field’s approach to
validity can be appreciated as a very original way to look at the issue of consequence,
it is argued that there are some important problems with it.
Before tackling the unconventional account of validity presented by Field, let’s have
a look at the traditional accounts of validity, and analyze how the notions of validity
and logic are intertwined. If we were asked what is logic and what is its subject
matter, we could answer that logic is plausibly seen as the study of what it is for an
argument to be a good argument. In other words, logic can be understood as the
study of what follows from what, i.e. consequence, or validity. The notion of validity
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is closely intertwined with the notion of logic, and the more we look for a definition
of logic, the more we find out we need to recur to some definition of validity to make
clear what logic is.
Furthermore, validity itself can be defined in different ways, with the different defi-
nitions not clearly interrelated. As if this weren’t enough, further complications are
found when we discover that there is no unique way in which consequence flows from
the premises to the conclusion(s) of an argument, either. In other words, different
logics recognize different sets of valid inferential rules. We might be tempted to ask
whether we even need a definition of validity in order to have a better understanding
of logic. Is validity really necessary for understanding what logic is?
Traditionally, logic is defined as the science of valid inference. However, as we know,
definitions can oscillate a little bit, so it is not uncommon to come across alternative
(and perhaps slightly sloppier) definitions of \logic’ employing terms such as \good
argument’ or \correct reasoning’. Although these small variations in the definition of
logic are easily overlooked, in fact they seem to broaden the class of what is subsumed
under the subject of logic.
What do these alternative definitions entail about the object of logic and what do
they fail to specify? First, stating that logic is the science of valid inference doesn’t
impose clear constraints per se over how “formalized” the inferences involved should
be. On the other hand, replacing that occurrence of \valid inference’ in the definition
of logic with more generic terms, such as \correct reasoning’, leaves room for pulling
extra-semantic and extra-syntactic content under the scope of logic. For instance, if
we were to define logic as the science of correct reasoning, this might well commit us
to the view that, say, preservation of informational content or reliable justification
are plausible objects of logic.
However, for the moment I want to stick to the traditional definition of logic as the
science of valid inference. I will first introduce the current positions in the debate
on validity and then I will focus on the primitivist approach to validity presented by
Field (2009), Field (forthcoming) and argue that this account comes close to what
I call an Epistemicism about Validity. Then, I will point out a technical problem
for Field’s account and argue that, besides this, epistemicism about validity displays
some philosophical problems. In the conclusion, I will show that, if we are to provide
accounts of validity alternative to the model- and proof-theoretical accounts, we’d
better avoid primitivist accounts as well. In this context, perhaps validity can be best
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characterized in a way that employs extra-semantic and extra-syntactical notions,
even within the frame of a reductive definition of validity.
1.2. In search of a definition
Over the last decades, a renewed interest in the nature of logical consequence has
revived the debate on validity and the traditional accounts of validity have been
challenged on different levels. Traditionally, validity has been characterized mainly
in two ways, i.e. model- and proof-theoretically, here labelled as (MTV) and (PTV),
respectively. I give the definitions of these accounts of validity for inferences below.
(MTV) For an inference Γ |= A to be valid, in every interpretation in which all
the sentences in Γ are given designated values, the conclusion A must
also be designated.1
An early formulation of (MTV) was included in Tarski (2002)2 and was meant to
provide a mathematical structure for a property which Bolzano (1972) had previously
called universal validity. The innovation that Tarski introduced in the formulation
of logical consequence was the definition of validity in terms of substitution. To
characterize validity in mathematical terms, Tarski first establishes that the non-
logical constants of the sentences can be replaced by variables to obtain sentential
functions (in Tarski’s words) or forms. Then he defines the notion of a model of a
class of sentences K as an arbitrary sequence of objects which satisfies each sentential
function in the class K, or (as modern logicians would put it) an interpretation which
makes each sentence of K true. Finally, he defines validity by employing the notion
of model. In Tarski’s words,
We say that the sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the
class K if and only if every model of the class K is at the same time a
model of the sentence X. (Tarski (2002): 186)
1As we know, the equivalent definition when truth is the only designated value in a logic is: For an
inference Γ |= A to be valid, in every interpretation in which all the sentences in Γ are true, the
conclusion A must also be true.
2However, it is controversial whether Tarski (2002) can be really considered as the first formulation
of what is currently called (MTV), mainly because the definition of model there doesn’t employ the
notion of truth. Bolzano (1972), first published in 1837, presented an intuition similar to Tarski’s,
but it is unlikely that Tarski had access to Bolzano’s work. It seems very plausible that Tarski
independently had the idea of defining validity in terms of substitution.
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Replacing the satisfaction function in Tarski (2002) with truth, contemporary logi-
cians paraphrase Tarski’s account of logical consequence as \truth preservation in all
the reinterpreted versions’. This construal of Tarski’s article on logical consequence
grounds what is currently called the interpretational account of validity. Before we
move to the objections to (MTV) and Tarski’s account of validity, let’s look at the
other main way validity has been traditionally fleshed out, i.e. (PTV).
(PTV) An inference Γ ` A is valid iff A is derivable from the sentences in Γ by
a specified collection of inference rules.
Although (PTV) is an account of logical validity and inferentialism is a theory about
the meanings of words,3 they can be seen as finding common ground in a special case
of inferentialism, i.e. logical inferentialism, which is the view that the inferential
rules of a connective specify the meaning of the connective.4 Among contemporary
versions of inferentialism, Boghossian’s views and his account of epistemic analyticity
in particular can be related closely to (PTV), and they are the object of a famous
attack due to Williamson (2007), which will be discussed later.
I won’t go into details about logical inferentialism here, but it is worth pointing
out that, although the core ideas underlying both (PTV) and logical inferentialism
can be tracked back to Gentzen (1969), inferentialism subsequently received different
formulations - at present we have at least four varieties of it, depending on which in-
ferential rules (or logical truths) are held to specify the meanings of the connectives.
This is not an exhaustive list, but let’s consider that one view about logical inferen-
tialism claims that only the introduction-rules for a connective specify its meaning;
another view takes both the introduction- and elimination-rules to specify the mean-
ings of the connectives; another inferentialist approach takes all the inferential rules
where the connective occurs to specify the meaning of the connective. There is also
an inferentialist account of the meaning of connectives holding that all the logical
truths containing the connective specify the meaning of said connective.
3Generally speaking, inferentialism holds that grasping the meaning of a word or a concept amounts
to being willing to reason according to certain inference patterns characteristic of that word or
concept.
4Logical inferentialism is closely related to the inferential-role semantics (also called inferentialism)
proposed by Brandom. See Brandom (2000).
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We have seen that (PTV) and logical inferentialism can both be seen as originating
from Gentzen (1969), but in fact one of the most acclaimed criticisms of logical in-
ferentialism and (PTV) was made a few years before Gentzen’s work became widely
known among philosophers, when Prior (1960) argued that not any arbitrary collec-
tion of rules specifies the meaning of a connective5 by showing how one can postulate
introduction- and elimination-rules leading to absurdity. Prior’s argument employs
a “made-up” connective, * (tonk), a *-introduction rule such that p `p * q, and
a *-elimination rule such that p * q `q. Clearly, applying these introduction- and
elimination-rules would let one derive anything from anything.
To bypass Prior’s argument, it has subsequently been suggested that in order to
determine whether an inference rule is meaningful (and possibly worth being put
into the collection of rules that determine what inferences are valid), the rule needs
to meet certain constraints. According to Dummett (1991), the grounds for assert-
ing a statement and the statement’s consequences should be in harmony. In other
words, if anywhere in a proof there is an application of the introduction rule for a
connective, and right after there is an application of the elimination rule for the same
connective which takes the result of the introduction rule as its major premise, then
the introduction and elimination steps can be eliminated leading to a more direct
proof.6
However, even once harmony constraints are imposed on the inferential rules, it is
contentious whether (PTV) is self-sufficient as a formulation of validity. For example,
Priest (2006) argues that harmony provides a justification only for some of the in-
ferential rules actually employed in a proof-theory, i.e. I- and E-rules, but it doesn’t
justify other (more fundamental) rules, i.e. structural rules. In fact, Priest argues,
harmony justifies the inferential rules for connectives, but substructural logics show
that there is no principled way to justify structural rules by relying exclusively on
proof theory.
5It is not clear whether Prior had become acquainted with Gentzen’s work by the time he published
his article on inferentialism. In fact, Prior (1960) attacks a version of inferentialism which is slightly
different from Gentzen’s.
6 The notion of total harmony is identified with conservative extension by Dummett. Conservative
extension applies to theories in general and, consequently, to logic too. In brief, if a theory, T2, is
a conservative extension of another theory, T1, then T2 contains additional expressions, inference
rules and axioms from T1 but in T2 it is not possible to prove any statement expressed in the
original vocabulary of T1 which isn’t already provable in T1.
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Even among proof-theorists, the role of harmony in determining logical validity has
been criticized, in particular by Read (forthcoming), who argues that harmony is
not sufficient to commit one to the validity of an inference because, as validity is
ultimately necessary truth preservation, harmony alone doesn’t guarantee that an
inference preserves truth necessarily.
Another well-known strong criticism of inferentialism has been made by Williamson
(2007), who argues especially against the inferentialism presented by Boghossian
(see e.g. Boghossian (1997)). As we have seen, inferentialism about logical constants
has it that to grasp the meaning of a connective, one has to be willing to apply
the inferential rules characteristic of that connective, such as its introduction- and
elimination-rules. Williamson’s concern is that understanding the meaning of a word
or of a logical constant is independent of assenting to rules governing the use of the
word. In the case of logical constants, Williamson argues that we cannot prove that
a deviant logician, who doesn’t assent to, say, Modus Ponens, hasn’t understood the
meaning of \if’ or is not competent in using the conditional.
On the other hand, the model-theoretic account of validity has its detractors too.
Prima facie, we might think that anti-realists especially may find (MTV) unattrac-
tive for it involves the notion of preservation of truth in a model, which they find
difficult to swallow without separating truth from a correspondentist interpretation,
which is traditionally connected to a realist approach to logic. Yet, as we know,
there are some ways in which truth theories compatible with anti-realism can be for-
mulated (e.g. deflationary truth theory), making the (MTV) formulation relatively
unproblematic from an anti-realist point of view.
Another possible criticism of (MTV) is connected with its being defined in terms of
designated-value preservation. That the conclusion, A, of an argument, Γ |= A, re-
ceives the designated value whenever the premises do, doesn’t make the consequence
“flowing” from the premises to the conclusion apparent, contrary to the definition of
validity in proof-theoretic terms.
However, a more radical criticism of (MTV) has been laid out by Etchemendy (1990),
who challenges specifically Tarski’s account of logical consequence. As I mentioned,
according to Tarski, an argument is valid when it is truth-preserving no matter what
the replacements of the extra-logical constants are. Etchemendy discusses Tarski’s
account at length, pointing out that it guarantees truth preservation through vari-
ations in the language.7 However, Etchemendy argues that the interpretationalist
7Or more precisely, in the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary.
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account of validity (such as Tarski’s) doesn’t guarantee that a valid argument is
necessarily truth-preserving. In fact, Etchemendy explains, to model logical con-
sequence as necessary truth preservation, different models need to reflect different
worlds, whereas the meanings stay fixed, unlike in Tarski’s definition.
I have discussed some general problems with (MTV) and (PTV), but are they really
so bad? Field adds other reasons why we should adopt a different account of logical
validity. Next, I will examine his views, then I will come back to the question ‘Are
(MTV) and (PTV) so bad?’.
Recently, Field has challenged both (MTV) and (PTV), arguing that these notions
don’t convey what we could call absolute validity (as opposed to what might be called
validity-in-a-logic,8 such as classical or intuitionistic validity) is really about. The
argument goes roughly as follows: what one establishes as valid using (MTV) and
(PTV) captures what is valid according to
• a certain set of inference rules (in (PTV)’s case), which therefore is always
relative to a logic;
• a certain set of semantically compositional rules, which is always relative to
a logic as well.
Therefore, the (MTV) and (PTV) accounts of validity don’t ultimately answer the
question about what is simply or genuinely valid.
Although Field maintains that (MTV) and (PTV) are important frameworks which
make communication between advocates of different logics possible, he suggests that
any reductionist account of validity, i.e. any account providing a definition of validity,
is bound to stumble upon problems analogous to those raised in ethics by Moore’s
Open Question argument: what is validity itself once validity-in-a-logic is set aside?
One possible answer to this question could be that you can’t really have validity
outside a logic. This answer can come in three flavours, supported by opposite
reasons:
(Relativism/Conventionalism) Assuming that one agrees that logical consequence is
necessary truth preservation, there is nothing like absolute validity because there is
nothing like absolute truth, i.e. truth outside a logic (or a language).
8This term isn’t used by Field. I’m using it here as a mere generalization.
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(Realism/Logical Monism) If there is a fact of the matter about whether, say, some-
thing is logically valid, then there must be some logic which represents those logical
facts for what they are. This \Universal’ or \True Logic’ represents validity as it is,
and there is nothing about validity that can possibly be conceived or understood
outside the frame of this True Logic.
The third position to be added to the list is different from the two options above for
two reasons: first, the third position tackles the question \Is there any absolute valid-
ity?’ on different grounds than (Relativism/Conventionalism) and (Realism/Logical
Monism); second, the third position is cross-party - it can be advocated both by
relativists/conventionalists and realists. Here it is:
(Validity Epistemicism) Even if there were logical facts, we could have no epistemic
access to them.
This means that there might be facts of the matter whether something is logically
valid or not but, those facts being epistemically inaccessible to us, we can deal only
with their consequences, i.e. the constraints they impose on our beliefs.
Holding that there really are logical facts9 is not crucial for this form of epistemicism.
For instance, an anti-realist validity epistemicist could argue that we would still have
logics and theories of validity even if there were no logical facts at all.10
At this point, we might be wondering what an epistemicist account of validity might
look like. Field’s theory of logical validity satisfies our curiosity, giving a character-
ization in terms of belief degrees of these constraints, while remaining silent about
what validity itself is.
Before moving to the next section, it is worth pointing out that there is another
approach to logical consequence that Field doesn’t consider in his discussion on
the theories of validity, and it would be worth considering alongside with (MTV)
and (PTV). Shapiro (2011) provides a deflationist theory of logical consequence.
9 Let me say something about \logical facts’, in case the reader was wondering. From a realist
(and atomistic) point of view, a fact is a fundamental structure of reality our beliefs and judgments
are related to. Moreover, if we are able to judge a proposition as true or false, that is because our
language mirrors reality. On this account, logical truths turn out to be factual truths: as logic is the
most general science, its truths are the most general truths. Therefore, from a realist perspective,
there is a fact of the matter about something being, say, logically valid, independently from our
linguistic conventions, mental architecture, and inferential practice.
10I will say more on the anti-realist take on Validity Epistemicism at the end of the next section.
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Shapiro’s point is: the deflationist theory of truth bypasses the problems that afflict
a metapysically loaded theory of truth, explaining the truth predicate as a mere
expressive device. So why not applying a deflationist approach to logical consequence
as well? According to Shapiro, logical consequence is a mere expressive device as
much as the truth predicate is.
The deflationist theory of validity presented by Shapiro recognizes two simple rules
as expressing the role of logical consequence, dubbed C-Intro and C-Elim:
Cn-Intro (p1 and ... pn) entails that q → ‘p1’ and ... ‘pn’ have ‘q ’ as a consequence.
Cn-Elim ‘p1’ and ... ‘pn’ have ‘q ’ as a consequence → (p1 and ... pn) entails that
q.
Would a deflationist approach to truth avoid the problems with (MTV) and (PTV)
that Field highlights?
Prima facie, the deflationist theory of validity bypasses Field’s criticisms of model-
and proof-theoretic validity, as it doesn’t need to be specified what set of semantically
compositional or inferential rules determines whether (p1 and ... pn) entail q.
On the other hand, it is not clear how to determine whether (p1 and ... pn) entail
q outside the framework of a set of rules, be they semantically compositional or
inferential.
1.3. Primitive validity
As already mentioned in the previous section, Field (forthcoming) suggests an ac-
count of validity which doesn’t offer any definition of validity. Field argues that
neither (MTV) nor (PTV) are successful in characterizing absolute or, in his words,
genuine validity and then goes on to test whether a more charitable definition of
validity, i.e. validity as logically necessary truth preservation, would do a better job.
As is immediately apparent, he argues, this definition is circular, as is shown by the
fact that validity for 0-premise arguments is equivalent to logically necessary truth.
Moreover, Field highlights two problems for the account of validity as logically nec-
essary truth preservation, which I will label the Partial Independence Problem (PIP)
and the Inadequacy to Paradoxes Problem (IPP).
The first problem can be summarized as
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(PIP) Validity and logically necessary truth preservation are partially indepen-
dent in some logics. Therefore, defining validity as logically necessary
truth preservation fails to be universal.
To show that (PIP) is a real problem for validity, Field implicitly assumes that any
sentence, A, is equivalent to True (<A>) and argues as follows:
Let’s represent what validity is intuitively about as
A1, ..., An⇒ B
and logically necessary truth preservation as
⇒ True (<A1>) ∧. . .∧ True (<An>) → True (<B>).11
In order to explain A1, ..., An⇒ B as ⇒ True (<A1>) ∧. . .∧ True (<An>) → True
(<B>), Field argues, it is crucial that they are both taken to be equivalent to ⇒
A1∧. . . ∧ An → B. However, in logics where Conditional Proof, ∧-Elimination or
Contraction fail, A1, ..., An⇒ B doesn’t require ⇒ A1∧. . . ∧ An → B and so ⇒
A1∧. . . ∧ An → B doesn’t require ⇒ True (<A1>) ∧. . .∧ True (<An>) → True
(<B>). This means that, in these logics, validity and logically necessary truth
preservation are divorced.12
The second problem for the definition of validity in question can be reformulated as
(IPP) Reducing validity to logically necessary truth brings about unpalatable
consequences when paradoxical sentences are involved.
Field argues that, given non-ordinary sentences, such as the Curry’s paradox sen-
tence,
11\⇒’ denotes logical necessity here.
12Field extends this argument to supervaluationism, replacing
⇒ True (<A1>) ∧. . .∧True (<An>) → True (<B>)
with
⇒ Supertrue (<A1>) ∧. . .∧ Supertrue (<An>) → Supertrue (<B>).
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(C ) True (<C>) → ⊥
the account of validity discussed above has counterintuitive consequences. To show
this point, Field considers one of the solutions to Curry’s paradox, i.e. rejecting
Conditional Proof. As a preamble to the discussion, let’s recall that the ingredients
to obtain Curry’s paradox include
• Truth-Inferences, i.e. Tr<A> → A and A → Tr<A>, obtained from the
T-schema;
• The possibility of constructing self-referential sentences in the language.
Once we have defined a sentence, C, such that
(C ): Tr<C> →⊥
the proof of ⊥ goes as follows:
1 Tr<C> Assumption for CP
2 C 1, Tr-Inference
3 Tr<C>→⊥ 2, subst. ident.
4 ⊥ 1,3 MP
5 Tr<C>→⊥ 1,4 CP
6 C 5, subst. ident.
7 Tr<C> 6, Tr-Inference
8 ⊥ 5,7 MP
As we mentioned, one of the ways to solve the paradox is to reject Conditional Proof.
However, even those who advocate this solution take the inference from Tr<C> to
⊥ to be legitimate, as C is equivalent to ‘If Tr<C> then ⊥’. Yet, Field argues, if
validity is defined as necessary truth preservation, they shouldn’t regard the inference
from Tr<C> to ⊥ as valid. In his words,
[...] what happens if we accept such a solution, but define ‘valid’ in a
way that requires truth-preservation? In that case, though we can le-
gitimately reason from K to ‘0=1’ (via the intermediate ‘True(<K>)’,
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we can’t declare the inference “valid”. For to say that it is “valid”
in this sense is to say that True(<K>) → True(<0=1>), which yields
True(<K>)→ 0=1, which is just K; and so calling the inference “valid”
in the sense defined would lead to absurdity. That’s very odd: this
theorist accepts the reasoning from K to 0=1 as completely legitimate,
and indeed it’s only because he reasons in that way that he sees that
he can’t accept K; and yet on the proposed definition of ‘valid’ he is
precluded from calling that reasoning “valid”. (Field (forthcoming):
11)
Therefore, he concludes, the account of validity as necessary truth preservation leads
one to endorse as valid those pieces of reasoning that lead to conclusions which are
not rationally acceptable.
Having argued that any definitional approach to validity leads to unsatisfying re-
sults, Field suggests that validity itself be treated as a primitive notion and gives a
“phenomenological” account of validity. In other words, we don’t know what validity
itself is but can see what its consequences are, i.e. that it constrains our beliefs.
This motivates an approach to validity which focuses on preservation of degrees of
belief, instead of truth preservation, as showed in the passage below:
To regard the argument from A1,..., An to B as valid is to accept a
constraint on degrees of belief: one that prohibits having degrees of
belief where Cr(B) is less than ΣiCr(Ai) − n + 1; i.e. where Dis(B)
> ΣiDis(Ai).) (Field (forthcoming): 26)
There are two things to stress about the passage above: first, the formula is not meant
to be a definition of validity because what is primitive (i.e. validity) can’t be defined
and, second, the approach to validity endorsed by Field is perspectivist, besides
being primitivist. The perspective stance on validity is evident in the passage, where
it is stressed that ‘To regard an argument as valid’ amounts to accepting certain
constraints on degrees of belief.
For reasons of clarity, I will use the formula Cr(B) ≥
∑
iCr(Ai) - (n-1), which
preserves the meaning of Field’s original formula, but avoids the confusion it might
bring about in the calculations. It can be noticed that Field’s approach to validity
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involves the use of degrees of belief, which are expressed as real numbers in the
interval [0, 1]. I will dub the account of validity presented by Field as (FV).
Once formalized, these constraints on belief turn out to be Cr(B) ≥
∑
iCr(Ai) -
(n-1), where Cr(ϕ) stands for the degree of belief relative to ϕ13
According to Field, this characterization of validity in terms of belief constraints
is less problematic than the reductionist account of validity in terms of logically
necessary truth preservation.
Prima facie, the formula for calculating the belief degree of a conclusion in an ar-
gument regarded as valid has a problem, as it can return results outside the [0, 1]
interval.




and apply the formula Cr(B) ≥
∑
iCr(Ai) - (n-1) to calculate what Cr(B) should be
if we regarded the argument as valid. The result turns out to be Cr(B) ≥ -0.2, i.e.
our degree of belief in the conclusion should be higher or equal to -0.2. This problem
is quite well-known in the literature on probabilism14 and it could be pointed out
that to require some credence to be greater than a negative value doesn’t amount to
assigning it a negative value.
However, the primitive theory displays some more serious internal problems which
will need be addressed in the remainder of this chapter. The same problems presum-
ably apply also to other primitivist accounts of validity, such as Etchemendy (1990).
Before discussing the problems for Validity Epistemicism, I want to point out that
this view can come in two varieties:
(Realist Validity Epistemicism) There are facts of the matter about validity but we
don’t have direct epistemic access to them. Facts about validity would take the form
13 As it can be seen in the formulation of Field’s approach to validity, the formula employs also the
dual notion of belief, i.e. disbelief, defined as 1 - Cr(ϕ), and represents intuitive validity as Dis(B)
≤
∑
iDis(Ai), i.e. the conclusion can’t be disbelieved more than its premises. Field generalizes the
belief degrees formulas to take into account conditional beliefs and multiple-conclusion systems, but
I won’t mention these generalizations here so I can focus on the general account instead.
14See Adams (1975).
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of, say, A ⇒ B ; to be realist about these facts means that one takes A⇒B to be
ruled by some intrinsic property of the relation between A and B. Despite the fact
that the intrinsic property is left undefined, we have normative constraints on belief,
which are the conceptual-role images of validity.
(Anti-realism about Validity) There aren’t facts of the matter about validity. We
have constraints on beliefs, which might be, e.g. stipulated. Logic’s normative power
doesn’t require that there are any facts about validity.
Both the positions above seem to raise important doubts, though. The former, i.e.
(Realist Validity Epistemicism), is subject to a general criticism of epistemicism,
i.e. how can one know that there are facts of the matter about validity without
having any epistemic access to them? The latter (Anti-realism about Validity) faces
an objection common to conventionalism, i.e. if every reasoner stipulated different
normative constraints on their beliefs, how would the communication between them
be possible? What would the discussion about logical revision and logical disputes
be all about?
One of the risks for (Realist Validity Epistemicism) is that it can easily come down
to be the same as its anti-realist (and conventionalist) analogue. In fact, as (Realist
Validity Epistemicism) holds that reasoners don’t have any epistemic access to the
facts about validity, it is hard to prove that there are said facts.
In addition, a general problem for Validity Epistemicism is that it is not immune from
at least one of the problems that might be intuitively worrying to proof-theorists. To
see this, let’s first decompose (FV) into the two conditionals which intuitively seem
to constitute it and that can be rephrased as:
A subject, S, accepts the following constraints over her beliefs:




(FV⇐) It is regarded as improper that Cr(B) <
∑
iCr(Ai) - (n-1)⇒ A1, ..., An
to B is regarded as valid
As I mentioned in the second section, Field argues that the reductionist accounts of
validity, such as (MTV) and (PTV) fail to leave room for logical revision, because
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they are defined in such a way that makes validity be always validity-in-a-logic. How-
ever, a primitive account like (FV), where constraints on belief degrees are equated
to subjective-probability distributions, seems to concede too much.
To see the point, let’s focus on (FV⇐). The requirement stated in (FV⇐) is that one
accepts that the credence relative to the conclusion be not smaller than the credence
relative to the premise set in order for an argument to be regarded as valid. However,
Cr(B) might happen to satisfy the requirement for reasons that have nothing to do
with the fact that the premise set is such and such, and the premises are assigned
certain degrees of belief.
The worry about (FV⇐) resembles one of the intuitive worries about (MTV) men-
tioned in Section 1, namely that the definition of validity according to (MTV) doesn’t
guarantee that the conclusion actually follows from the premises. The conclusion
might well be a tautology, which is true independently of the premises, giving rise to
a worry that is certainly common among relevant logicians. Similarly, the credence
relative to the conclusion might be greater than or equal to the credence relative to
the premise set for independent reasons, with nothing guaranteeing that the conclu-
sion actually follows from the premises. This is a concern that might arise regarding
different accounts of validity, as I said, and also for (MTV), but it shows that Field’s
approach to validity is not in a better position than the theories of validity it opposes.
In the next section, we will explore the possibility of giving a reductionist twist to
(FV) and will analyze its consequences.
1.4. Between facts and norms
We have seen that current theories of validity are roughly divided into four groups:
model-theoretical, proof-theoretical, deflationist, and primitivist. The common de-
nominator between at least the model-theoretical, the proof-theoretical and the prim-
itivist accounts is that they take validity (or at least, what we regard as valid) to be a
preservation of some sort. However, to return to the question in the introduction, is
it possible to define validity in such a way that leaves room for extra-syntactical and
extra-semantic contents? This is certainly not the case for (MTV) and (PTV), and
there are reasons to exclude Field’s approach to validity as well, because it doesn’t
address the issue of defining validity.
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In addition, the discussion of the current theories of validity in the sections above
highlighted how close primitivist approaches to validity are to what I called epis-
temicism about validity.
In this section, I am going to address what are the normative consequences of the
primitivist account of validity (FV); next, I will argue that if there are no strong
reasons to endorse a justification reductionist account of validity, neither are there
to prefer (FV) over the model- and proof-theoretic accounts of validity
In terms of normativity, the main difference between the account of validity in terms
of belief degrees and other accounts of logical consequence, e.g. (MTV) and (PTV),
seems prima facie to be that (FV) doesn’t need supplementary bridge principles to
connect logical consequence with constraints on beliefs.15 In fact, Field’s account
could be read as including an implicit ought, as in:
If you regard the argument from A1, . . ., An to B as valid, you ought to regard it as
improper to have degrees of belief in which Cr(B) is less than
∑
iCr(Ai)- (n-1).
If this understanding of Field’s account of validity were correct, we could conclude
that according to (FV), the validity of an argument entails a normative requirement
about believing the premises and the conclusion. This reading makes Field’s account
of validity look very similar to the bridge principles connecting deductive validity to
rational reasoning, such as those presented by MacFarlane (2004), which will be
discussed at length in the remainder of the thesis, especially in chapters 3 and 6. In
chapter 6 in particular, we will see how the bridge principles encounter problems in
meeting their desiderata. For now, we will just say that reading (FV) as a prescription
on belief would not give (FV) an advantage over other accounts of validity anyway.
Moreover, such a reading wouldn’t be really faithful to Field’s intentions. In fact,
(FV) says that regarding an inference as valid amounts to judging it improper to
believe the conclusion to a lesser degree than the result of
∑
iCr(Ai) - (n-1). So,
there is no conditional clause taking a primitive logical consequence relation as its an-
tecedent and a wide-scoped normative claim as its consequent. In fact, (FV) displays
an identity relation between our judgments of validity and our normative judgments
about believing the premises and the conclusion of an argument. Specifically, the
identity relation in (FV) is stated between what one regards as valid and what one
regards as improper to believe below a certain degree.
15I refer to principles such as those suggested by MacFarlane (2004).
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As it happens, the normative requirement about believing the premises and the
conclusion of an inference is not enforced by the validity of the inference itself. On
the contrary, the normative requirement is presupposed in stating that the inference
is valid. In this sense, Field’s account of validity goes a step further with respect
to the other accounts of validity, incorporating a normative stance but leaving it
undefined. Not only validity is taken to be primitive, but also normativity is as well.
Can (FV) guarantee that our judgments of validity are not completely subjective
and arbitrary, then?
Field tackles this question by applying to validity a theory which was originally
developed to explain the link between chance and belief.16 This project goes under
the name of projectivism and has it that, starting from our subjective judgments of
validity, we can project our epistemic states into objective statements about validity.
In other words, the (subjective) constraints on belief degrees are the starting points
from which reasoners try to make projections about what objectively counts as valid.
What does this amount to and how are the projections performed? Presumably, upon
considering her validity judgments, a reasoner will try to generalize the conditions
which contributed to the development of those judgments. For instance, suppose that
I have formed some beliefs about the validity of an inference rule, say, disjunctive
syllogism (DS), and that I have done so on the basis of some evidence I collected, an
underlying logical theory which I believe to be right, etc. Then I have assembled some
complicate justification to explain to myself why I formed certain beliefs about the
validity of DS. Now, to project my subjective attributions of validity into objective
judgments, I will presumably wonder whether I built up my justification in an optimal
way, under the best conditions, and so on. I will also ask to myself whether the
justification which explains why I believe that DS is valid (or invalid) would sound
convincing to other people.
However, as I argued in the previous sections, Validity Epistemicism encounters
problems not easily overcome. Therefore, while going back to a reductionist account
of validity might be a more promising option than remaining a primitivist about
validity, it is not sufficient to restructure (FV) to turn it into a definition of logical
validity. To see this point, let’s consider a hypothetical reductionist counterpart of
(FV), call it Reductionist Field’s Validity (RFV):
16Field cites as primary sources on chance theory Jeffrey 1965, The Logic of Decision, New York:
McGraw-Hill, and Skyrms 1984, Pragmatics and Empiricism, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
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(RFV) An argument from A1, . . ., An to B is valid iff Cr(B) ≥
∑
iCr(Ai) - (n-1).
What is immediately apparent in (RFV) is that validity is determined by the relation
between our beliefs in the premises and our belief in the conclusion. Nothing prevents
validity so understood from being dependent on our beliefs, therefore (RFV) appears
to be a psychologistic account of validity. We already know that psychologism about
logic hasn’t been welcome since Frege, and for the moment, this will do to rule out
the possibility of adopting (RFV) as our account of validity.
In light of the discussion above, it appears that there are no clear reasons why (FV)
should be preferred over the reductionist accounts of validity.
Although it is not my aim here to support a theory of validity in particular, it is
worth observing that there might be alternative definitional theories of validity that
avoid the problems encountered by (MTV) and (PTV). For example, consider an-
other reductionist account of validity, which defines validity in terms of justification.
It could be argued that such an account would be very close in spirit to Field’s prim-
itivist theory but, being a definitional account, avoids taking an epistemicist stance
on validity. I am aware that the topic of justification is a difficult one and largely
debated itself, but it seems that defining validity as justification preservation might
have some advantages.
Roughly, such an account of validity (let’s call it (JV)) could be stated as
(JV) Γ entails B iff, for any justification j, j justifies B at least as strongly as
j justifies the premise set, Γ.
To have an idea of this, let’s take two key-points of (FV), i.e. that
• validity constrains our beliefs directly, and that
• “projectivizing” validity attributions involves more than the subjective evi-
dence and beliefs of the reasoner.
To make projections about what objectively counts as valid implies that those pro-
jections are made in virtue of some justifications. This might motivate the move to
an account of logical consequence as justification preservation, which would avoid
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the problems of Validity Epistemicism and, at the same time, the danger of drifting
towards psychologism,17 which was the main worry about adopting (RFV).
Giving a definition of validity in terms of justification preservation would maintain
direct normative constraints over beliefs similar to those of (FV), without the ac-
count having to rely on model- or proof-theoretical frameworks or on necessary truth
preservation. In addition, defining validity as justification preservation wouldn’t
preclude logical revision, as (MTV) and (PTV) seem to do.
A similar attempt at a definition has been made by Restall (2004), which suggests
that the validity of an argument can be cashed out in terms of warrant preservation,
provisionally formulated as \[...] for any argument from premises X to conclusion A,
if all of the premises in X are warranted (for some believer) so is the conclusion.’
(Restall (2004): 4).
The advantage that such a definition of validity would have over other reductionist
accounts has been pointed out by Restall, who argues that such an account of validity
would fit well within a logically pluralist frame. Taking as an example the case of
disjunctive syllogism (DS), which is valid in classical logic but not in relevant nor
in paraconsistent logic, Restall argues that we nonetheless could recognize that DS
preserves warrant in some sense. Referring to the example of a dog pursuing a man
down a path and coming to a fork in the path, where she applies DS to infer which
way the man has gone, Restall argues:
The Dog is not making a mistake by inferring B from A∨B and ∼A.
Given that her beliefs that A∨B and that ∼A were warranted, then so
is her belief that B. Conversely, if it turns out that she was somehow
mistaken in her belief that B, this will be because one of her prior (but
perhaps still justified) beliefs that A∨B and ∼A was also mistaken.
Her inference clearly seems a good one. The move from premises to
conclusion seems to preserve any warrant the dog has for the premises
into warrant for the conclusion too. (Restall (2004): 3)
By considerations of warrant preservation, one should agree with classical logicians
that DS is correct, as \the warrant of the premises “flows through” the conclusion’
(Restall (2004): 4). However, Restall goes on, although agreeing with classical logic
17Provided that we take justification to be related to the external world to some extent.
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could be a problem for a non-classical logician who holds that there is only one correct
logic, it is not particularly troublesome for a pluralist about logic. Nor does warrant
preservation in itself point to some particular logic which preserves warrantedness
better than others. We might be tempted to identify, e.g. classical logic with the
logic which preserves warrantedness best. We might want to prove this by showing
that the basic inference schemata (such as ∧− I or DS) preserve warrant. However,
in Restall’s words,
This is an appealing picture, but it too must be flawed. If each of
the baby steps in a proof preserves warrant, in the sense that if the
premises have warrant so does the conclusion, then any argument, no
matter how complex or convoluted, no matter how unsurveyably large,
preserves warrant. The warrant provided for the premises filters down
uninterrupted to the conclusion, passing through each rule along the
way. If the warrant stops, it must stop at some inference, and this
inference will fail to preserve warrant. (Restall (2004): 5-6)
And again, Restall concludes
Mere entailment is not enough to guarantee the preservation of war-
rant. If there is a logic of warrant preservation, it is nothing like
classical predicate logic or any of its neighbours. (Restall (2004): 6)
Even though a definition of validity in terms of warrant or justification preservation
still has a long way to go, it doesn’t appear to fare worse than the primitivist account
of validity. Perhaps there are no strong reasons why we should commit ourselves to
a theory of validity as justification preservation, but such an account seems to avoid
both problems common to (MTV) and (PTV), and issues regarding (FV). Therefore,
if there are no strong reasons to endorse a justification reductionist account of validity,
neither are there to prefer (FV) over the model- and proof-theoretic accounts of
validity.
CHAPTER 2
Logical revision and the apriority of logic
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34 2. LOGICAL REVISION AND THE APRIORITY OF LOGIC
Abstract. The most immediate reason why we should care about the apriority
of logic lies in the interest regarding the specific epistemic status of logic with
respect to the other sciences. However, there is another reason for caring about the
apriority of logic, namely, the status of the norms that logic provides for reasoning.
Given the topic of this thesis, the relevant question is the latter, i.e. \Does logic
provide a priori norms for reasoning?’.
Nonetheless, the two questions are intertwined, and answering to one requires in-
vestigating the other. The traditional definition of a priori knowledge claims that
some knowledge is a priori iff it is known (or justified) independently of experi-
ence but, far from settling the issue, the definition has raised questions on what
\indepedently of experience\ means. The first part of this chapter addresses the
connection between a posteriori evidence and a priori knowledge, surveying some
views on the relevance of empirical evidence to the a priori, and explaining what
characteristics evidence should have to deprive the knowledge of its a priori status.
Next, I address the empiricist’s view about logic, focusing on the famous work by
Putnam, and explain the main replies to empiricism. Subsequently, I divide the
approaches to the a priori into two main categories: the positive and the negative
accounts of the a priori. The positive definitions of the a priori specify under
what conditions a proposition, p, is known a priori, and under what conditions
one’s entitlement to believe such a proposition is a priori, whereas the negative
characterizations of the a priori specify what needs to be absent from the warrant
of p, for p to be known a priori.
I discuss the negative accounts first, focusing especially on Field’s apriorism, his
fallibilist view on the a priori, and the thesis that we are entitled by default to
apply logical norms; I then dicuss the two ways in which a priori has been positively
characterized: (i) as knowledge gained through rational intuition, e.g. by BonJour
and Bealer, and (ii) as knowledge that is true and justified in virtue of language
alone, e.g. by Boghossian.
Finally, I turn to the debate between the empiricist fallibilism promoted by Bueno
and the aprioristic fallibilism endorsed by Field, arguing that Bueno’s attacks to
Field’s apriorism are not conclusive. Another criticism of the a priori remains to be
discussed, and I tackle it in the last section before the conclusion: Williamson has
recently argued that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is not philo-
sophically meaningful. I respond by examining Williamson’s argument, identifying
the main assumption on which it relies, and rejecting it.
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2.1. Introduction
There are two main reasons why we should care about the apriority of logic. The
most immediate one lies in its interest with respect to the epistemic status of logic
compared to other sciences. We want to know what is peculiar about logical knowl-
edge, its method, and its justification. The other reason why one might want to
address the question of the apriority of logic is more indirect and it has to do with
the kind of normative status that logic imposes on thinking. The relevant question
here is \Does logic provide a priori norms for reasoning?’, and it has been addressed
for instance by Railton (2000), who summarizes his views as
Initially suspicious of the a priori, I have come to see that we need it.
We need it in part because we need to be able to regulate our practices
by normae that fit various purposes and can be used as standards for
our often actual imperfect performance, that do not simply bend to
fit that performance a posteriori, as empirical generalizations must if
they are to be correct. (Railton (2000): 194)
The normative status of logic is the main topic of the remaining chapters, and the
question about what kind of constraints logic imposes on thought will be addressed
at length especially in chapters three and six.
Meanwhile, the aim of this chapter will be to explain what it means for some knowl-
edge to be a priori/a posteriori, and to discuss the main views about the epistemic
status of logic (whether it is a priori or not), with the aim of using this discussion as
background for further considerations about logical norms.
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge can be tracked back to
Kant and his Critique of Pure Reason, where it is claimed that a priori knowledge is
transcendental, i.e. based on the form of all possible experience, whereas a posteriori
knowledge is based on the content of experience. To make the distinction clear, it will
help to specify that, according to Kant, the form of all possible experience denotes
the innate epistemic structures. In other words, the form of the experience is what
makes our experience of any object possible. Therefore, a priori knowledge is a kind
of knowledge that relies exclusively on our epistemic faculties.
The current definition of the a priori has it that a proposition is a priori iff it can be
known (or justified) independently of experience. More precisely, the feature of being
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a priori refers to the warrant that one has in knowing a proposition, p. However,
what \independent of experience’ means in the definition of a priori is much debated.
2.2. The role of a posteriori evidence in the a priori
In defining what a priori knowledge is, it has been often pointed out that two sorts
of experience involved in the process of acquiring or checking knowledge are not
relevant in making that knowledge a posteriori. For example, the experience needed
to acquire the competence to use mathematical concepts, such as the ideas of number,
and so on, is thought to be compatible with mathematical knowledge being a priori.
Similarly, if you check a mathematical or logical proof, that experience is thought
to not affect the a priori status of said proof. The broad issue of what role coun-
terexamples play in the rational status of theories and in the methodology for theory
construction has been addressed in depth notably by Popper (1959) (first published
in 1934 in German), who is famous for having developed a falsificationist approach
to science, also called critical rationalism. Popper’s falsificationism revolves around
the notion of counterexample, claiming that only theories that can be proved false by
counterexamples can be deemed as scientific theories. The obvious reply to Popper
is that the falsifiability principle gets into trouble when it is applied to mathematics,
as even simple mathematical claims cannot be shown to be false. To this criticism,
Popper replies that there is a sense in which mathematical claims can be falsified,
in other words, a sense in which mathematical claims (e.g. numerical claims) can be
applied to real objects (Popper (1946): 48).
2.2.1 Lakatos and the heuristic approach to mathematics
Years later, the problem about the role of counterexamples in mathematics has been
addressed more directly by Lakatos in his Proofs and Refutations, where Lakatos ar-
gued that, similarly to other sciences, mathematical knowledge progresses by a trial-
and-error method, which is instatiated by conjectures, proofs, and counterexamples
to the proofs. Lakatos (1976) (first published in 1963-1964) is organized as a dialogue
between a math teacher and his pupils, where the teacher invites his students to find
a solution to a problem about polyhedra. A debate between the students follows,
where the progress of mathematics is highlighted through the statement of basic
conjectures, attempts to come up with proofs supporting said conjectures, global
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and local counterexamples to the conjectures, and adjustments to the theorems. As
claimed by the character Lambda in the dialogue:
[...] one cannot put proof and refutations into separate compartments.
This is why I would propose to rechristen our \method of lemma-
incorporation’ the \method of proof and refutations ’. Let me state
its main aspects in three heuristic rules:
Rule 1. If you have a conjecture, set out to prove it and to refute
it. Inspect the proof carefully to prepare a list of non-trivial lemmas
(proof-analysis); find counterexamples both to the conjecture (global
counterexamples) and to the suspect lemmas (local counterexamples).
Rule 2. If you have a global counterexample discard your conjecture,
add to your proof-analysis a suitable lemma that will be refuted by the
counterexample, and replace the discarded conjecture by an improved
one that incorporates that lemma as a condition. Do not allow a refu-
tation to be dismissed as a monster. Try to make all \hidden lemmas’
explicit.
Rule 3. If you have a local counterexample, check to see whether it is
not also a global counterexample. If it is, you can easily apply Rule 2.
(Lakatos (1976): 49-50)
Opposing the deductive approach to mathematical knowledge, Lakatos defends a
heuristic approach instead, according to which a posteriori evidence (i.e. the coun-
terexamples) plays a big role in the scientific progress. Whereas, according to the
deductivist, \[m]athematics is presented as an ever-increasing set of eternal, im-
mutable truths’, where \[c]ounterexamples, refutations, criticism cannot possibly en-
ter’ (Lakatos (1976): 142), Lakatos argues that theorems are in fact open to refu-
tation, and that the deductivist approach fits better the role of a presentation style
rather than the role of a truthful account of how mathematical knowledge is gained.
Lakatos rejects the Euclidean idea that all the mathematical theorems descend from
some basic axioms and inferential rules through deduction in a truth-from-truth fash-
ion, never falling into theoretical pitfalls. The deductivist account of mathematics
mentioned in the second appendix to Proofs and Refutations connects the a priori
status of mathematical knowledge with its unrevisability, even at a work-in-progress
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stage. However, the heuristic approach to mathematics doesn’t aim to disprove the
apriority of mathematical knowledge.
As we have seen, Lakatos holds that theorems get the formulation we know after a
trial-and-error process, but it is quite uncontentious that the knowledge so acquired
doesn’t deserve to be called \empirical’. It could be suggested that mathematical
knowledge be characterized as quasi-empirical, as it relies substantially on a pos-
teriori evidence (i.e. the counterexamples), though. In other words, mathematical
knowledge could be still deemed a priori, because it doesn’t rely substantially on em-
pirical evidence, but it is revisable, as Lakatos’ work shows. On the other hand, we
could think that Lakatos’ views have an import on the epistemic status of logic too,
as mathematics and logic share a common use of abstract concepts and categories,
they both seemingly rely on rational processes having little to do with experience,
and they seem to have special connection with one another. Therefore, if we accept
that mathematics is rationally revisable for the reasons highlighted by Lakatos, we
could expect the same line of reasoning to apply to logic in order to argue that logic
can be rationally revised, as well.
The role of a posteriori evidence in Lakatos’ view of mathematics and its application
to logic doesn’t necessarily challenge the apriority of mathematics or logic, as long as
rational revisability is considered inoffensive for apriority. The discussion in Lakatos
(1976) highlights how a priori knowledge is sensitive to a posteriori evidence, but
it remains to be explained in what sense a posteriori evidence is a threat for the
apriority of knowledge.
In the introduction, we have seen that a proposition is considered a priori iff it
can be known or justified independently of experience and, to be clear about what
counts as a priori knowledge, it is crucial that we are clear about what kind of
a posteriori evidence is decisive for knowledge to be classified as empirical. One
of the points made by those who have discussed the a priori is that certain kinds
of experience are not relevant for invalidating the a priori status of mathematical
or logical propositions. Checking a proof requires some amount of experience, i.e.
someone (yourself or someone else) has to go through your proof and check whether
each step of the derivation follows from the others.
Therefore, to some extent, revising a proof involves a posteriori activity, but it might
be replied that here lies a confusion among different senses of a priori and a posteriori.
It is true that checking a proof is a process taking place after the proof has been
laid out (in this sense it is a posteriori) and that checking a proof requires that
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someone has the competence and the experience to draw proofs. However, there
is no straightforward way to show that the process of checking a proof is not itself
a priori, as it is a mental activity that doesn’t rely on empirical evidence in any
significant way. Consequently, it is not straightforward that checking a proof is
enough to turn the proof into an a posteriori piece of knowledge.
2.2.2 Against the a priori. Williamson on empirical evidence
Cases like the proof checking fall under the category of rational revisability, which
is usually held as being compatible with the a priori, and it is contentious whether
rational revisability is really an interesting issue for the debate about the a priori.
A radical empiricist could follow Quine (1951) and reject the Fregean distinction
between matters of meaning and matters of fact: as long as experience plays any role
in the acquisition of knowledge or in the revision of knowledge, it makes that piece of
knowledge empirical. However, to the radical empiricist it could be replied that the
issue is much more nuanced than it seems and that whether a proposition is known
a posteriori depends on the role that experience plays in acquiring the knowledge of
said proposition. The traditional response to empiricism has been summarized by
Williamson (2013), who follows Burge’s1 distinction between an evidential role and
an enabling role of experience in acquiring and using concepts. (Williamson (2013):
292-294)
Williamson explains that experience is regarded as having an evidential role whenever
it plays a direct role in acquiring knowledge. So, for example, to know that water
freezes at 0°C, we need to perceive that the water is turning into ice and we need to
perceive that the temperature has hit 0°C, e.g. by looking at a thermometer.
On the other hand, experience is held to have an enabling role whenever it makes
us able to use correctly a certain word or concept. For instance, to infer from \If
the water has frozen, then the temperature must be lower than 0°C’, and from \The
water has frozen’ that the temperature is 0°C or less, doesn’t require that we read
the temperature on a thermometer. We simply apply an instance of Modus Ponens
to the knowledge we already have, and infer that the temperature must be lower
than 0°C.
1See Burge (1993).
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Therefore, according toWilliamson, to show that a proposition (suppose a mathemat-
ical or logical proposition) is known a priori, it is crucial to show that (i) experience
has a merely enabling role in the acquisition of the knowledge of that proposition,
and that (ii) experience plays no role in revising the knowledge of that proposition.
If the two conditions are met for some propositions, we can claim to have a pri-
ori knowledge, whereas if we are not able to identify any proposition meeting the
conditions, we should reject that there is anything like a priori knowledge.
Before we discuss the empiricist attack to the a priori, we might want to mention that
Williamson criticizes the a priori/a posteriori distinction on non-empiricist grounds,
taking into account not only the experience connected to the senses (outer expe-
rience), but also the experience obtained through introspection or reflection (inner
experience). The consequences of taking inner experience to be on a par with outer
experience will be addressed in more detail the last section. For now, I will take a
traditional stance on experience, holding that it means \sensory experience’.
It is traditionally accepted that (sensory) experience has a purely enabling role in
obtaining a priori knowledge and, if it is to maintain its epistemic status, a piece of a
priori knowledge shouldn’t be revisable on empirical grounds. The topic of empirical
unrevisability has been addressed by Field (2005), who distinguishes two definitions
of the a priori called, respectively, weak and strong a priori, and relates them to the
role that experience plays in knowledge acquisition. Weak and strong a priori will
be the object of section 2.4.
Prior to addressing the two senses of the a priori discussed by Field, let’s have a look
at the empiricist view about logic.
2.3. Empiricism about logic
2.3.1 Putnam on quantum logic
Quine famously argued that in principle all knowledge is empirically revisable, but it
wasn’t until Putnam’s famous paper in 1968 (reprinted in Putnam (1979), to which
I will refer here) that the question of the empirical revisability of logic received much
attention. Putnam’s main question in his \Is logic empirical?’ is: is logic revisable
in light of new empirical data? Putnam anticipates that the answer is \yes’, making
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of logic an empirical science as much as physics is. Putnam’s article includes a
discussion of the contribution of empirical science to the evolution of geometry, and
its analogy with the case of logic.
First, Putnam draws a parallel with non-Euclidean geometry (Putnam (1979): 174-
176), where the example is taken to show that a prima facie a priori science (ge-
ometry) has in fact turned out to be a posteriori regards the case of parallel lines.
Contrary to the classical definitions of parallel lines, the General Theory of Relativity
has shown that two parallel straight lines could well converge in the end and, accord-
ing to Putnam, the idea that two parallel lines can converge challenges the supposed
necessity of “a priori” propositions. In other words, as it is thought to be a necessary
truth that parallel lines remain equidistant, because they have been defined as such,
Putnam argues that the case of parallel lines shows that empirical discoveries can
disconfirm propositions that were thought of as necessarily true (Putnam (1979):
176).
Another important example is provided by quantum mechanics, which has inspired
quantum logic. Specifically, quantum logic doesn’t validate P ∧ (Q ∨ R)↔ (P ∧ Q)
∨ (P ∧ R), nor P ∨ (Q ∧ R)↔ (P ∨ Q) ∧ (P ∨ R) (distributive laws),2 which makes
it not only a non-classical logic, but an empirically grounded revision of classical logic
(Putnam (1979): 184).
In light of the case of parallel lines, Putnam argues, if geometry can be proved to be
empirically grounded, why should we resist the hypothesis that logic can be revised
on empirical grounds as well? Related to the question of the empirical foundations
of logic, there is the question about the factuality of logic: if logic can be revised on
empirical grounds, would that mean that logical laws somehow capture the structure
of reality (or can be expected to do so)? In other words, are logical theories different
in any significant respect from, say, physical theories? Putnam answers that logic
is as empirical as geometry and it is \in a certain sense, a natural science’ (Putnam
(1979): 174).
Another point addressed by Putnam is the issue of conventionalism. Does the change
of logic amount to a mere change in the conventions of language, as conventionalism
seems to imply? The first brief reply to the question is that, if logical laws were
just linguistic stipulations, there wouldn’t be any way to know whether they are fit
for rational inquiry (Putnam (1979): 188). The discoveries of quantum mechanics
2More in detail, in quantum logic the first biconditional fails left to right, and the second bicondi-
tional fails right to left.
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highlight that there is a gap between the implications of the empirical results for
the distributivity laws and classical logic. The problem can be solved either by
presupposing that there are some problems at the methodological or theoretical level
with quantum mechanics, or by concluding that quantum mechanics does disconfirm
the classical laws of distributivity.
As apriorism can be formulated in terms of the view that logical laws are true in
virtue of language alone, we shall analyze the question in more detail. One important
issue raised by inferentialism about logic is the following: we might see the meaning of
the connectives as imposed by the corresponding introduction- and elimination-rules
(or introduction-rules alone). So, for example, the meaning of ∧ would be specified
by P, Q ` P ∧ Q, and P ∧ Q ` P, P ∧ Q ` Q. According to Putnam’s take on the
inferentialist view, a language without a connective that follows the inferential rules
(classically) specified for it, doesn’t contain the concept associated with said connec-
tive at all. To this, Putnam replies sceptically about the philosophical relevance of
inferentialism:
To mean \or’ e.g. a connective must satisfy such principles as: \p
implies p or q ’ and \q implies p or q ’, simply because these formulate
the properties that we count as \the meaning’ of \or’.
Even if this be true, little of interest to the philosophy of logic follows,
however.
[...] it does not follow either that a language which is adequate for the
purpose of formulating true and significant statements about physical
reality must contain a word V which obeys such-and-such patterns of
inference, or that it should contain a word V which obeys such-and-
such patterns of inference. (Putnam (1979): 188-189)
To the change-of-meaning argument, Putnam replies that the introduction- and
elimination-rules for ∧ and ∨ are the same in quantum and in classical logic; there-
fore, even from an inferentialist point of view, there is no change of meaning involved
with respect to the connectives, but only a change in view with regard to the dis-
tributivity laws.
To save classical logic from revision, one might be tempted to dismiss the empirical
evidence with all the sorts of expedients, such as pointing out that there are im-
portant methodological mistakes in quantum mechanics, like undetected variables,
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mistaken reports, gaps in the observations registered, etc. Alternatively, one might
reject quantum physics as a truthful scientific theory and so deny that we should
revise classical logic in light of quantum mechanics because it is plainly wrong. How-
ever, Putnam argues, instead of resisting empirical evidence, it seems more reasonable
just to bite the bullet and admit that classical logic is wrong because it doesn’t reflect
reality.
2.3.2 Replies to Putnam
Unsurprisingly, Putnam’s empiricism about logic has been challenged in many ways.
For example, Dummett, in his paper also called \Is logic empirical?’, asks whether the
empirically grounded logic should really replace classical logic, and answers that log-
ical revision on an empirical basis changes the meanings of the connectives, similarly
to logical revision on non-empirical grounds.
Dummett argues that quantum logic, as presented by Putnam, in fact introduces two
new connectives ∧ and ∨, and the analogy with the straight lines confirms that the
revision boils down to a shift of meaning, contrary to what Putnam tries to prove.
In the example of the straight lines, Dummett argues that Putnam
[...] insist[s] on two points: (i) that there is enough in common between
the uses of \straight line’ in the two contexts for the use of the same
expression not to be a mere equivocation; and (ii) that we have not
merely shifted the label \straight line’ from one set of paths to another.
[...] Point (ii) is to the effect that this is not what happens in the
geometrical case: even if \straight line’ has changed its meaning, we
cannot, having adopted Riemannian geometry, use any expression with
just that meaning which \straight line’ used to have when we adhered
to Euclidean geometry. (Dummett (1976): 284)
In fact, according to Putnam, when a meaning shift is just a re-labelling, we are
still able to express the old meaning, but in the case of geometry, we aren’t. On the
other hand, Dummett argues that the meanings of ∧ and ∨ in quantum logic are
held alongside their classical meanings by Putnam, as Putnam himself cannot help
but use classical logic.
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Dummett summarizes Putnam’s argument roughly as follows: suppose A stands for
the position of a particle at a given time, and that B1, ..., Bn stand for all the possible
momenta the particle has. As we cannot know both the position of a particle and
its momentum, the statement A ∧ B i, for each i among B1, ..., Bn is false. But as
we know that A is true (suppose we measured the particle’s position and we believe
the measurement to be accurate), classical logic would take us to claim that B1 ∨
... ∨ Bn is false, i.e. that the particle has no momentum. However, as we know, the
particle has momentum, i.e. B1 ∨ ... ∨ Bn is true, and in fact also A ∧ (B1 ∨ ... ∨
Bn) is true, but from this we cannot derive (A ∧ B1) ∨ ... ∨ (A ∧ Bn), as we know
that A ∧ B i is false. (Dummett (1976): 271-273)
However, Dummett argues, if Putnam wants to be a realist about quantum mechan-
ics, he is forced to keep the laws of distributivity; conversely, if Putnam wants to
reject bivalence and distributivity, he cannot be a realist about quantum mechanics.
Why? Well, Putnam believes that any particle has both momentum and a position
at any given time, but he claims that we just cannot know them both, otherwise we
would know a logical contradiction. But the contradiction is a contradiction only in
a factual (quantum-mechanical) sense, and
the notion of truth to which Putnam appeals when he defends a re-
alist view of the quantum-mechanical system, and when he says that
there is a true statement about the momentum which, knowing a true
statement about the position, we do not know and cannot know, is a
notion which obeys classical, two-valued principles. (Dummett (1976):
273)
In fact, Dummett argues, Putnam’s argument relies on the fact that if B1 ∨ ...
∨ Bn is true, one of the disjuncts must be true, therefore Putnam relies on the
classical meanings of ∨ and ∧ for his argument to follow and in turn, he relies on the
distributivity laws.
Therefore, the analogy between the case of geometry and the case of logic is under-
mined, and the logical revolution of quantum logic is ultimately a re-labeling of the
meanings of ∧ and ∨. Dummett’s response to Putnam invokes the principle that
any attempt to revise logic is an attempt to change the meanings of the logical con-
stants, ruling out any possible logical revision as a case of semantic disagreement.
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Dummett’s reply to Putnam seems to commit one to the view that logical revision is
more than a disagreement about meanings, which seems a rather hard bite to swal-
low. Therefore, if we take logical revision to be an example of genuine theoretical
disagreement, we should look elsewhere for replies to empiricism.
Another typical response to Putnam’s argument involves the role of empirical method-
ology in gaining experience, and it will be discussed in the next section. For now, it
will suffice to say that the methodological argument roughly goes as follows. It could
be argued that some a priori truths are crucial for collecting data and making sense
of the empirical evidence collected. Therefore, before we are actually called to revise
our a priori methodological principles in the face of new experience, we must bear
in mind that the experience has been acquired through those very principles that it
seems to defeat.
On the other hand, Field argues that being aprioristic about logic doesn’t commit
one to holding that logic is unrevisable come what may (he calls this non-dogmatic
apriorism). We will see in section 2.6 how contemporary empiricism replies to the
methodological objection against empiricism, whereas Field’s apriorism will be the
object of the next section.
2.4. Negative characterizations of the a priori
Before we discuss weak and strong notions of the a priori, it should be made clear that
there are two main characterizations of the a priori. There are positive definitions
of the a priori, i.e. definitions that specify under what conditions a proposition, p,
is known a priori, and under what conditions one’s entitlement to believe such a
proposition is a priori; and negative characterizations of the a priori, i.e. definitions
that specify what needs to be absent from the warrant of p, for p to be known a
priori.
We have already mentioned that the common definition of the a priori states that for
a proposition to be known a priori, it has to be known independently of experience.
\Independently of experience’ characterizes this definition as a negative one, as it
specifies that p is known a priori if and only if experience doesn’t play a role in our
entitlement to know that p.
Starting from the negative definition of the a priori, Field (2005) distinguishes two
senses of the a priori: propositions that one has an priori entitlement to believe in
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a weak sense, and propositions that one has an a priori entitlement to believe in a
strong sense.
Assuming that ’someone knows that p only if p is true, she believes it, and she is
entitled to believe it; the issue of a priority concerns the kind of entitlement that is
in question’. (Field (2005): 70) For a proposition, p, to be a priori in the weak sense,
one needs to have gained entitlement to believe p independently of experience. In
other words, there is no experience that has made one entitled to believe p.
On the other hand, for a proposition, p, to be strongly a priori, p must be unrevisable
on empirical grounds. In other words, no experience counts as defeating the enti-
tlement to believe p, although this doesn’t mean that, to be a priori, a proposition
has to be unrevisable tout court. If p is revised by reason alone, it might well still
be a priori, whereas the kind of revisability which could really cast doubts on the
apriority of a piece of knowledge is empirical.
Field considers the strong sense of the a priori as philosophically more interesting,
and he analyzes two versions of it. According to Field, one can hold that some
knowledge p cannot be revised in two important senses. In the first sense, p couldn’t
possibly be revised under any circumstances, i.e. it is impossible that p can be
revised. In the second sense, there is a remote possibility that p can be revised, but
there is no actual evidence for that possibility.
Field argues that to claim that logic is unrevisable in an epistemic sense, i.e. that
logic cannot possibly be revised on empirical grounds, is far-fetched and difficult to
prove, so a less dogmatic view of the revisability of logic is more plausible. Instead,
there is a remote possiblity that logic can be revised empirically, e.g. in light of
quantum mechanics.
In addition, Field argues that we have a default entitlement to some beliefs, i.e. an
entitlement to regard some propositions as true without having to put them to the
test. In Field’s words:
Probably the best view is that we simply have an attitude of regarding
some beliefs as entitled under some circumstances, others not; and we
regard some of them as entitled in absence of evidence for or against,
even though there might someday be evidence that disconfirms them.
(Field (2005): 75)
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Could it be that we believe logical and mathematical propositions by default?
We might think that any such default entitlements require a source. For example, we
might think that the source of the entitlement could be found in the meanings of the
logically-relevant concepts, but Field considers a different option. The entitlement
to the logical truths could, according to Field, depend on the possibility of genuine
disagreement.
To introduce the point, Field distinguishes the case of disagreement about a method-
ology from the case of the disagreement about mathematics. In the former case one
can value, say, inductive methodologies over counterinductive ones. There is a gen-
uine disagreement about what methodology is the most reasonable one, the most apt
for constructing reliable theories of the world, and so on. In the case of empirical
methodology, we might think that there must be a way to justify the choice of a
methodology over the others, i.e. a source of our entitlement to a methodology.
The case of disagreement in mathematics is very different, Field argues. Mathematics
is the sort of science where a genuine disagreement cannot exist and, in fact, when
two consistent theories seem to rival each other, they are just about different subjects.
The case of logic, Field concludes, is more akin to the case of empirical methodology
than to the case of mathematics. In fact, we seem to need a justification to regard
as correct some basic beliefs about logic. Especially in the case of conflicting logics,
we think that there is something making it the case that a logic is correct and the
other one is wrong.3 Although it is difficult to identify what it is exactly that rival
logics disagree on, Field suggests that rival logics disagree about the rules of rational
belief (as it will be discussed later).
If the matter of the disagreement is really the principles of rational belief, what
would entitle us to use the rules of a certain logic instead of the rules of another
logic? Some think that meaning, inferentially or truth-theoretically intended, is the
source of this entitlement. However, justifying our entitlement through the truth-
theoretic meaning of the logical expressions would be circular. According to Field,
the case is different with inferential semantics, i.e. with a semantics that defines the
connectives by the corresponding inferential rules. As on an inferentialist account of
logic, accepting some basic logical beliefs about inferential rules is strictly connected
to accepting the meaning of the corresponding connectives, this connection provides
a justification for the corresponding principles, Field argues.
3Supposing that we are not pluralist about logic, of course.
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If we disallow circular justification, we are urged to look for a source of entitlement
elsewhere. However, there is no proper source of entitlement for a logic, according
to Field, because we cannot expect logic to be justified through arguments, nor can
we expect it to be justitifed through non-argumentative forms of justification either.
What in fact we have is a default entitlement to our beliefs that a certain logic is
correct, which might nonetheless be called into question at times. For instance, our
entitlement to a logic is called into question when our favourite logic is challenged:
there we need to show why, say, LEM is a valid principle in the face of phenomena
that seem to disconfirm its validity, such as vagueness.
Field’s discussion of the entitlement to basic logical beliefs is reminiscent of Boghos-
sian’s views on the entitlement to use logical rules (which is discussed in the next
section) and the debate about epistemic entitlements, which has been the object
of extensive investigation (see, e.g. Dretske (2000) and Wright (2004) for a thor-
ough discussion on this). Roughly speaking, epistemic entitlement is the kind of
non-inferential and apparently unsupported warrant that one has toward certain
propositional attitudes. The beliefs held through epistemic entitlement can come
from, e.g. perception, memory, introspection. Among the beliefs we are epistemi-
cally entitled to, there are also some propositions we endorse a priori, e.g. logical
truths. This raises the issue of whether a positive characterization of the a priori is
possible. In other words, can we define apriority in terms of its connection to some
rational faculty or to some other philosophically relevant concept?
2.5. Positive characterizations of the a priori
The a priori has been positively characterized mainly in two ways: (i) as knowledge
gained through rational intuition (see Bealer (1998); BonJour (1998)), and (ii) as
knowledge that is true and justified in virtue of language alone.
Intuition in general is described by BonJour (1998) and Bealer (1998) as the conscious
experience such that if you have an intuition that p, it seems to you that p. To
this extent, intuitions are explained as propositional attitudes which are nonetheless
distinct from beliefs and, at the same time, also different from perceptions. Intuitions
are different from perceptions mainly because the seemings involved in intuitions are
intellectual seemings, rather than sensory ones. In turn, philosophically relevant
intuitions need to be distinguished from other sorts of intuitions, as the intuitions
that are relevant to philosophical inquiry are a priori intuitions, which manifest
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themselves as necessary (Bealer (1998)). Similarly, BonJour (1998) describes rational
intuition as a propositional attitude such that if you have the rational intuition that
p, it seems to you that necessarily p.
Unfortunately, the account of rational intuition provided by Bealer and BonJour
faces an immediate problem: if a rational intuition that p is an a priori intuition, i.e.
a seeming that necessarily p, it is not clear how the rational intuition account could
give a definition of the a priori avoiding circularity.
The other positive characterization of the a priori defines it in terms of analyticity,
as Boghossian (2000) does.
Similarly to the principles of mathematics, logical rules are deemed as justified/known
a priori. According to the traditional negative characterization of the a priori, if
knowledge of logic is a priori, it cannot be defeasible nor revisable on empirical
grounds.
Boghossian asks two separate questions about how it is possible that we have logical
knowledge. On one hand, there is the question about what justifies the belief that a
certain inferential rule, say Modus Ponens, is valid. On the other hand, Boghossian
asks what makes us entitled to use a logical rule in our derivations or reasoning. It
is worth pointing out that Boghossian sticks to a specific use of \justification’ and
\entitlment’, where ‘justification’ applies to beliefs, and ‘entitlement’ applies to the
application of rules.
First of all, Boghossian raises the question of how we could justify our beliefs in logical
rules. One can think that the belief that, in Boghossian’s example, MP is valid could
be justified somehow and ask whether the justification could be inferential or not.
If MP cannot be justified inferentially, i.e. resorting to some other sort of rule that
proves that MP is valid, then we need to show that there is some special intuition,
e.g. rational intuition, pointing to the validity of MP. Rational intuition represents
the rock bottom of the justification process, a sort of rational enlightenment, so one
cannot just ask that rational intuition be justified itself by something else. There is
another option, though. One might think that logical rules are justified because one
cannot see any counterexamples to them. However, Boghossian quickly dismisses the
option, arguing that not being able to recall any counterexamples to a rule is just a
way to camouflage an inferential account of the justification of logical rules. Perhaps
it is less than straightforward that looking for counterexamples bears epistemically
on rule inferentialism, but I won’t address this question here.
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The issue of the circular justification of logic is discussed at length by Boghossian
(2000) who, after having rejected the option that the justification of a logical rule can
be non-inferential, discusses the inferential case. The first question coming to mind
is therefore: can the justification of the validity of a logical rule be non-circular?
Clearly not. Suppose you want to justify the validity of a derived rule, such as
Disjunctive Syllogism. In that case, you will start a justification regress to more
primitive rules, such as ∨-E, until you reach the point where you use the very same
primitive rules to justify themselves.
On the proof-theory side, the issue of circular rule justification has been addressed
by the question of justification in inferentialistic terms, as in Read (forthcoming).
Read argues that Introduction-rules determine the meaning of the corresponding
connectives and are therefore self-justified, whereas the Elimination-rules are justi-
fied in virtue of the corresponding I-rules and of the principle of General Harmony,
which prevents the connectives from falling into tonk -like problems.4 So, to take up
Boghossian’s example about MP, according to Read (forthcoming), MP being → E,
it is justified by Conditional Proof, i.e. → I, which is self-justifying.
As circular justification is traditionally not welcome, Boghossian in his paper asks
what is so bad about it. Is it really unadmissible that logic or mathematics are based
upon some sort of circular justiifcation? Most of the effort in Boghossian’s paper
is devoted to defeat the prejudice against circular justification and to prove that
in certain contexts, namely, logic, circular justification is the best we can get. To
Boghossian, giving up rule-circular justification would make any a priori justification
of logical rules impossible and it would pave the way to skepticism. Therefore,
Boghossian concludes that we should ultimately bite the bullet and accept that the
foundations of our logical knowledge rely on self-justification.
The empirical justification of logic would still be an option, but Boghossian argues
that there are no clear reasons to prefer an empirical justification over an a priori
justification of the inferential rules. In fact, Boghossian argues, suppose we are in
search of an empirical justification of logical rules, and suppose that we want to
compare how different theories of the world and the logics underlying them fare in
the face of empirical evidence. Boghossian observes that we would need a meta-logic
to compare the logics underlying the theories, pushing the circular justification from
the object-level to the meta-level. Therefore, Boghossian concludes, if rule-circular
4I direct the reader to the first chapter for further discussion of Proof-theory and of the Principle
of Harmony.
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justification is a problem, opting for empiricism doesn’t help with it and, as we
cannot do without a justification for logical rules, circular justification is better than
none.
On this account, logic is a priori in a weak sense, as experience doesn’t play a role in
the acquisition of logical knowledge or, to put it in Williamson’s terms, experience
has a merely enabling role. However, whether Boghossian would endorse a strong
view on the apriority of logic or not remains an open question. That the rules of
logic are only justifiable in a circular fashion certainly means that experience is not
involved in any substantive way in the justification of a rule R, but it doesn’t show
that logical rules cannot be defeated on empirical grounds. A rule R could ultimately
rely on itself for its own justification, but it is still conceivable that we revise our
belief about R on the basis of the discoveries of, say, quantum mechanics. Therefore,
R wouldn’t be a priori in a strong sense, but it would be more akin to a default-
entitled rule à la Field, in the sense that we assume that we are entitled to know
and use R, but it is conceivable that R be defeated on the basis of some relevant
experience.
In the previous two sections, we have examined some among the most important
views on the a priori, dividing them into two main groups: those providing a negative
definition and those providing a positive definition of the a priori. We have seen that
in both cases, there are convincing reasons to think that the only justification that
we can obtain of a priori rules, such as the inferential rules, is circular, so we need to
assume that we are entitled to use those rules in our reasoning at least most of the
time. On the other hand, being entitled by default to apply the rules doesn’t rule
out that the rules are (virtually, at least) fallible and revisable.
In the next section, fallibilism about the a priori will be addressed through Bueno’s
criticism of Field’s aprioristic fallibilism.
2.6. Contemporary empiricism
Against Field, Bueno argues that Field’s fallibilism is ultimately incompatible with
apriorism about logic.
Bueno, in opposition to Field’s fallibilist apriorism, presents a view dubbed fallibilist
empiricism. Fallibilist empiricism displays no substantial difference with what we
could call apriorism in a weak sense, following Field’s definitions of the a priori.
As we have seen, that some knowledge is a priori in a weak sense means that one
is entitled to that knowledge independently of experience. I call the corresponding
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view about logic apriorism in a weak sense. Similarly, fallibilist empiricism holds that
\although the legitimacy of logical rules does not depend upon empirical evidence,
logic is empirically defeasible’ (Bueno (2010): 108).
Bueno argues that there is no clear reason for preferring fallibilist apriorism over fal-
libilist empiricism. He addresses three arguments presented by Field in his defense of
apriorism and counters each of them, trying to show that the implausibility of Field’s
arguments makes the fallibilist view incompatible with apriorism. The arguments
in favour of the apriority of logic presented by Field revolve around, respectively,
(i) the argument that empirical evidence is ultimately irrelevant to logical revision;
(ii) the argument that logic must be a priori if it is non context-dependent; (iii) the
argument that logic and geometry cannot be treated as if they were parallel cases of
empirically revisable subjects. The third argument is specifically against the famous
argument in Putnam (1979) that we have already discussed, and we will address it
last.
I will start following the order of the arguments and their responses in Bueno’s paper.
In Field (1998): 3, Field addresses the question \What does it mean to revise a logic
on empirical grounds?’ or, more specifically, \What does it mean to revise logical
principles on empirical grounds?’. A first shot could be that revising a logic empir-
ically is what happens when we discover that Santa doesn’t exist and consequently
decide to revise our logic to include non-referring terms. However, Field replies, this
is not a genuine case of revision on empirical grounds, as the discovery made through
empirical evidence that there are non-referring terms \is simply serving to bring our
attention to a conceptual possibility that we should have already recognized.’ (Field
(1998): 3) Field dismisses the example as uninteresting, because empirical evidence
has a marginal role in demonstrating that we need to accommodate non-referring
terms into our logic. Therefore, we need some sort of discrimination between cases
like the example of the non-referring terms and cases like quantum logic, where
empirical evidence is appealed to more seriously.
To this argument, Bueno replies as follows: if the empirical evidence that Santa
doesn’t exist is dispensable for the revision of logic because it just points out some
conceptual possibility we have failed to recognize, the same should apply to quantum
mechanics. The evidence from physics experiments against the distributivity laws
could be seen as irrelevant, as it points out to some conceptual possibility we should
have already recognized. However, Bueno argues, this is plainly implausible, and the
argument against the relevance of empirical evidence to logical revision can be pushed
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further. Suppose we, like Field, claim that an empirical phenomenon brings to our
attention a possibility that we should have recognized independently of experience.
Then, Bueno argues, we would also be committed to the claim that we can derive all
the scientific discoveries a priori. Therefore, Field’s argument ends up proving that
scientific theories are empirically indefeasible too. On the contrary, Bueno argues
that the revisions to our theories flowing out of the scientific discoveries are not
conceptual at all. Indeed, the revisions are empirical as much as the phenomena
that motivated them.
However, Bueno’s reply to Field’s first argument seems to be very much in the spirit
of Putnam (1979) and, as it aims to undermine the apriorist’s argument on the basis
of radical empiricist assumptions, it is very theory-laden.
The second argument Field outlines to show that logic is a priori is centered on
the universality of logic: we need logic as a methodology for empirical research.
Therefore, logic cannot be context-dependent and it must be a priori. In brief, the
argument to the universality of logic goes as follows: empirical methodology needs an
underlying logic which enables us to collect and make sense of the empirical evidence,
so there must be some correct logic that meets our epistemic and methodological
needs.
Bueno responds that there is no clear reason why logic should be deeemed as a priori
in virtue of being what underlies empirical theories. There might be a manifold of
good logics, each adequate to a certain context or domain.
For example, classical logic might be adequate in certain contexts but not in others,
where it would be appropriate to use intuitionistic or quantum logic instead. In
certain contexts it might be appropriate to apply logics that are clearly empirically
revisable, such as quantum logic, whereas in other domains it may be better to apply
logics that are not considered empirically revisable by many, such as classical logic.
Bueno argues that the logical landscape emerging from this pluralism of applications
and domain-dependency doesn’t force the conclusion that classical logic has a status
different from the status of other logics in virtue of not being (allegedly) empirically
revisable. The logic underlying the methodology can change as much as the theory
can.
However, the empiricist is not committed to the view that each of the logics which are
part of the plurality is empirically defeasible. Some of them might not be empirically
revisable but only rationally revisable, and this wouldn’t undermine the empiricist
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stance anyway, because empiricism about logic holds that some logics are revisable
on empirical grounds, not that all of them are.
Bueno’s reply to the universality argument seems to address the question \Should we
apply classical logic to all the domains?’, rather than the question \Should we use one
logic for our inquiry methods in all domains?’. Suppose we are interested in the study
of certain nanoparticles that sometimes display a certain property, F, and suppose
that, upon accurate investigation, we find out that some of the nanoparticles have F,
some don’t, and for the remaining nanoparticles it is uncertain whether or not they
have F. Therefore, we conclude that, given the state of our technology and research,
a logic including LEM among its laws can’t be used to describe the behaviour of the
nanoparticles adequately.
However, when we consider our study of the nanoparticles and we plan the experi-
ments we are going to conduce to investigate the properties of the nanoparticles, we
assume that either the nanoparticles have the properties F, G, H, ..., or they lack
them. In other words, we do apply LEM in our investigation method, tacitly giving
ourself a default entitlement to apply LEM to collect the experimental data. The
logic underlying our methodology could nonetheless be open to revision, although
revising our methodology might take much longer than revising the logic we apply
to a certain domain.
Finally, about the third argument, Field tries to show that the parallel between
logic and geometry doesn’t hold. The fundamental difference between logic and
geometry, according to Field, is that whereas logic underlies our empirical theories,
geometry doesn’t. Therefore logic, unlike geometry, has a central role with regard to
our knowledge. For this reason, it makes sense to argue that geometry is empirically
revisable, but it is unadmissible that logic is genuinely revisable on empirical grounds.
However, Field leaves open the possibility that logic could be empirically revisable
in an epistemic sense, i.e. that it is conceivable that logic be revised on empirical
grounds but that there is no actual evidence that might suggest a logical revision.
Bueno replies that Field’s third argument overlooks a distinction common to geom-
etry and logic, i.e. the distinction between pure logic/pure geometry and applied
logic/applied geometry. Pure logic is the abstract study of consequence relations
in general and it can be applied to derive consequences about objects in particular
contexts, which is where applied logic arises. It is at the level of applied logic that
we might want to revise the logical principles, Bueno argues, as we could recognize
that the empirical evidence calls for a revision of the general principles.
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In the reply to the third argument, the clash between two opposite assumptions
(the apriorist’s and the empiricist’s) shows up again, making it seem as if Bueno
and Field are talking past each other. However, it is doubtful that Bueno really
proves that empirical fallibilism is to be preferred over aprioristic fallibilism, partly
because the two fallibilistic views are similar in many respects, and partly because
Bueno’s second reply seems to rely on a change of subject. For these reasons, the
contemporary empiricism represented by Bueno doesn’t seem to be a big threat for
apriorism. In the next section, a more pernicious view is discussed, that tries to
dissolve the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge.
2.7. Rejection of the a priori/a posteriori distinction
The difference between contemporary empiricism, as presented by Bueno, and the
fallibilist apriorism held by Field is very thin, indeed almost unrecognizable. So, it
makes sense to ask whether the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is really
philosophically significant. Similar worries have been raised by Williamson (2013),
who denies that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is really central
to the philosophical discussion. As we have seen in the first section, Williamson
claims that traditional discussion on the a priori has tacitly assumed that there is a
substantial difference between an evidential role of experience and an enabling role
of experience.
Nonetheless, Williamson argues that the distinction between the two roles of experi-
ence is much more blurred than tradition has taken it to be, as there are no clear-cut
cases in which experience plays a merely enabling role in the acquisition of concepts.
Therefore, Williamson concludes, the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is
not substantial.
To support his views, Williamson suggests that we take two cases that seem clear
cases of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, respectively, namely the sentence \All
crimson things are red’ and \All recent volumes of Who’s Who are red’. But now
suppose that someone, a boy called Norman in Williamson’s example, learns the
meanings of \red’ and \crimson’ by ostension and doesn’t know that they are corre-
lated. When asked whether \All crimson things are red’, Norman imagines a sample
of crimson and a sample of red, and assents to the statement. Norman is then asked
whether \All recent volumes of Who’s Who are red’ and having seen the volumes,
having acquired competence with the words \volume’ and \recent’, after reflecting
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for a moment, Norman assents to the statement about the recent volumes of Who’s
Who.
Williamson argues that the mental activity underlying Norman’s two responses to
the statements are essentially the same, as in both cases Norman imagines samples
of the objects included in the sentences. Therefore, Williamson asks, if the cognitive
processes involved in acquiring a clear case of a priori knowledge and a clear case of
a posteriori knowledge are the same, how can the distinction between a priori and a
posteriori be really meaningful? (Williamson (2013): 296)
Another point undermining the a priori/a posteriori distinction lies in how we define
experience. In the second section, we had seen that Williamson puts inner experience
on a par with outer experience. Williamson argues that including inner experience
into the use of \experience’ has some worrying consequences for the supporter of
the a priori/a posteriori distinction. On one hand, one might worry that the inner
experience needed to perform some mathematical calculation in one’s head could
turn out to have an evidential role, making the mathematical calculation a piece of
a posteriori knowledge. But more importantly, the outer experience could turn out
to play an enabling role in empirical science. As Williamson puts it,
[...] part of the evidence that a massive comet or asteroid collided
with the Earth about 250 million years ago is said to be that certain
sediment samples from China and Japan contain certain clusters of
carbon atoms. That those samples contained those clusters of atoms
is a nonpsychological fact. Of course, in some sense scientists’ outer
experience played a role in their access to the fact. But, by analogy
with the logical and mathematical cases, the relevant evidence is not
the psychological process of undergoing those outer experiences, but
rather the non-psychological physical facts to which that process en-
ables us to have access. The role of the outer experience is purely
enabling, not evidential. If so, what would usually be regarded as par-
adigm cases of a posteriori knowledge risk reclassification as a priori.
(Williamson (2013): 294)
The issue raised by Williamson is a serious one, and it shouldn’t be taken too lightly.
The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge relies on the definition
of \experience’ we give, but Williamson asks why inner experience should not count
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as experience in the relevant sense. On the other hand, if we did, the distinction
between what is known a priori and what is known a posteriori would become more
confused than it traditionally has been taken to be.
More importantly, Williamson’s argument aims to show that even clear-cut cases
of a priori and a posteriori knowledge have the same underlying mental process,
legitimating the question \If it is not the epistemic process underlying the two sorts
of knowledge that makes the difference between a priori and a posteriori, what does
the job?’. This is perhaps the main threat to the a priori. Nonetheless, Williamson
suggests that philosophy can dispense from the traditional epistemological distinction
without much damage.
Williamson’s argument relies heavily on the radical assumption that inner experience
should be treated on a par with sensory experience. Without assuming that intro-
spection, reflection, memory, etc. must be treated as empirical sources of evidence on
a par with perception, Norman’s knowledge of the two propositions would turn out
to be of very different kinds. In fact, to know that \All the recent volumes of Who’s
Who are red’ Norman presumably relies on memory, imagination and the perceptual
experience he had when he saw the volumes in question, where the visual experience
plays an evidential role in Norman’s assent to the proposition.
On the other hand, to know that \All crimson things are red’, Norman relies on
memory, imagination and his rational abilities to grasp the concept \red’ and \crim-
son’. The visual experience Norman had when he first saw a sample of red and a
sample of crimson enabled him to form the concepts \red’ and \crimson’, but Norman
understands that \All crimson things are red’ is necessarily true in virtue of those
concepts, rather than in virtue of the original visual experience.
Therefore, it is hard to prove that there is no significant distinction between a priori
and a posteriori knowledge unless we make the rather bold assumption that inner
experience counts in the same way as sensory experience, epistemically speaking.
Mathematics and logic might not be seriously affected by a change in their epistemo-
logical status, as Bueno argument purports to show, and sometimes aprioristic and
empirical views might be divided by a line so thin that makes the debate look almost
flimsy, but we must concede that whenever we engage in reasoning, we assume that
we have reason to apply certain inferential principles, which might well be a priori
and open to empirically grounded revision, even if in remote circumstances. For
these reasons, it seems plausible that logical norms be recognized as rules that we
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are entitled to apply by default, as suggested by Field (2005). In the last chapter, I
will give more reasons in support of the default-entitlement view.
2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have addressed the question \Is logic a priori?’, which is relevant
to the question \Is logic a source of a priori norms?’, and we have surveyed the main
views on the epistemic status of logic. First, we have considered the definition of a
priori knowledge, and observed that it raises a number of questions; in particular,
defining a priori knowledge as knowledge that is gained independently of experience
pushes us to distinguish two roles that experience plays in acquiring knowledge,
namely enabling and evidential.
Traditionally, apriorists have argued that whenever experience has a merely enabling
role in producing some kind of knowledge, said knowledge is considered as a priori.
On the contrary, experience plays an evidential role in the acquisition of a posteriori
knowledge, as in the natural sciences.
On the other hand, the empiricist often denies that there is a distinction between
the enabling and evidential roles of experience. However, an empiricist view more
relevant to our discussion is the modern empiricism of Putnam, who has argued that
since logic is open to revision on empirical grounds, it cannot be called a priori.
As we have seen, Putnam argues that the finding of quantum mechanics have a
direct impact on logic, showing that the distributive laws don’t hold in the realm
of quantum physics. Therefore, Putnam argues, as empirical discoveries shape our
theory of the world, and as logic is aimed at truth as much as the other sciences, if
an empirical finding provides evidence against a law of classical logic, that evidence
provides grounds for rejecting the law in question on a logical-theoretical level.
Many have replied to Putnam’s attack to the apriority of logic, with Dummett re-
sponding that the attempt to revise logic relies on a meaning change, and with Field
arguing that a priori truths are essential in the methodology of research, as we col-
lect empirical data and make sense of them relying on inference rules. Therefore, to
revise a priori truths, such as logical rules, on empirical grounds we rely on empirical
evidence that has been collected and interpreted on the basis of those very a priori
truths.
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We have also addressed Field’s negative account of a priori. We are familiar with
the traditional definition of a priori knowledge as knowledge gained independently
of experience, which is a negative characterization of the a priori. Field takes the
discussion a step further, clarifying the sense in which a priori knowledge should be
independent of experience. As we have seen in section 2.4, Field distinguishes two
senses of the a priori, i.e. weak and strong.
In a weak sense, a proposition is known a priori whenever the knowledge of p is gained
independently of experience, as in the traditional definition. On the other hand, a
proposition is strongly a priori whenever it is unrevisable on empirical grounds.
In turn, Field distinguishes two “strictness” levels of the empirical unrevisability:
either it could be impossible to empirically revise a proposition tout court, or it
could be remotely possible to revise a proposition on empirical grounds, even though
we currently don’t have any actual evidence for that possibility. Field argues that
proving that logical laws are unrevisable in the first sense (impossible to revise) is
too difficult, and that is a reason why we should be more open to a non-dogmatic
apriorism, i.e. an apriorism that doesn’t rule out empirical revision across the board.
The debate on the epistemic status of logic has included also the issues of the jus-
tification of our beliefs in the logical laws and our entitlement to use them. Some,
such as Field, have argued that our entitlement to apply logical rules has no proper
source; in fact, we have what could be called a default entitlement to use the laws of
logic for our reasoning purposes. A similar view of the entitlement to logic has been
endorsed by Boghossian, who argues that we need to accept circular justification as
the only justification logical truths can have; therefore, Boghossian argues, we have
a sort of justification for our beliefs in logical truths by default.
To these modern aprioristic views on logic, Bueno opposes his fallibilist modern
empiricism. Bueno’s account is very similar in spirit to Field’s account of logic as
(remotely) open to empirical revision, except that Bueno argues that although logical
truths are not empirically justified, they are empirically revisable. However, we have
seen that Bueno doesn’t provide conclusive arguments against Field’s position, failing
to prove fallibilist empiricism.
We addressed another threat to logical apriorism in the last section, where we have
discussed Williamson’s (2013) argument against the a priori/a posteriori distinction.
There, Williamson argues that a priori and a posteriori are not significant philo-
sophical categories, as they are much more blurred than the philosophical tradition
has taken them to be. However, we have seen that Williamson’s argument relies on
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a very substantial assumption, i.e. that inner experience (related to mental states,
such as reflecting, remembering, etc.) should be treated on a par with sensory ex-
perience. Without this assumption, Williamson is unable to establish that there is
not a significant difference between a priori and a posteriori knowledge and, as the
assumption is quite controversial, I think it shouldn’t be taken too lightly.
In conclusion, we have seen that there is no serious threat to the apriority of logic,
at least not from the modern empiricist views we have discussed nor from the views
that try to dissolve the a priori/a posteriori distinction. In light of this, I have argued
that a fallibilist apriorism, which takes logical rules to be justified by default, is the
most plausible option.
CHAPTER 3
Current accounts of normativity
Abstract. In this chapter, I want to address current theories of the normativity
of logic. First I will talk about how the scope of logic is taken to be constrained by
necessity and formality, the characterization of which is far from being uncontro-
versial. MacFarlane addresses the issue of the formality of logic in his (unpublished,
but available on his webpage) doctoral dissertation and the issue of the normativity
of logic in a more recent paper, outlining an account of logic which stresses the
importance of subjective acknowledgment of the inferential patterns in evaluating
reasoning. I motivate the investigation of the normativity of logic by addressing
a paper by Elqayam and Evans that discusses the normative approach taken by
the psychological study of deductive reasoning to highlight how much of said study
is jeopardised by implicit applications of is-ought inferences. I show how E&E’s
argument relies on a controversial claim that cannot be accepted in light of a close
analysis. Then, I discuss the bridge principles introduced in MacFarlane (2004) and
agree with MacFarlane that some of them (dubbed Wr+, Wr-, and Wo-) describe
prima facie plausible ways to frame the constraints imposed by logic on informal
reasoning. Then, I analyze the deontic operators used in the bridge principles,
distinguish five senses of ought and make a hypothesis about the sense in which
ought is employed in Wo-. Then, I suggest that one of the operators included in
the bridge principles (i.e. has reason to) can be made sense of through the minimal
deontic logic developed in Chellas (1974, 1980).
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce the topic of the normativity of logic highlighting the
connection between formality and normativity, then I make some hypotheses about
the deontic operators in the normative principles.
In drawing the borders of logic, philosophers have to take into account many (com-
peting) factors; they try to sail safely between the philosophical quest for formal
rigour and the commonsensical quest for an intuitively appealing characterization of
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logic. The demand for an intuitively plausible explanation of mathematical struc-
tures is widespread in logic. Kripke’s construction and ternary relations in relevant
logic are examples of mathematical frames which have received philosophical and
“intuition-friendly” interpretations, without which they would have remained signif-
icantly obscure to many philosophers.
As can be immediately noticed as soon as one looks at an encyclopedia entry or
at a basic philosophy of logic textbook, the main characteristics of logic which are
mentioned most often are truth preservation of inferences, necessity and formality.
Leaving aside truth preservation, the interplay between necessity and formality allows
at least five combinations, i.e.
1. Necessity constrains validity.
2. Formality constrains validity.
3. Formality and necessity have the same power of constraining validity.
4. Necessity is “reduced” to formality.
5. Formality is “reduced” to necessity.
Of the five combinations above, at least three have been discussed in the literature.
The first option on the list corresponds to what Etchemendy calls representational
semantics1, where a proposition is valid iff it is true across all the possible worlds.
This in turn amounts to constraining logical validity by necessity (truth across all
possible worlds).
The fourth combination corresponds to Tarski’s take on logical validity.2 In fact, to
characterize validity in mathematical terms, Tarski first established that the non-
logical constants of the sentences be replaced by variables to obtain sentential func-
tions (in Tarski’s words) or forms. Then, he defined the notion of a model of a
class of sentences K as an arbitrary sequence of objects which satisfies each senten-
tial function of the class K, or (as modern logicians would put it) an interpretation
which makes each sentence of K true. Finally, he defined validity employing the
notion of model. In Tarski’s words,
We say that the sentence X follows logically from the sentences of the
class K if and only if every model of the class K is at the same time
a model of the sentence X. (Tarski (2002): 186)
1Presented in Etchemendy (1990).
2At least according to Etchemendy’s construal of Tarski on logical validity.
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Therefore, by defining validity in terms of substitution, Tarski set up a definition of
validity in which necessity is reduced to formality. We will see how this category has
a correlate in one of the senses of formality distinguished by MacFarlane (2000).
But how about the second combination? Saying that formality constrains validity
sounds very close to defining validity in terms of formality (although it isn’t neces-
sarily so, as we might want to take into account non-definitional characterizations
of validity as well). Broadly speaking, Tarski’s project is included in the wider en-
terprise of explaining validity in terms of formality, for the reasons I have mentioned
above. However, as we will see, MacFarlane tries to rehabilitate Tarski’s account
of validity, which Etchemendy had shown to be fundamentally flawed by pointing
out that interpretational semantics doesn’t guarantee that validity is equivalent to
necessary truth preservation.
3.2. MacFarlane on formality
In this section, I introduce MacFarlane’s classification of formality types. Because
MacFarlane argues that one of the formality types is connected to logical normativ-
ity, his discussion of formality can be seen as preparatory to his discussion of the
normativity of logic, which is the focus of this chapter.
In his doctoral dissertation, MacFarlane distinguishes three types of formality and
motivates the distinction by citing the historical development of the characterization
of logical validity over the past four centuries.
To say that logic is 1-formal is to say that its norms are constitutive of
concept use as such (as opposed to a particular kind of concept use).
[...]
To say that logic is 2-formal is to say that its characteristic notions and
laws are indifferent to the particular identities of different objects. [...]
Mathematically, 2-formality can be spelled out as invariance under all
permutations of the domain of objects.
To say that logic is 3-formal is to say that it abstracts entirely from
the semantic content or “matter” of concepts [...]. (MacFarlane (2000):
51)
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These three types of formality are independent from each other, although they can
come together in certain philosophical theories. MacFarlane explains that, histor-
ically, 1- and 3- formality had been discussed long before 2-formality entered the
scene. In particular, both 1- and 3-formality were already recognizable in Kant’s
distinction between laws of formal logic and laws of the special sciences. However,
whereas philosophers after Kant continued to focus on 1-formality, 3-formality has
been brought back to the philosophical arena only over the last century, when some
members of the Vienna Circle started discussing logic in terms of semantic-content
neutrality.
Regarding 1-formality, MacFarlane claims that it is essentially normative for thought
in general, and that 1-formality norms are categorical. To make this point clear, it
is worth mentioning a distinction which MacFarlane adopts from Kant. That these
norms are categorical means that they are universally applicable, i.e. their application
is not limited to a certain kind of concept (e.g. moral concepts) or situation. The
type of norms applicable to specific kinds of concepts are called hypothetical, because
they are of the form \If condition X holds, then do Y ’. As categorical norms are
universally applicable, they are constitutive of thought, although this doesn’t imply
that the possibility of error is ruled out by these norms being constitutive of thought.
These norms are not absolutely compelling in the sense that reasoners are forced to
think according to them no matter what, but just in the sense that reasoners must be
held responsible to the laws of logic for the assessment of their thought, MacFarlane
explains.
On the other hand, 2-formality is cashed out as permutation invariance, a con-
straint which has become common in the logical literature especially after Tarski.3
2-formality avoids any reference to the norms of thought and to domain-neutrality,
but represents the generality of logic as indifference to the objects’ identity. Tarski’s
so-called interpretational semantics is clearly an example of 2-formality: Tarski de-
fines logical validity as truth in every model, where the variation across models is
taken to be a reinterpretation of the non-logical constants. In other words, logi-
cal validity and logical consequence are accounted for by Tarski in terms of truth
independent from the particular identity of objects, or permutation invariance.
3However, MacFarlane points out that the core idea of 2-formality dates back to the nineteenth
century, when Felix Klein employed the notion of invariance under a group of transformations to
define different geometries. 2-formality was subsequently extended to logic (MacFarlane (2000):
57). The kernel of 2-formality presumably dates back to Bolzano as well, as Tarski admitted that
his work was to be seen as continuous with Bolzano’s.
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What MacFarlane means by 3-formality is not as easy to grasp. 3-formality is sup-
posed to be an absolute abstraction from semantic content, even when the content
is extremely general. Whereas 2-formality abstracts from specific semantic content
(i.e. the identity of objects) and maintains general semantic content (i.e. logical
constants) nonetheless, 3-formality abstracts from semantic content tout court. Ac-
cording to MacFarlane, an example of the third type of formality can be found in
Kant’s discussion of the modes of judgment in the First Critique, where he consid-
ers only their form and abstracts completely from any semantic content that these
judgments may have.4
Prima facie, a concept of formality (and of logicality) which abstracts from logical
constants can strike one as immediately suspicious. Upon slightly more careful reflec-
tion, the advantages that such notion of formality can bring start to crop up: first of
all, 3-formality escapes the modern logician’s worries about determining what logical
constants are. Characterizing logicality as 3-formality also seems to imply that logic
doesn’t provide any truth. In fact, whereas 2-formal logic still delivers very general
truths (being concerned with general semantic content, i.e. with logical constants),
3-formal logic is supposed to abstract even from logical constants and it isn’t clear
how this can provide truths at all. But my concern is about the status of 3-formal
logic: it seems to deliver a taxonomy of judgments, but it is hard to picture a (3-
formal) logic which is just a taxonomy. Therefore, I imagine that 3-formal logic
is also meant to be a principled way to connect judgments of a certain type with
judgments of other types, as it may be the case in, say, Aristotelian syllogistics.
I find 1-formality the most interesting among the three types of formality distin-
guished by MacFarlane, partly because there is no clear way to connect 2-formality
to our thought in a normative fashion, it being defined in terms of mathematical
frameworks. On the other hand, 3-formality looks like a slightly cumbersome no-
tion: 3-formal logic is supposed to define the conceptual (or linguistic) framework
for stating facts and, as such, it seems to have a normative role, but if so, it isn’t
clear whether its normative role relates to 1) how our judgments or sentences should
4To refresh the reader’s memory about the modes of judgment in Kant’s First Critique, here is the
Table of Judgments presented in Kant’s main work.
Quantity Quality Relation Modality
Universal Affirmative Categorical Problematic
Particular Negative Hypothetical Assertoric
Singular Infinite Disjunctive Apodictic
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be formed in order to be meaningful, 2) how they should be connected to each other
to preserve truth (or validity), as in syllogistics, or 3) both.
Leaving the worries about 3-formality aside, in the rest of the chapter I will focus on
MacFarlane (2004), where it is argued that formality is the source of the normativity
of logic, and where the connection between formality and logic’s constraining power
on beliefs is cashed out in terms of bridge principles. Before turning to discuss the
general framework to make sense of the normativity of logic, I want to motivate why
we should embark on such an enterprise in general. To do so, I will argue against
a particular anti-normativist stance in the study of human reasoning and will show
that it relies on an assumption that is very hard to justify.
3.3. Pro normativism
Normativism with respect to the study of human thinking is the view that reasoning
conforms to some extent to a normative system on the basis of which it should be
assessed. On the other side, we have descriptivism with respect to the study of
human thinking, i.e. the view that the study of reasoning should consist of the
analysis of the way it actually works. It is worth pointing out that these paradigms
on reasoning refer especially to the study of higher mental processing, i.e. decision
making, judgment and, in a word, what we intuitively mean when we think about
\reasoning’. In fact, the literature on mental processes distinguishes between two
main types of processes (this is called the dual-process framework), one of which is
fast and undemanding and can be approximately referred to as heuristics, and the
other is slow and demanding and corresponds to our analytic abilites, mathematical
reasoning, deliberation and speculation.
Under the broad category of normativism, a corner is occupied by what Elqayam and
Evans (2011) call logicism. Logicism understood this way is completely different from
Russell and Frege’s logicism about the status of mathematics. In fact, logicism with
respect to human thinking is a version of normativism that takes some mental version
of classical logic to be the normative system to which reasoning should conform and
against which it should be evaluated. To keep things simple, let’s say that any mental
logic (not necessarily classical logic) will do.
I will now focus on Elqayam and Evans (2011), who argue that normativism is both
harmful to and unnecessary for the study of reasoning. As a preface to the discussion
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of their article, I want to point out that I don’t think that descriptivism and nor-
mativism with respect to the study of human thinking has to be seen necessarily as
contrasting views. On the contrary, I think that they are wholly compatible, as they
can be understood as two distinct phases of the work of the psychologist interested
in the study of reasoning.
Their argument is developed around three main issues, dubbed the arbitrariness
problem, the is-ought inference problem, and the research biases problem.
The first problem on the list addresses the situation in which the analysis of human
thinking faces conflicting norms. The structure of the argument is the following: if
we are to be normativist with respect to human thinking, then presumably there
must be some norm that draws the line between right (or good) and wrong (or bad)
reasoning. Moreover, if classical logic is the normative system human reasoning
is judged against, it looks like conformity to logical laws is the norm reasoning
should be assessed against. Elqayam and Evans (2011) add that, for a normativist
theory to be coherent, the norm should be unique. However, when we try to make
sense of the experimental results in the psychology of reasoning, it is hard to find
a norm that justifies the paradigm in a coherent way. On the other hand, having
more than one norm results in two problems, i.e. 1) having a conflict between
norms complicates the assessment of the mental process, and 2) if the conflict is not
exclusively between different norms but also between different normative systems, it
results in the dilemma of how to decide which of the competing normative systems is
the most appropriate to the context and therefore ought to be chosen. I will tackle
the problem raised from the first point of Elqayam & Evans’s argument in the later
chapters of my thesis, so I postpone the discussion on it to then.
The second main point against normativism in Elqayam and Evans (2011) is meant
to show that the study of human thinking in a normativist fashion is spoiled by
a repeated application of the controversial is-ought inference. The illegitimate ap-
plication of the is-ought inference springs from a fundamental misunderstanding of
the theoretical fruitfulness of the competence theories (which the authors take to be
descriptive theories): normative theories have relied on competence theories as evi-
dential support, Elqayam & Evans argue. As it happens in linguistics, in the study
of human reasoning the competence/performance level and the normative level have
to be neatly distinguished, Elqayam & Evans continue. However, normativism has
fallen short of doing so. In analyzing human reasoning, the descriptive role of the
competence theories has been largely overlooked. In addition, Elqayam & Evans
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argue, normative systems, such as, say, classical logic, are pretty arbitrarily chosen
to fill that role. Whatever the common habit of the normativist psychologists has
been so far, I think that this analysis is flawed in many respects. In my opinion, the
main problem with the argument is that it is contentious that the competence level
of the analysis can really be treated as descriptive instead of as normative. Elqayam
& Evans argue in favour of their thesis by using an example drawn from linguistics.
In linguistics, there is a formal grammar, which fills the role of the normative sys-
tem, and there is a theory that describes the language rules actually used by the
speakers in everyday usage (the competence theory). Appealing to the definition of
the competence theory as providing a collection of rules, the authors argue that the
competence theory has a purely descriptive value.
Descriptive and normative theories differ in the questions they are developed to
answer, i.e. \what is ...?’ or \how is ...?’ for the descriptive theories and \what ought
to be ...?’ for the normative theories, and, as we expected, competence theories
ask questions falling under the former kind. However, I think that an easy point
can be made, which casts serious doubts on the idea that competence theories are
intrinsically descriptive. Granted that they are but collections of rules governing our
everyday usage of language, inferences, etc., we should be able to see that, in order
to isolate such a collection of rules, we have to contrast them with the brute facts of
performance, and from there we can then proceed to fill out a list of the competence
rules. That is to say, to develop a competence theory, we cannot just list a collection
of performance cases but we must remove what we regard as the flaws (i.e. the
fallacies, errors, trivial mistakes, etc.) from them. Therefore, it looks like competence
theories aren’t limited to answer what-is-type questions and are not in fact purely
descriptive as Elqayam & Evans suggest. If I am right and competence theories
are normative themselves, there is no way to argue that normativism commits the
naturalistic fallacy of inferring a norm from an observation.
The last problem addressed by Elqayam & Evans relates to the research biases
brought about by normativism. According to the authors, adopting a normativist
stance negatively affects the result of the empirical tests. In fact, assuming norma-
tivism in conducting experiments on reasoning is an instance of the ought-is inference,
which is as illegitimate as the is-ought inference. However, I think that normativism
shouldn’t be blamed for being the exclusive carrier of the ought-is fallacy and of
theory-laden experiments. This is a general problem that applies to experimental
studies, and this point can’t be considered too harmful against normativism, unless
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one agrees that normativism has the intrinsic feature of having theoretical biases
underlying empirical research.
From the discussion of Elqayam and Evans (2011), I hope to have shown to the
reader that the anti-normativist’s argument is not successful. In the next section, I
will delve into the normativity of logic. In particular, I will focus on the principles
that bridge logical consequence and reasoning, especially in a framework developed
to make sense of how logic constrains beliefs. I will highlight how some of these
principles can be prima facie preferred over the others and I will point out that an
attempt to generalize the form of the principle is not successful.
3.4. Norms for reasoning
1-formality says that logical laws are constitutive of thought as such. What does this
amount to? To explain how logical norms are relevant to thought and to what extent,
MacFarlane (2004) first distinguishes two senses of \reasoning’, i.e. a formal and an
informal one. Following Harman (1986), MacFarlane defines formal reasoning as the
reasoning one applies in drawing a conclusion from a set of premises, and informal
reasoning as reasoned change in view. A first reply to this distinction is that the
borders between informal and formal reasoning seem blurred most of the time, and
therefore it might be contentious that such a distinction really exists. To prove that
informal and formal reasoning are two separate modalities of thinking, the following
argument is often shown:
Suppose that we have a set of premises, Γ, and that Γ ` A. If A is absurd or false,
reasoners are rationally entitled to revise their beliefs in one or more of the premises
in Γ. But if our reasoning were formal and consequently constrained by formal logic,
we ought to conclude A instead of revising the premises.
I am not sure that this argument is correct, though. First of all, it seems that revising
the propositions in Γ should be described as an application of Modus Tollens and of
the Completeness and Deduction theorems rather than as the application of some
reasoning principle independent of logical reasoning. For the time being, I will leave
the question about the distinction between formal and informal reasoning open, as
it is not the topic of this chapter, but I will address it later on, as this question
has important relations with the way we model the structure of our mind and, more
generally, with models of rationality.
For now it will be enough to say that, whereas Harman argues that there is no
way to formulate plausible bridge principles between formal and informal reasoning,
70 3. CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF NORMATIVITY
MacFarlane tries to articulate a spectrum of the possible bridge principles connecting
the two types of reasoning, which, in turn, correspond to different ways of explaining
the normativity of logic.
According to MacFarlane, the general form of the bridge principles connecting formal
and informal reasoning is:
If A, B |= C then ... (normative clause).
The types of bridge principles can be distinguished on the basis of:
• the deontic operator they involve (i.e. ought, is permitted, has reasons for);
• the polarity of the normative clauses (are they reasons for believing or for
not disbelieving?);
• the scope of the deontic operator (i.e. the deontic operator ranges over the
whole conditional, its consequent, or each of the antecedent and the conse-
quent).
I refer to MacFarlane (2004) for the whole list of bridge principles. For the moment,
it will be sufficient to mention some of them and explain what the corresponding
labels stand for. For instance, Co+ means that the deontic operator applies to the
conclusion (C ), that the deontic operator is an ought (o), and that the polarity is
positive, so the bridge principle commits the reasoner to believing the conclusion
(instead of not disbelieving it). Then, the whole bridge principle will read as
If A, B |= C, then if you believe A and you believe B, you ought to
believe C.
On the other hand, Bp- means that the deontic operator (which in this context is
permission, p) applies to both the antecedent and the consequent of the implication
(B) and the polarity is negative, so the bridge principle tells the reasoner that she
is permitted not to disbelieve the conclusion. The full bridge principle is:
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If A, B |= C, then if you may believe A and believe B, you are
permitted not to disbelieve C.
To conclude the batch of examples, let’s take Wr+. This means that the deontic
operator (\has reason for’, r) ranges over the whole conditional (W ) and that the
polarity is positive, i.e.
If A, B |= C, then if you have reason to see to it that if you believe
A and you believe B, you believe C.
This taxonomy can be augmented by a whole class of principles if the antecedent of
the bridge principle is taken to be \If you know that A, B |= C’, in which case the
suffix \-k ’ is added to the principles’ name.
Out of these principles, MacFarlane will consider two plausible. Co+ is the first
bridge principle to be ruled out, by an argument drawn from Broome (1999). The
argument goes as follows: in any logic where A |= A is a theorem, the relevant
instance of Co+ turns out to be \If A |= A, then if you believe A, you ought to
believe A’, which sounds just like a self-justification of belief A, for any A. Moreover,
the application of Co+ to A |= A is also an instance of the the so-called is-ought
inference. The same argument against Co+ seems to apply to all the other C-bridge
principles, so MacFarlane rules out also the other C’s.
As for the B-principles, MacFarlane argues that they aren’t really as normative for
thought as they should be. For instance, Bo+ would read as \If A, B |= C, then if
you ought to believe A and believe B, you ought to believe C ’; however, this sounds
too weak a normative principle, because \if you ought to believe A and believe B’
implies that the principle applies to those reasoners \whose beliefs are already in
order’ (MacFarlane (2004): 9). In other words, the B-principles are not enforced
unless the agent believes the premises that she should believe.
If Wo- leaves room for the possibility of revising the premises, the same should be
true of Co-. Ruling out all of the C’s and B’s versions of the bridge principle, leaves
us with six W’s combinations to assess, i.e. Wo+, Wo-, Wp+, Wp-, Wr+, Wr-.
However, again, the Wp-principles seem too weak, because they state that if A, B
|= C, you may see to it that if you believe A and believe B, you believe (or don’t
disbelieve) C. However, simple permission to see that if you believe the premises,
72 3. CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF NORMATIVITY
you believe the conclusion doesn’t really put constraints of any kind. Although this
argument is used against the Wp-principles, I think that it applies to all of the
bridge principles in the taxonomy involving permission as their deontic operator. In
my opinion, a similar argument applies also to the bridge principles involving \has
reason to see to it’.
However, to go back to MacFarlane and cut a long story short, MacFarlane finally
acknowledges Wo-, Wr+, and Wr- as the only plausible principles in the spectrum
(and possibly Wr+/- as even less problematic than Wo-). Wo- reads, \If A, B |=
C, then you ought to see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you do not
disbelieve C ’. The reason why MacFarlane thinks that Wo- works better than Wo+ is
that, including the positive polarity in the consequent (\you believe C ’), Wo+ seems
to assume that the rational agent’s beliefs are closed under logical consequence.
The only concern that one might have about Wr+ and Wr- is that they don’t impose
strong constraints on belief, but rather recommendations on what to believe. The Wr
principles have weaker normative power than that of Wo-, nonetheless they have a
slightly stronger power than permissions. Being permitted to believe the consequence
upon believing the premises of an argument says that one can conclude C from A
and B, but it doesn’t properly recommend it. On the other hand, having a reason
to believe the conclusion upon believing the premises of an argument is enough to
recommend that one believes the conclusion.
3.4.1 The subjective acknowledgment turn
So far, so good. What happens next? MacFarlane revises the bridge principles in light
of further considerations on transparency and formality. Let’s start with formality.
MacFarlane (2004) points out that \the normativity of logic has its source not in the
formal validity of inferences, but in the formal validity of inference schemata’ (ibid.:
22). The point is made to exclude material validity from the discussion on bridge
principles, and I won’t argue against this for the moment.
In addition, MacFarlane claims that, for a bridge principle to be fully enforced,
logical validity has to be transparent. In other words, for a particular occurrence of
the bridge principle regarding the inference A, B |= C to have an effective normative
power over an agent, the agent must recognize that A, B |= C is an instance of a
valid inference schema. For instance, transparency fails when two coreferring terms
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occur in an inference without the agent being aware that the two terms denote
the same object, as in the famous \Hesperus is Phosphorus’ case.5 In such a case,
MacFarlane argues, the agent is at least excused for violating the bridge principle to
some extent (MacFarlane (2004): 21, footnote 23). This calls for a revision of the
form of the bridge principle in such a way that the principle makes explicit the role of
inference schemata in the normative power of logical validity and avoids holding an
agent responsible for violating the bridge principle when cases similar to \Hesperus
is Phosphorus’ occur. The revised version of the principle form reads:
If [you know that] the schema S is formally valid and you apprehend
the inference A, B / C as an instance of S, then (normative claim
about believing A, B, and C ). (MacFarlane (2004): 22)
However, is this revised version of the principle really an improvement? Consider
the ways in which an agent can fail to recognize an inference, I, as an instance of an
inferential schema, S :
1. The agent knows that S is a valid inference schema but fails to apprehend I as
an instance of S.
2. The agent doesn’t know that S is a valid inference schema.
Then, if an agent fails to recognise I as an instance of S, that might happen because
the agent doesn’t know that S is a valid inference schema. This would mean that the
revised bridge principle takes into account not only the cases in which logical validity
is not transparent, but also the agent’s logical competence or logical knowledge. In
other words, the principle enables the agents to be freer to believe what they like the
more logically ignorant they are. However, this very point seems to be inconsistent
with a comment that MacFarlane makes on the -k bridge principles.6 The issue is
labelled \Priority Question’ by MacFarlane, and is presented in the following way:
5In such a case, an inference like
Hesperus is the first star to appear in the evening.
Phosphorus is the last star to disappear in the morning.
Therefore, some star is the first to appear in the evening and the last to disappear
in the evening.
is valid in Kaplan’s sense (see Kaplan (1978)).
6The -k bridge principles are those of the form, \If you know that A, B |= C, then (normative
claim)’.
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According to the -k variants, we are subject to logical norms only in
so far as we have logical knowledge. The more ignorant we are of what
follows from what, the freer we are to believe whatever we please [...].
(Ibid.: 12)
As we have seen, the same consideration holds also for the non-k bridge principle.
Therefore, if we are to exclude material validity from our normative account, we have
at least to get rid of the subjective acknowledgment bit of the new bridge principle.
At that point, it can be questioned whether the shift from a class of bridge principles
to another is really worthy, though, and we might just decide to be content with
the old principles. I will temporarily leave aside the question about the general
framework of the bridge principles, and will turn to the deontic operator involved in
the bridge principles.
3.5. Analysis of the deontic operator
3.5.1 Senses of ought : suggestions from the study of rationality
Five senses of ought can be found in the literature on rationality. Given that we are
concerned with constraints (and specifically, with obligations), I think that it would
be helpful to specify in what sense ought is used in the context of logic. The first three
senses in the list below (i.e. functional, directive, and evaluative ought) are drawn
from Thomson (2008) and Elqayam and Evans (2011), whereas I have taken the
distinction between subjective and objective ought’s from Kolodny and MacFarlane
(2010). Later on, I will address the question of what the interplay between these
senses of ought is.
(1) Functional ought. This is an impersonal ought that applies to objects and
refers to their proper function, as in \Heart ought to pump the blood’.
(2) Directive ought. This is an instrumental ought that applies to agents, as in
\To get to the entrance door, you ought to walk behind the building’.
(3) Evaluative ought. This is a “principled” ought that applies to both objects
and agents, such as in \We ought not to kill animals’.
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(4) Subjective ought. This is relative to what you should do (or believe) given
only the information available to you.
(5) Objective ought. This is relative to what you should do (or believe) given all
the information.
Apart from the functional sense of ought, which is impersonal, we can ask whether
directive and evaluative ought’s can come in subjective/objective versions. It is
pretty clear that the directive ought can take subjective or objective sense, as in the
example of the miners trapped in a shaft (Kolodny and MacFarlane (2010), although
the example I use here is slightly modified). I will summarize the example to give a
taste of what the subjective and objective readings of the directive ought amount to.
Ten miners are trapped in one of the two shafts of a mine, call them A and B, but
we don’t know in which one. A big quantity of water is expected to hit the shafts
and the rescuers have to decide where to deviate the water to. If the entrance of
one of the shafts is blocked, the water will fill the other shaft to the ceiling and all
the miners will die; if neither of the shafts is blocked, the water will flow into both
shafts, filling each of them halfway up, and only the shortest of the miners is likely to
drown. Not knowing in which of the shafts the trapped miners are, the rescue team
ought to block neither shaft, so that nine out of ten miners will survive. But suppose
that someone, say, Moira, has a very sophisticated machine that detects heartbeats
at very long distances and that this machine detects that there is someone in shaft
B and no one in shaft A. Moira goes to the rescue team and advises them \I know
where the miners are. You ought to block shaft B ’.
The ought’s in question in making decisions about which shaft has to be blocked
are not of the evaluative type. In fact, there is no principle involved in blocking a
shaft or the other, or neither, per se. These ought’s are directive, as they refer to
actions that are instrumental to save the miners. On the other hand, in the trapped
miners’ story, an evaluative ought could be expressed as \We ought to save the highest
number of people’. Whereas it is pretty uncontroversial that the directive ought’s can
be either subjective or objective, it still can be asked whether the evaluative ought’s
can, too. Prima facie, it doesn’t look like the quantity of information available to
the agent makes much difference in the context of evaluation. However, we can
be easily distracted by a different sense of \objective’ and \subjective’ here, and be
subsequently led to think that there is in fact something like a subjective sense of
the evaluative ought. For instance, suppose that Irene and Ida are discussing Irene’s
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decision to become a vegetarian. Irene says: \You ought to quit eating animals’. Ida:
\I can’t see why. I think that you ought not to become a vegetarian’.
Although the ought’s in the dialogue above are evaluative and they are relative to two
different points of view (Irene’s and Ida’s, in the example), it doesn’t look like they
are subjective ought’s just because they are expressed by different subjects and are
relative to their individual views. We might report the conversation as: \According
to Irene, you ought to become vegetarian and according to Ida, you shouldn’t’, but
this has nothing to do with the amount of available information that Irene and Ida
have at that point.
For now, let’s say that the constraint that Wo- imposes on beliefs could be seen as
a mix of the directive and of the evaluative ought. In fact, if the obligation involved
in the normativity of logic were purely evaluative, it would be hard to explain how
advocates of different logics can have a genuine debate about logic and not just talk
past each other, as in Irene and Ida’s case. In the last chapter, I will argue that
the normativity of logic is in fact much weaker than the prescription imposed by the
ought’s would suggest, but for now I want to focus on the analysis of those bridge
principles that came out as winning the race. The next section is therefore devoted
to a possible analysis of the deontic operator \has reason to’.
3.5.2 More deontic operators
The study of the normativity of logic on thought is not exhausted by the discussion
of the bridge principles, though. To make clear what is the exact meaning of the
principles, it is not enough to rely on the intuitive understanding of the deontic
operators involved. The deontic operators, as they have been used in MacFarlane
(2004), are addressed by an extensive literature, and they constitute an object of
investigation on their own. The three deontic operators considered in drawing the
bridge principles are is permitted to, ought and has reason to. The definitions of
is permitted to and ought are such that we can take one of the operators as basic
(e.g. ought) and define the other operator in terms of it, analogously to what we
do with ♦ and . In fact, the permissibility operator (let’s call it P) is usually
defined as follows: Pϕ = df ¬O¬ϕ. On the other hand, the obligation operator,
O, is such that Oϕ is equivalent to ¬P¬ϕ. The third operator, has reason to (let’s
call it R), is taken from Broome (1999), where the difference between reasons and
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normative requirements is spelled out. The distinctive feature of has reason to is
that an agent can have conflicting reasons, i.e. reasons for ϕ and reasons for ¬ϕ,
whereas conflicting obligations are usually not admitted.
Chellas (1974) develops a logic for the monadic (and the dyadic) deontic operator and
two systems for each of the operators. I will now focus on the monadic deontic logic
introduced by Chellas and argue that, despite the fact that the two systems (D and
D*) presented in Chellas (1974) are both meant to be systems for the operator O,
one of them is also appropriate for a different operator, i.e. R, discussed in Broome
(1999). I present the main features of D and D* below.
System D* (standard monadic deontic logic in Chellas (1974)):
OA is true at w if A is true at w ’s deontic alternatives. Every world, w, has a related
set of possible worlds, DeAl, that are w ’s deontic alternatives. Therefore, νw(OA) =
1 if ∀w′ : w′ ∈ DeAlw , νw′(A) = 1.7
(ROM) A→B
OA→OB
(Obligation is closed under logical implication)
(OD) ¬O⊥
(Nothing impossible is obligatory. Transposed: Ought implies Can)
(ON) O>
(Obligations exist at every possible world)
(OK) (OA ∧ OB) → O(A ∧ B)
7 Another way to cash out the definition of O is to specify a relation, R, meaning \is a deontic
alternative to ...’, such that νw(OA) = 1 if ∀w′ : w′ ∈W , such that w’Rw, νw′(A) = 1.
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(Obligation is closed under adjunction. Chellas (1974) argues that (OK) amounts to
closing obligation under logical consequence - it states \that a proposition is obliga-
tory if it is a consequence of obligatory propositions’8)
D* doesn’t allow any conflicting obligations. In fact, take (OD) and consider a
contradiction, e.g. A ∧¬A. By (OD), ¬O(A ∧¬A). Therefore, by transposition of
(OK), ¬(OA ∧O¬A).
These axioms conform to the meaning that is usually given to the deontic operator
O. However, removing (OK) from our deontic logic results in ¬(OA ∧ O¬A) not
being derivable anymore in the system. The new system is what Chellas (1974) calls
D, or minimal monadic deontic logic. To be more precise, in D neither (OK) nor
(ON) hold. The fact that (ON) doesn’t hold means that there are possible worlds
without any obligation. However, as D and D* provide different axioms for the same
operator, i.e. the monadic ought, they ultimately leave to the reader the burden of
figuring out which ought she is talking about each time - the strict obligation of D*
or the weaker obligation of D?
I suggest that we retain both the logics D* and D, interpreting the deontic operators
used in each system instead. I will therefore ask the reader to follow me in a short
detour through the deontic operators, to identify what operator best suits each of
the systems discussed above.
As I mentioned, Broome (1999) distinguishes reasons from normative requirements.
In doing so, he argues that reasons impose on the agent a constraint which is weaker
than the demand imposed by normative requirements. To this purpose, Broome
proposes that we use two deontic operators, R and O, where R (i.e. \has reason to
...’) is weaker than O (i.e. ought). The distinguishing feature of R is that an agent is
allowed to have conflicting reasons, namely, reasons for A and reasons for non-A, as
having reasons for is pro tanto, i.e. it is not as constraining as ought is. At the same
time, if you have a reason for A and no reason for non-A, you ought to A, therefore
(R(A) ∧ ¬R(¬A)) → O(A).
It seems plausible that D is suitable for R, as it allows for conflicting reasons. There-






On the other hand, as long as we don’t allow conflicting obligations (that is, at least
when the objective ought is in play), we can be quite happy with D*. However, if
obligations are closed under logical consequence, this might be a feature that doesn’t
match with the normative requirements that logic imposes on thought, as the ought
involved in the bridge principles seem to be the subjective ought rather than the
objective ought.
So far, I have taken into consideration only monadic deontic operators. Now I want
to spend a few words on the reason why I didn’t take conditional obligations into
account in my discussion of the deontic operator suitable for the bridge principles.
Suppose that we want to provide a version of the bridge principles that employs a
dyadic deontic operator, such as O(A|B), to be read as \You ought to believe A,
given that you believe B ’. A bridge principle with conditional obligation would read
as
If A, B |= C, then you ought to believe C, given that you believe A
and believe B.
Now, let’s consider the instantiation of such a bridge principle for A |= A. That
would read as
If A |= A, then you ought to believe A, given that you believe A,
which is as unconvincing as the C-versions of the bridge principles are (for the same
reason). Then, it looks like conditional obligation is not a plausible candidate for
the bridge principles, and we should stick to monadic deontic operators.
3.6. Conclusion
We have seen that the bridge principles are an attempt to explain the normative
power of formal reasoning over informal reasoning. Among the options presented
by MacFarlane, only three can be considered plausible (at least prima facie), and I
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argued that trying to generalize the principles by appealing to inferential schemata
faces an important problem.
I distinguished five different senses of ought (of which, only four are relevant to the
normativity of logic), and suggested that the ought involved in the bridge principles
is a directive obligation, which leaves room for genuine debate about logic.
Finally, I focused on the operator has reason to, which first appeared in Broome
(1999) (as far as I know) and was used in the bridge principles Wr+ and Wr-, and
suggested that it can be made sense of by looking at Chellas’s minimal deontic logic.
The discussion in this chapter lays the ground for the analysis of the normativity of
logic that takes place in the sixth chapter. That is why I haven’t taken a stance on
which bridge principles are to be preferred over the others. Although I agree with
most of the initial considerations that MacFarlane does about the scope of the deontic
operators and the types of operators (e.g. ruling out permissions), the discussion in
this chapter is meant to be propaedeutic to the rest of the thesis.
CHAPTER 4
Minimal rationality
Abstract. In this chapter, I address two theories of rationality that have changed
profoundly the literature on reasoning and rationality. The two approaches are
presented in Harman (1986) and Cherniak (1986) and have several elements in
common. First of all, both theories focus on the study of rationality in real agents;
both approaches take into account the cognitive, memory and temporal limitations
of human agents. Discussing these theories of rationality will help lay the ground
for discussing the normative role of logic on thought in real agents, which is the
ultimate goal of my thesis. The last section of the chapter is devoted to discuss
Peirce’s account of logica docens and logica utens, which is beneficial for putting
into perspective the accounts of rationality discussed in the earlier sections of the
chapter.
Introduction
Before we investigate the normative status of logic, we need to qualify what it is
that we are judging logic against. In other words, we take logic to have a normative
status because it provides norms that should help us maximize rationality, but what
kind of rationality should we consider? As our concern is with ordinary agents, this
chapter describes some theories of rationality that have been developed to capture
the sort of rationality we actually expect to find in our and other people’s beliefs
and behaviours. For this reason, it is important to stress that belief revision is
relevant to logic. This would perhaps strike some logicians as an undesired piece of
psychologism but rather it is crucial for logic to take belief revision seriously. By this
I don’t mean that logic ought to represent or simulate belief revision, although logics
of belief revision have already been developed, e.g. AGM framework by Alchourron
and Makinson (1985). Instead, belief revision is relevant to logic as a scientific theory
that evolves over time and this looks like a good reason for logic to care about change
in belief. Furthermore, belief revision is something logic should care about because
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we want logic to give us some constraints, directions, or somehow to guide us when
we add a new belief to our pre-existing set of beliefs. In this sense, we want to spell
out what logic can do to guarantee that our beliefs be rational, which is so important
to us because we decide and act upon them.
Belief change is not necessarily synonymous with rational belief change, though. For
example, take Dave’s particular belief, b, that plane trails are caused by condensed
water vapour resulting from the exhaust of aircraft engines. Now imagine that Dave
reads a leaflet published by an alleged scientific association explaining that some of
those trails are not actually made of condensed water vapour but rather are chemical
agents sprayed by planes to harm people. Dave finds this theory convincing and
comes to believe that plane trails are actually chemical trails aimed at intoxicating
people. Although Dave might have come to believe what the leaflet says because
he finds the argument particularly compelling or cogent, from an objective point of
view, this is an obvious case of bad belief revision and, in fact, its outcome is less
rational than the starting belief. Therefore, there must be something involved in
belief change which turns a belief revision into a rational revision, i.e. good/reliable
justification. Reliability and justification are objects of a massive investigation in
epistemology which is beyond the purposes of this chapter, so I will leave the issue
aside. For the time being, let’s say that we want to consider logic(s) as a set of beliefs
which can be revised according to some criteria, the investigation of which has been
extensively undertaken in the works I am going to discuss in the following sections.
For almost a century, the issue of logic being relevant to rationality hadn’t been
seriously put into question. Frege argued that if logic (recall that by \logic’ he meant
some sort of ancestor of contemporary classical logic) is the study of validity in de-
ductive arguments, it has to be rational and nothing is more tightily connected to
rationality than logic itself. In fact, according to Frege, logic has a special status
among other sciences, and it is no doubt the science conforming to rationality itself
at the highest levels because rationality is constituted by logic. If this can be para-
phrased as \logic is rational because rationality is logical’, Frege’s position on the
connection between logic and rationality can hardly be seen as helpful in clarifying
the matter.
On the other hand, trying to give a comprehensive definition of \logic’ and trying
to analyze its interplay with rationality raises many questions, especially because it
is challenging to define the rather vague concept of rationality. We might even find
it difficult to get a unitary and non-subject-specific articulation of rationality. As
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for logic, the situation is perhaps less ambiguous as we all know that it is defined
as the systematic study of the laws of valid inference, but at the same time, as we
have seen in the first chapter, it is controversial how validity itself should be defined;
in the first chapter, we have seen that a definition of validity can be given in - at
least - three different ways, i.e. model-theoretically, proof-theoretically and non-
definitionally (e.g. characterizing validity in terms of degrees of belief, as suggested
in Field (2009)).
We have already discussed the contrasting positions on logical form and on the nature
of validity, so now I will rather move on to discuss some views of rationality. In this
chapter, I will first describe two approaches to rationality sharing the common thesis
(labelled \(ILR)’ in the following sections) that logic is not specially relevant to
rationality; in the later chapters I will argue whether ILR is really justified.
4.1. Is deductive reasoning a chimaera?
As anticipated above, I am going to present two approaches to rationality which
share a common thesis about the relevance of logic to rationality. These theories
also have in common an important assumption on the nature of rational agents, as
we will see in due course. The core works that I am going to discuss here are Harman
(1986) and Cherniak (1986), which represent important achievements in the study
of what could be called minimal rationality.
Harman (1986) argues that logic is neither a psychological nor a normative theory,
which means that logic doesn’t describe how people actually reason nor is it an
adequate theory about how people ought to reason in order to be rational. To
support this point, Harman first distinguishes between reasoned change in view (or
reasoning) and argument (or proof). According to his view, deductive principles,
which are employed in arguments, are of no help when it comes to revising our
beliefs. To see his point, suppose that Γ ` A, where Γ is a set of beliefs and A is any
proposition logically derivable from Γ. Now, if an agent discovers that A is not the
case, then she will realise that something must be revised in Γ. Therefore, following
logical principles can lead an agent to acknowledge that a revision process in her
beliefs must be undertaken, but logic can’t (and isn’t supposed to) suggest how to
revise beliefs.
In order to stress the difference between reasoning and proofs, Harman identifies
some principles of reasoning, i.e. principles according to which rational agents revise
their beliefs. The main principles of reasoning listed in Harman (1986) are:
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• (Clutter Avoidance): One ought not to clutter one’s mind with irrelevancies.
• (Coherence): One ought to revise one’s beliefs so to avoid inconsistencies
among them and to maximize the explanatory power of each on the others.
• (Conservatism): In revising one’s beliefs, one ought to minimize the change.
As it is apparent from the list, the principles of reasoning are not principles of logic on
Harman’s account. Moreover, as we have seen above, Harman gives different mean-
ings to argument and reasoning and goes on to state that, consequently, deductive
argument and deductive reasoning shouldn’t be identified, nor should inductive ar-
gument and inductive reasoning either. In line with his previous statements about
the nature of reasoning and argument, the author claims that deductive reasoning
simply doesn’t exist, whereas inductive reasoning does. On the other hand, it is
contentious that agents can produce inductive arguments, whereas one can certainly
produce deductive arguments. To see why Harman claims that deductive reasoning
doesn’t exist, recall that (on Harman’s account) principles of reasoning constrain how
beliefs ought to be revised, whereas deductive principles provide reasons for revising
one’s beliefs at best.
Before we continue discussing Harman’s theory of rationality, it’s worth saying more
about the approach to logic in Harman (1986). We have seen that Harman takes argu-
ments (and not reasoning) to be the proper domain of logic. Harman (unpublished)
denies that logic is the science of what inference forms preserve truth necessarily.
This claim can be made sense of in light of the distinction drawn between inference
and implication presented in Harman (1986). A good deal of Harman’s first chapter
is devoted to defending the view that inference doesn’t match up with logical implica-
tion, arguing that the distinction between implication and inference is parallel to the
dichotomy argument-reasoning. On Harman’s account, implication links adjacent
steps of an argument, whereas inference plays a role in reasoning and doesn’t follow
logical principles. Harman argues that the main point showing that implication and
inference are not intersubstitutable is cumulativity : whereas implications are cumu-
lative, inferences are not. In other words, Harman states that logical implication
is monotonic, whereas our reasoning seems to be dynamic and inferences seem to
be non-monotonic. The obvious question here is whether the same difference would
persist if instead of implication in, say, classical logic, we considered implication in
non-monotonic logics. Harman dismisses this option very quickly, pointing out that
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[...] although this terminology emphasizes the noncumulative character
of reasoned revision, it is also potentially misleading in calling the
ordinary sort of proof or argument "monotonic reasoning", because
proof or argument is not of the same category as reasoned revision.
(Harman (1986): 4)
However, this reply seems to beg the question, because Harman is precisely trying to
support the very existence of a distinction between argument and reasoning through
the distinction between implication and inference here.
Let’s pause once again on Harman’s position on deductive reasoning (or better, on
its nonexistence). In order to show that reasoning doesn’t follow deductive principles
and, in turn, that deductive reasoning doesn’t exist, Harman stresses that
a) logical principles hold in any case and don’t admit exceptions, whereas not in
every case we are inclined to infer, say, Q from P and if P then Q.
b) when reasoning, we are not usually inclined to draw all the conclusions that
an application of the logical law in question would allow us to draw, e.g. from a
contradiction P and not P we don’t feel compelled to draw anything (in fact, we
usually don’t conclude any proposition whatsoever from a contradiction). We avoid
applying instances of ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) not to clutter our minds with irrelevant
information, Harman concludes.
The above two points display a clash between two competing accounts of rationality.
On one side, there is a well-entrenched model revolving around an ideal agent pos-
sessing flawless and infinite cognitive, deductive and mnemonic abilities. I will label
this theory Ideal Agent Rationality, or (IAR).
On the other side, there is an emerging model of rationality which rejects ideal agents
and is centred upon human agents instead, taking into account real agents’ limita-
tions in terms of cognitive and deductive abilities, information retrieval, memory
capacity. I will label this theory Minimal Rationality, or (MR).1
Point b) addresses a fundamental principle of (IAR), i.e. the
(Logical Closure Principle): a set of beliefs, Γ, of an agent, S, ought to be closed
under logical consequence, i.e. for any proposition, A, such that if Γ ` A, S ought
to believe A,
1Minimal Rationality is the term that Cherniak (1986) uses in his work.
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and denies that Logical Closure is a crucial principle of rationality. On the contrary,
rational agents would better violate Logical Closure not to clutter their minds with
irrelevancies, according to (Clutter Avoidance). Harman stresses that it is real agents’
limitations in terms of mental abilities and memory storage capacity to make it
impossible to comply with Logical Closure.
However, I’m not sure that the points made by Harman are conclusive arguments to
support the view that reasoning and argument and, in turn, implication and inference
are really different. I don’t mean that argument and reasoning are equivalent, but
rather that Harman’s argument doesn’t make the right moves to dismiss the option
that they are tightily connected.
To see why, let’s go back again to point b). The remark in b) would succeed in
proving that logical and reasoning principles have nothing to do with each other if
Clutter Avoidance were an exclusive feature of reasoning (I am referring to reasoning
as reasoned change in view, as Harman puts it). However, it seems to me that the
same applies also to proofs and arguments: it is not the case that, just because
we can go on drawing conclusions from certain premises in a proof, we actually do
that if these are not relevant to what we intend to prove. Therefore, Harman must
mean that principles of reasoning are metaprinciples. To make the difference between
reasoning and logical principles clear, let’s reflect on what happens when we try to
prove some conclusion, C : we apply logical rules in drawing a line from another, e.g.
in natural deduction, from a set of premises, Γ, to a set of intermediate steps, ∆,
to the conclusion, C, but also apply a proof strategy to get the conclusion we want,
e.g. we stick to a certain order in applying inference rules to keep the proof as short
as possible, and this strategy might follow general principles of reasoning which are
distinct from the logical rules.
It seems that, according to Harman, in this respect it wouldn’t make much differ-
ence if we replaced \logical rules’ with \chess rules’ and \proof strategy’ with \game
strategy’ in the sentence above: that is why talking about deductive reasoning is as
meaningless as talking about chess reasoning. Leaving chess aside and going back
to philosophy talk, Harman’s description of principles of reasoning makes them look
close to what other philosophers have called \epistemic norms’. Harman argues that
it might well be the case that we fail to apply (or consciously suspend) rules in our
reasoning, as stated in point a) above but if the principles of reasoning were equiva-
lent to logical principles, we should apply the reasoning principles without exception.
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This is not the case and therefore deductive principles can’t also be principles of rea-
soning. Consequently, whereas arguments can be valid or not, reasoning cannot be
valid nor invalid. In other words, Harman is arguing that because rational agents can
dispense from applying logical laws, the principles of logic can’t be principles of rea-
soning, which is similar to saying that chess rules can’t be game strategy principles
because we may fail to move the rook correctly.
The overall impression is that Harman is not proving that there is a difference be-
tween reasoning and argument and between implication and inference, but he rather
assumes that such differences are in place. This makes the distinctions remain ulti-
mately not well-defined. Moreover, the mutual appeal of each distinction to explain
the other doesn’t help much either.
However, to give additional support to his view, Harman proceeds to list four possible
ways in which reasoning can go wrong:
1. One might start with false beliefs and by reasoning be led into
further errors.
2. One might reach a conclusion that is perfectly “reasonable”, even
though it happens to be mistaken.
3. One can be careless or inattentive; one can forget about a relevant
consideration or fail to give it sufficient weight; one can make mistakes
in long division; one can fail to see something, to remember something,
to attend carefully; and so on.
4. One can revise one’s view in accordance with an incorrect rule of
revision, thereby violating the correct rules.
(Harman (1986): 7)
Among these, Harman argues that only the last two can really be regarded as reason-
ing mistakes. However, given that Harman argued that principles of reasoning are
principles of reasoned belief revision, it looks like the only proper error of reasoning
is only 4. In fact, Harman claims, errors in group 3 can be attributed to lack of
reflection, but it is not clear whether Harman wants errors in group 3 to fall under
the category of reasoning mistakes or not. That obviously depends on what Harman
exactly means by \reasoning’. If we take principles of reasoning to mean principles of
rational belief revision and consequently reasoning as rational change of belief, then
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errors in group 3 don’t seem to fit in the family of reasoning mistakes. However,
Harman doesn’t deny that they are reasoning mistakes (as in fact they seem intu-
itively), but it is hard to see a view on reasoning which classifies group 3 as errors
of reasoning with the meaning of \reasoning’ given by Harman and discussed above.
To sum up, according to the distinction between argument and reasoning presented
in Chapter 1 of Harman (1986), on one side we have proofs or arguments, which
are properly the domain of logical principles and validity and on the other side we
have reasoning, which is reasoned change in view, and its principles, which look quite
close to epistemic norms and ultimately metaprinciples. I don’t think that Harman’s
argument does prove that such a distinction is in place, but we could just assume
that such a distinction is an intuitive way to define different mental processes, one of
which is step-by-step and cognitively demanding, while the other is intuition-based.
4.2. Which logic?
The purpose of this section is to argue that (ILR) needs to be qualified. Before I do
that, I clarify what kind of logic is the object of (ILR), the thesis that logic is not
specially relevant to reasoning. In his examples, Harman refers clearly to first-order
classical logic, but he means some language elements, such as the truth predicate, to
be included in the logic, so what Harman refers to seems to be a sort of increased
classical logic which includes also some strictly semantic elements. For example,
Appendix A of Harman (1986) includes the following argument:
X is part of Y
Y is part of Z
Therefore, X is part of Z
and it is argued that it might be the case that we can consider it a logical argument.
Harman explains that to identify logical constants, we often apply the grammaticality
criterion, briefly described as:
[...] logical constants in a natural language are grammatically distinc-
tive in always being members of small, closed logical classes of terms.2
2This passage refers to Harman (1982).
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However, Harman suggests that we drop the grammaticality criterion to take the
truth predicate into account as a logical constant. In fact, in order to have instances
of the Truth Schema in the set of our logical formulas, we want truth to be included
in the logical vocabulary, despite the fact that the truth predicate doesn’t display
any particular difference with respect to other predicates and adjectives that behave
very similarly in \that’-clauses, such as \is probable’ and \believe’. Harman tries to
support the thesis that Tarski’s biconditional should be part of our logic to prove that
only logical implication and inconsistency are psychologically ‘immediate’, i.e. in, say,
inferring A from A∧B, no intermediate steps are necessary from a psychological point
of view. However, Harman argues, this doesn’t mean that logic has any privileged
relation with reasoning.
It would be interesting to understand who the addressees of Harman’s arguments
are. From the discussion in Change in View, the Artificial Intelligence programme
looks like a plausible candidate and perhaps it is what Harman has in mind when he
distinguishes between inference and implication and argues that, specifically, non-
monotonic logics3 and, generally, logics which attempt to model human reasoning
don’t model how human agents infer. His point in raising questions about logics
involved in AI concerns the impossibility of (presumably) dynamic or epistemic logics
to ultimately model human reasoning, because reasoning escapes the structure of
logical implication. We have seen the reasons why Harman argues this, so I am
now going to make some additional remarks about Harman’s claim that logic is not
specially relevant to reasoning and then I move on to a similar view on rationality
which displays the crucial features of (MR) (like Harman (1986) does), i.e. the thesis
that (IAR) isn’t a satisfactory model of rationality.
I want to conclude this section raising some questions about the plausibility of (ILR).
The main remark about (ILR) is that it is not clear what it is to be \specially rel-
evant to reasoning’. My best bet is that this special relevance consists in putting
constraints on rationality, as reasoning is defined as rational change in view. But
what constraints are we talking about? Does (ILR) mean something like \Logical
entailment imposes obligations on what we should believe in order for us to think
rationally’ or does it mean something like \Logical entailment gives us recommenda-
tions on what we should believe in order for us to think rationally’? The two options
3 Or what we would call \dynamic logics’ nowadays.
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are quite different, and it will be especially clear that they are in the last chapter of
the thesis.
What Harman’s argument really manages to defeat is the view that the application
of inferential rules always results in epistemic rationality. In other words, Harman
argues that (i) classically valid inferential rules are not applied systematically by
human agents, and (ii) even though human agents don’t apply those rules all the
time, their reasoning can be deemed rational nonetheless.4
The claim that logic is relevant to rationality doesn’t commit us to apply all the
classically valid inferences, nor to stick painstakingly to predicate logic all day. What
makes the difference in proving or disproving (ILR) is, as I mentioned, the normative
power that we attribute to logic. There is a big difference between expecting logic
to impose obligations on thought in order for it to be rational and expecting logic to
guide thought.
Besides that, it is worth highlighting that Harman’s work is revolutionary for the
study of the normativity of logic in two senses: first, Harman gives philosophical
relevance to a realistic model of rationality that takes into account the limitations
of real agents; second, Harman acknowledges that logical laws and epistemic norms
sometimes conflict, and that rational thought doesn’t depend necessarily on following
the former.
What I have shown is that the thesis that logic is not specially relevant to reasoning
is in need of qualification. Firstly, I have clarified what logic Harman is concerned
with in his Change in View. Secondly, I have distinguished two senses in which (ILR)
could be read, that will be the object of discussion in the last chapter of my thesis.
I will now turn to another account of rationality, i.e. Cherniak’s minimal ratio-
nality account, and I will highlight the common ideas between Harman’s theory of
rationality and the minimal rationality approach.
4.3. Minimal rationality
Not very dissimilar to Harman in spirit is Cherniak (1986), where rationality and
the constraints it imposes are discussed. What is at stake in Cherniak’s theory is
4 In the next chapter, I will discuss experimental results in the psychology of reasoning that confirm
(i), and in the sixth chapter, I will argue for a claim very close in spirit to (ii).
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the foundation of our theories about other people’s cognitive states. How do we
attribute intentions and beliefs to ohers? Trying to answer this question, Cherniak
embarks in an inquiry about human limitations of cognition, memory and deductive
abilities. Cherniak wants to show that a model of rationality based on ideal agents
with impeccable cognitive capacities and logical omniscience wouldn’t help us much
when it comes to attributing intentions and beliefs to agents or when it comes to
attributing rationality to agents’ beliefs and actions.5 What we can predict about
others’ mental beliefs is based on our implicit acknowledgement of certain systematic
shortcomings in deductive tasks, information retrieval and memory tasks.
Due to these limits, humans have developed a pretty reliable heuristics which enables
them to draw conclusions and make decisions privileging quickness over information
and deductive accuracy. The discrepancy between idealized cognitive and deduc-
tive abilities and the “quick and dirty” decision-making process has motivated the
development of a model of rationality alternative to the (IAR). In much discussion
on rationality, decision-making and game theory, ideal agents supplied with infinite
deductive and memory powers have been considered a basic presupposition. Among
these agents’ deductive powers, the most notable ones are Logical Closure (which I
mentioned above) and Belief Consistency. Logical Closure and Belief Consistency
are interconnected in an important sense: if an agent S has a set of beliefs, Γ, which
is closed under logical consequence, then S has also the ability to detect all the in-
consistencies in Γ and to remove them. Cherniak argues that an alternative (weaker)
ideal agent model can be found in the literature, e.g. in Hintikka (1962, 1970), where
the idealized agent’s inferential abilities conform to what has been summarized by
Cherniak as ideal inference condition:
If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would make all and only
sound inferences from the belief set that are apparently appropriate.
(Cherniak (1986): 13)
This condition would be equivalent to:
(i) A would select all and only those inferences to make from the beliefs
that are apparently appropriate for A to make.
5Cherniak presupposes a holistic approach to beliefs, desires and meanings, where these are deemed
as interdependent.
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(ii) A would successfully perform all and only those inferences. (Ibid.:
13)
Cherniak dubs (i) ideal heuristic requirement and (ii) ideal deducing requirement,
and points out that in practice it is never the case that these conditions are met by
real agents and that human agents follow them in attributing rationality to other
agents’ beliefs. Agents conform to a minimal requirement on inferences:
If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would make some, but not
necessarily all, of the sound inferences from the belief set that are
apparently appropriate. (Ibid.: 10)
In other words, of all the possible inferences which real agents might perform, only
some are actually picked out in virtue of being appropriate to the agent’s goal and,
of these, only a subset is performed. Heuristics tells us what inferences we ought
to perform to accomplish our target but doesn’t explain why we select a particular
subset of the appropriate inferences. Cherniak offers a theory to account for this
selection, labelled as \theory of feasible inferences ’. According to this theory, it
would be unrealistic to deem all the inferences as maximally feasible, i.e. always
accomplished, or not feasible at all, i.e. never accomplished, because real agents tend
to fall in between. Accordingly, Cherniak suggests that inferences can be ranked
on the basis of a feasibility ordering which applies to agents in a temporally and
contextually relative fashion. In other words, the difficulty that real agents encounter
when drawing inferences may vary over time and situations and it is difficult to
identify a batch of inferences which are unanimously easy to accomplish.
According to Cherniak, the impossibility of drawing a distinction which enables
agents to attribute rationality a priori can be swallowed after one realizes that ideal
deductive abilities would be not only inappropriate to explain rationality, but even
detrimental to it. Cherniak initially takes first-order classical logic as the set of infer-
ence rules and axioms to run his argument against (ILR), arguing that whereas ideal
agents would keep applying classical logic rules regardless of context and regardless
of relevance of the conclusions to the context, real agents would select a subset of the
inferential rules and would apply them in a context-sensitive way. Then, Cherniak
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argues that the argument against (ILR) holds even if classical inference rules are
replaced by non-classical ones.
Besides the common focus on real agents, Cherniak and Harman’s arguments are
similar with regard to their approach to logic: both Harman’s theory and Cherniak’s
minimal account of rationality revolve around the assumption that \logic’ is coex-
tensive with \(classically) valid inferential rules’. For the sake of simplicity, in the
next chapters I will also take the example of classical logic as representative in my
discussion, but I am aware that sampling the class of logic more broadly would make
the analysis more exhaustive.
A different perspective on logic is given by Peirce, who distinguishes different uses of
the word \logic’. Peirce’s distinctions are a first step towards a clarification of what
we mean by \logic’ when we say that logic is normative for thought.
4.4. On Peirce’s use of the notions of logica docens and utens
In this section, I draw on Peirce’s work on logica docens and logica utens to show
how it could be applied to the debate on the relevance of logic to reasoning.
In his writings, Peirce revives a useful distinction within logic which first appeared in
Scotus’ discussion on syllogistics and then apparently had been forgotten for many
centuries. The distinction at stake is between
Logica Docens, i.e. \the result of scientific study’ of arguments and of their constituent
parts, the classification of arguments and, ultimately, the scientific theory of validity
which can be learnt and taught; and
Logica Utens, i.e. a pre-scientific theory which enables us to reason according to some
general principles and to recognize good and bad arguments. According to Peirce,
we can’t properly reason without employing such a logic.
Two considerations that come to my mind in analyzing these definitions are, first,
that it may be questioned whether Peirce’s definition of logica docens and utens fully
matches with Scotus’ and, second, how we ought to interpret the passage below in
light of Peirce’s discussion of the two senses of logic:
I shall have a good deal to say about right reasoning; and in default
of better I had reckoned that as a Topic of Vital Importance. But I
do not know that the theory of reasoning is quite vitally important.
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That it is absolutely essential in metaphysics, I am as sure as I am
of any truth of philosophy. But in the conduct of life, we have to
distinguish everyday affairs and great crises. In the great decisions,
I do not believe it is safe to trust to individual reason. In everyday
business, reasoning is tolerably successful; but I am inclined to think
that it is done as well without the aid of theory as with it. A Logica
Utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the billiard player’s
nerves, best fulfills familiar uses. (Peirce (1935): 108-109)
The above passage can be interpreted mainly in two ways, which differ substantially
in the construal of the phrase \[T]heory of reasoning’. We will see how the interpre-
tation of such expression has significant consequences in the right interpretation of
Peirce’s take on the connection between logic and rationality. According to Peirce’s
previous discussion of the topic, the options seem to be:
1. \[T]heory of reasoning’ refers to logica docens. Therefore, the subsequent discussion
is meant to argue that logica docens is dispensable in the \conduct of life’ and unsafe
if followed by itself \[in] the great decisions’, without rejecting that logica utens is
necessary in our everyday reasoning. This interpretation of the passage would still
be compatible with a view contrary to Harman’s;
2. \[T]heory of reasoning’ refers to logica utens. If so, Peirce would be alluding
at the fact that normatively-guided inferential practice is dispensable in everyday
reasoning, so his position would lean towards something analogous to Harman’s view
on the relation between logic and rationality.
In other passages6, Peirce defines logica utens as a non-scientific inferential theory
which every individual holds in performing reasoning, intended as the inferential
activity of obtaining new knowledge from true premises, which makes logica utens
look close to the mental logic we will discuss in the next chapter. In another passage,
Peirce writes that \Now a person cannot perform the least reasoning without some
general ideal of good reasoning’.7 Therefore, the construal of point 2 above seems
implausible. In fact, as I mentioned, if a theory of good argument is a necessary
condition for reasoning, reasoning \without the aid of theory’ would be enough for
the reasoning to be irrational. In light of Peirce’s discussion, I think that logica
utens can be paraphrased as \a pre-scientific theory of validity’. In fact, on Peirce’s
6See Peirce (1932): 2.204.
7Peirce (1932): 2.186.
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account logica utens is 1) a theory of what good reasoning should look like, therefore
a normative theory; 2) a theory which nobody can dispense with when engaging in
reasoning; 3) a non-scientifically informed theory. So, saying that logica utens is a
folk (or pre-scientific) theory of validity doesn’t seem too far-fetched.
However, it seems reasonable to ask what happens to an agent’s logica utens when
she comes to believe a scientific theory of validity (logica docens). Is logica utens
superseded by logica docens once an agent has accepted a certain scientific account
of validity?
If I am right in taking logica utens to be a folk theory of validity, I think that agents
tend to retain logica utens anyway. But even so, what are the reasons for retaining a
pre-scientific theory once one has accepted a scientific one? To answer this question,
we might resort again to the passage above: \In everyday business, reasoning is
tolerably successful [.] [...] A Logica Utens, like the analytical mechanics resident
in the billiard player’s nerves, best fulfills familiar uses’.8 Peirce seems to address
the question, replying that the reason to keep a folk theory of consequence is that
it is successful in our everyday reasoning. It might be so because logica utens is,
e.g. inductively modelled and has a certain predictive power which our favourite
deductive theory lacks. For instance, suppose I hold some truth-value-gap logic as
my logica docens and that, according to that, I reject the Law of Excluded Middle
(LEM), |= A ∨¬ A. Nevertheless, it might be wise to stick to LEM in certain ordinary
cases, for example when I try to determine whether my cat has already been fed or
not. As another example, suppose I hold classical logic, which entitles me to apply
Ex Falso Quodlibet, A ∧¬A |= B, for any A and B. In my ordinary life, I don’t really
infer anything from a contradiction, but probably keep applying other logical laws
which my favourite logic holds as valid.
Many have attempted to explain this seemingly double standard, such as the minimal
rationality approaches discussed above. Those approaches defended a “human”, sit-
uated model of rationality, in which principles of reasoning (which seem pretty close
to epistemic norms) overcome logical principles. Here, I defend the view that logica
utens offers a normative theory of good argument which ordinary reasoning must
follow and that this view is compatible with (MR). As logica utens has normative
powers and logica docens has too, they might be seen as alternatively overcoming
each other. As Peirce writes, logica utens best fulfills familiar uses; on the other
hand, it still might be that logically-trained agents resort to scientific theories of
8Peirce (1935): 109.
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validity when engaging in reasoning about non-ordinary matters, more or less in the
same fashion as people apply certain naïve physical theories when trying to predict
roughly the path of a ball bouncing on the ground but have to resort to scientific
physical theories when confronted with the path of objects in space.
In order to understand how logica docens and logica utens interact, it might be useful
to consider in turn how each affects the other. Consequently, I will turn to examine
first the case of logica utens affecting logica docens and then vice versa.
Case 1 :
Our pre-scientific theory of good argument provides intuitions that we might want
to transfer to logica docens. The motivation for developing some non-classical logics
(and therefore, revising logica docens) has been that some classically valid inferences
don’t seem good inferences intuitively. A correlated question is: Can pre-scientific
theories of good argument be revised? Intuitively, I would answer \yes’. The logica
utens an agent holds when she is, say, 17 years old, can change over time even without
any training in formal or informal logic. Does revising logica utens affect logica docens
somehow? I don’t have a precise answer to this question, but in principle I think
that it would be possible that revising logica utens affects logica docens.
Case 2 :
Suppose that an agent gets training in logic for the first time, learns that some infer-
ential patterns previously applied are invalid, that some seemingly counterintuitive
inferential patterns are valid, etc. Then, the agent will presumably modify her logica
utens accordingly, e.g. by eliminating from her logica utens the invalid inferences.9
Nonetheless, as I mentioned above, agents might have reasons to retain their logica
utens even after having learnt to apply a logica docens. Does revising logica docens
affect logica utens? To answer, let’s give an example. Suppose I have been trained
to apply classical logic and to think that certain rules are valid, and suppose that
helped me reshape my pre-scientific theory of validity. At some point, I realise that
classical logic includes some invalid inferences and decide to adopt a paraconsistent
logic. This might be motivated by my intuitions about the invalidity of Explosion,
and in that case my decision about revising logica docens would perhaps be triggered
by the logical intuitions in my logica utens. In cases like this, a revision in the logica
docens doesn’t usually affect much the logica utens.
9My intuition is that when agents learn to apply logica docens, they tend to reorganize their logica
utens so as to eliminate invalid inferences more than to add counterintuitive valid inferences.
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To conclude, let’s consider models of rationality once again. The clash between (IAR)
and (MR) has been largely motivated by the different take on logic - especially on
the role and relevance of logic to rationality - they hold. (MR) focuses on actual
agents, instead of ideal agents with infallible logical abilities. The whole minimal
rationality project is concerned with developing a theory which takes into account
the cognitive, memory and deductive limitations that real agents actually have.
On the other hand, as we have seen, (IAR) assumes that agents hold a certain logical
system, which corresponds to what Peirce identified as logica docens, sticking to it
without exception. Therefore, if such an ideal agent existed, her logica utens would
conform exactly to the logica docens she holds. However, when minimal rationality
approaches tackle the question about how relevant logic is to rationality, suddenly the
options seem to squeeze into two alternatives: either we must expect from real agents
to conform to logica docens, i.e. a scientific deductive theory of valid arguments, in all
their beliefs, decisions, and intentions, or logic is not especially relevant to rationality.
As we have seen, from observing that real agents’ reasoning doesn’t conform to
logica docens all the time, (MR) advocates conclude that it just doesn’t conform to
logic tout court. A possible response along the lines of Peirce’s work could be that,
unlike with ideal agents, real agents’ logica docens and logica utens don’t overlap
entirely.10 In fact, if logica docens is meant to be a scientific theory of validity, it is
certainly the case that common people with no training in logic don’t even hold a
logica docens. This doesn’t mean they don’t have a clue about how good arguments
ought to look like, though. Moreover, this doesn’t mean that, for example, they lack
the competence to deem as irrational something which is a non sequitur. So, what
is this mysterious faculty which enables real agents to reason according to certain
normative logical patterns? Logica utens could look like a good candidate for filling
this gap, as it still displays the feature of being normative, which minimal rationality
models want to preserve.
In the next chapter, we will address the question whether there is something like
a logica utens applied by real agents. The corresponding psychological position is
called Mental Logic theory, and holds that people reason in conformity to some
mental inferential rules that, on some versions of Mental Logic, overlap with rules of
classical logic.
10Despite I am applying the distinction to the discussion on minimal rationality, I should point out





Abstract. Until late 1960’s, the mainstream view in the psychology of reasoning
held that human reasoning follows roughly the same principles as formal logic. The
then-orthodox view is often called Mental Logic Theory. In 1966, Peter Wason
developed his famous selection task to test people’s deductive reasoning skills, and
the results of his test became known as a knock-down counterexample to Mental
Logic.
In the chapter, I distinguish the main reactions to the results of the test and I high-
light that the responses to the selection task are philosophically relevant. Then,
I focus on a particular strategy to rescue the core idea underlying Mental Logic,
which I call the Wrong Conditional Reply, arguing that the strategy doesn’t with-
stand scrutiny. To make my point, I consider alternative versions of the selection
task (developed in the 1980’s) with manipulated semantic content, and I stress that
the responses given by the majority of people to those tests disconfirm the Wrong
Conditional Reply.
In the last section, I discuss the main theories of reasoning and how they explain the
evidence from experimental results, especially the selection task and its alternative
versions.
Finally, I argue that if we agree that the selection task and its alternative versions
are valuable as psychological evidence, we must conclude either that deductive
reasoning is not indispensable for rationality, or that the responses given by people
to the task show that they are often arational, rather than irrational.
5.1. Introduction
The last decades have seen a proliferation of studies in the psychology of reasoning.
Until the half of the last century, scholars would generally agree with a strongly
idealized view of human reasoning and, roughly speaking, with what philosophers
could call a Fregean view of human reasoning competences.
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However, some experiments performed in the late 1960’s revealed a disconcerting
deviance from logic in most of the subjects tested.
Since then, psychologists have tested people on a variety of reasoning abilities, e.g.
deductive, conditional, and probabilistic reasoning, just to mention a few. Concomi-
tantly, a wide array of theories have been developed to explain the experimental
results.
This chapter will address some philosophically relevant conclusions that have been
drawn from psychological experiments on reasoning. First, Wason’s test will be
described and it will be pointed out why the test is significant for the subsequent
study of reasoning.
The selection task leaves many open questions for both philosophers and psychol-
ogists to answer. Since the results of the test have been published, the scientific
community has been haunted by the suspicion that the test might prove that human
reasoning is illogical and/or irrational.
A way to avert this conclusion is to contest that the selection task addresses the
wrong kind of conditional, i.e. a conditional that is not often represented in human
reasoning. I call this the Wrong Conditional Reply. If this response to the selection
task were successful, it would be especially helpful to rescue Mental Logic theory,
which is often deemed as the main victim of Wason’s test.
According to the Wrong Conditional Reply, the responses to Wason’s test could have
been assessed taking into account conditionals different from material implication,
consequently averting the conclusion that humans are not rational. Before discussing
the Wrong Conditional view, Adams’ and Stalnaker’s probabilistic accounts of the
conditionals will be summarized.
Then, the problems with some of the theories of conditionals mentioned will be
pointed out.
In particular, Stalnaker’s account of the conditional has come under strong criticism,
and it has been subsequently ruled out by many. On the other hand, Adams’ account
of conditionals has had a better fate. Adams’ conditional is the focus of a version of
the Wrong Conditional Reply.
The Wrong Conditional thesis will be discussed and examined in light of the original
version of the selection task and of the alternative versions of the task. Then, it will
be determined whether non-material conditionals explain also the responses to the
alternative versions of the selection tasks.
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The last section will be devoted to the theories of reasoning that have been developed
and spread, paying attention to the way those theories have respectively claimed
Wason’s experiment to be supporting evidence. But, before we start, it is worth
pointing out what will be left aside from the discussion, as the experimental results
we will consider in a moment are but a small part of all the studies produced in the
psychology of reasoning.
There is a huge literature on reasoning, be it deductive or inductive, but not much
work has been done to import the results from cognitive science to philosophy. The
issue of human rationality raised from the psychological studies is important and
philosophically relevant, but philosophers are sometimes discouraged from taking
empirical results seriously.
However, there are some fortunate exceptions. The general issue of the philosophical
import of reasoning experiments has been addressed by Stein (1997), who argues
that a philosophical study of human rationality cannot dispense from taking into
account the experimental results in the psychology of reasoning. In particular, Stein
discusses what he calls ‘the standard picture of rationality’, and argues in favour of
another view, that he calls ‘the naturalized picture of rationality’.
Briefly, the standard picture of rationality is the view claiming that rationality is
subject to some normative principles of reasoning, and the principles of reasoning
are usually taken to be derived from logic or probability.
In other words, the standard picture is understood as taking logical or probabilistic
principles as the standard against which reasoning is to be assessed. If a piece of
reasoning doesn’t match up with such normative principles, it can be judged as
irrational. However, Stein argues, if we really want to keep the standard picture
of rationality, we must accept the harsh verdict suggested by the experiments on
reasoning.
In light of the experiments, Stein claims, there is no easy way to reconcile the stan-
dard picture with the view that human are in fact rational. Consequently, Stein goes
on, arguing that humans are rational requires that the standard picture of rationality
be ruled out.
For this reason, Stein suggests a different picture of rationality, which doesn’t en-
compass a unique set of normative principles of reasoning. The naturalized picture
of rationality is described as a system where the normative principles of reasoning
are given by a wide reflective equilibrium, instead of being provided by logic alone
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(or probability alone). The reflective equilibrium keeps in balance what we con-
sider correct reasoning; what we deem as the general principles of correct reasoning;
philosophical and scientific theories, and scientific evidence.
Thanks to the scientific evidence, we acknowledge the cognitive and temporal limita-
tions of human agents. In a naturalized picture of rationality, the scientific evidence
input and the other inputs balance out. So, Stein claims, the picture of rationality
emerging from the reflective equilibrium avoids the pitfalls both of a an idealized
model of rationality, and of a trivial model of rationality.
5.2. Ideal agents and real agents
For some time, the study of reasoning in experimental psychology was dominated
by the Mental Logic theory, according to which ordinary agents’ reasoning conforms
to inferential rules similar to those of classical logic. An early version of this view
(also called logicism in the psychology of reasoning)1 can be attributed to Piaget
(1972b), who claimed that the adult cognitive stage is characterized by the ability
to use symbols and abstract operations (the so-called formal operation stage of the
cognitive development).
As we will see more in detail in the fourth section, the early developments of the
psychology of reasoning were still clinging onto the view that reasoning was mostly
syllogistic. It is more contentious whether the early studies referred to Aristotelian
syllogistics, or rather to some modern re-elaboration of them.
Piaget was halfway between the early psychologists, who still identified human
reasoning with syllogistic reasoning, and the modern psychologists. Therefore, it
shouldn’t surprise that Piaget’s writings include plenty of references to syllogisms.
However, Piaget’s work on operational logic shows that not only he was aware of the
20th-century developments of formal logic (for example, Piaget cites logical atomism
and axiomatic theory), but he had substantial familiarity with modern logic.2
Piaget claimed that there is a correspondence between the formal operations of cog-
nitively fully developed subjects on one side, and classical logic on the other. This
is not the same as claiming that people were born with perfectly developed logical
abilities, though.
1Not to be confused with philosophical logicism.
2For example, Piaget (1972a), §§49, 50 are devoted to discuss negation-free logics and multivalued
logic, respectively.
5.2. IDEAL AGENTS AND REAL AGENTS 103
With his famous Cognitive Stages Theory (CST), Piaget meant to show that in the
last stage of cognitive development (that starts approximately at the age of 13),
subjects are able to pursue and complete reasoning tasks requiring the ability to ab-
stract away from concrete objects and situations. The last stage is called the Formal
Operational Stage right because individuals at this stage display formal reasoning
skills. In other words, subjects who have reached the last stage are able to reason
on the basis of the form of propositions, i.e. the internal structure of propositions,
regardless of their content. Morever, when a subject reaches the Formal Operational
Stage, she is able to handle reasoning also with the relations between propositions,
abstracting from the propositions’ content.3 CST was subsequently identified as an
early variety of the broader Mental Logic theory and Piaget was discussed in the
psychology of reasoning for his “Fregean” views on human reasoning.
The key points of Mental Logic theory had been taken for granted during the first
half of the twentieth century at least but, from the late 1960’s, experimental results
started to cast doubt on the tenets of Mental Logic. The revolutionary experiments
presented in Wason (1966) are taken to show that Mental Logic didn’t get the picture
quite right.
In the tests run by Wason, known as the selection task, the experimenter lays down
four cards in front of you, as represented in Fig.1. You know that each card has a
number on one side and a letter on the other side, and the experimenter asks you
to turn over only those cards that are relevant to determine whether the following
claim is true:
If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side.
Fig.1 4
3Piaget distinguishes intrapropositional operations from interpropositional operations. The latter
are about relations between propositions (e.g. logical connectives), whereas the former refer to the
internal structure of a proposition.
4Image from http://www.psychologyinaction.org/2012/10/07/classic-psychology-experiments-
wason-selection-task-part-i/
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It turns out that the vast majority of people taking part in the study select card A
(which is correct) and a significant portion of them also pick card 4 (which is incorrect
according to classical logic and most non-classical logics), whereas less than 10% of
the participants turn cards A and 7 (arguably the logically correct choice).
The error made by people choosing to turn cards A and 4 in the test is seemingly to
commit the Affirming the Consequent fallacy, whereas people who decide to turn only
card A seem to be not capable of applying Modus Tollens. Therefore, the selection
task has been revolutionary because it has been taken to show primarily that ordinary
agents fail to reason according to logical rules substantively and repeatedly. However,
not everyone agrees on what the psychological or philosophical import of the selection
task is, and there have been many conflicting replies to the experiment.
To make things clear, we could divide the main reactions to the selection task into
two big groups: in the first group, there are all those who think that there is a
substantive way in which reasoning logically is a necessary feature of rationality (I
call this view Rationality&Logic); in the second group, there are all those who think
that following deductive reasoning is not an essential feature of rationality (I call this
view RationalityOrLogic).
Within the Rationality&Logic group, there are two main responses to Wason’s eper-
imental results. The first is just to take the results at face value and bite the bullet,
admitting that human beings are illogical and, as such, humans are also irrational
(we could call this the irrationality thesis, following Stein (1997)). I discuss this view
in more detail in the fourth section.
The second response under the Rationality&Logic group tries to cope with the re-
sults without admitting that humans are irrational. There are two main strategies
to do this, namely (i) arguing that the selection task is unreliable and the results of
the test shouldn’t be taken seriously, or (ii) arguing that the interpretation of the
task incorrectly assumes that the conditional in the test should be interpreted as a
material implication (I call this the Wrong Conditional Reply). The latter strategy
supports the view that Wason’s results are compatible with non-classical condition-
als, such as, e.g. conditional probability or Adams’ probabilistic conditional (see
Duca (2009)).
Before we discuss the non-classical conditional response to the selection task, it
is worth explaining what the conditional probability approach and, in particular,
Adams’ conditional are.
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5.3. Conditional probability
Many of us are familiar with material implication, which has been taught in ba-
sic logic courses for decades. The truth conditions for material implication, ⊃, are
v(ϕ ⊃ ψ) = 1 iff v(ϕ) = 0 or v(ψ) = 1. The truth conditions say that the antecedent
being false or the consequent being true are sufficient for the implication to be true,
which might be found unintuitive. But perhaps the truth table for ⊃ was enough
to persuade us that we could ignore the seeming counterintuitivity of material im-
plication and be content with it. However, even if we are convinced that material
implication is an adequate account of the conditional, there are some examples that
demonstrate that conditionals are not truth-functional. To see this point, I will use
an example from Read (1995).
First of all, suppose you and I are discussing an issue and we have opposite views.
As our views are mutually inconsistent, they cannot both be true. Now, consider the
sentence
Either if I was right so were you, or if you were right, so was I.
(Read (1995): 73)
The truth tables for material implication and for disjunction tell us that one of the
two conditionals must be true. Therefore, the disjunction is true, no matter who is
right. However, we cannot help thinking that the conditionals are not true, so the
example seems to give substance to the suspicion that conditionals are not truth-
functional, after all.
In addition, Ramsey’s test confirmed the intuitive worries about conditionals. The
basic idea underlying Ramsey’s test was: to prove the credibility of a conditional \If
ϕ then ψ’, when you are uncertain about the truth of ϕ, add hypothetically ϕ to
your set of beliefs. Then, check whether you would believe ψ. Clearly, the test is not
designed to test the truth value of conditionals, but their chances to be believed.
Unsurprisingly, once put to the test, none of the conditionals in the example \Either
if I was right so were you, or if you were right, so was I’ turns out to be credible.
Consider the setup of our example once again: you and I have mutually inconsistent
views on an issue, and each of us is arguing in favour of her view. Now, let’s take the
first conditional, \If I was right so were you’, and add hypothetically the antecedent
(\I am right’) to our stock of beliefs. Would you believe the consequent (\You are
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right’)? Clearly not. Let’s do the same with the other conditional, \If you were right,
so was I’. As Ramsey’s test prescribes, let’s take the antecedent (\You are right’) and
add it hypothetically to our set of beliefs. Would you believe the consequent (\I am
right’)? No, you wouldn’t believe this either.
In response to the seeming implausibility of material implication, Stalnaker and
Adams developed their conditional probability approaches which, as the name itself
suggests, employ probabilities instead of truth values. The general considerations
behind the choice of adopting probability are (a) that probabilities capture reason-
ing with uncertain premises better than truth conditions, and (b) that a theory of
conditionals cashed out in terms of probabilities would recapture logical truths and
falsities as absolutely credible or absolutely incredible propositions anyway.
Probability functions assign values between 0 and 1 to the propositions. Unsurpris-
ingly, logical truths take value 1 and contradictions take value 0. Moreover, supposing
that ϕ is a proposition, the probability of ¬ϕ, p(¬ϕ), is equal to the probability of
1 - p(ϕ).
The conditional probability of ψ given ϕ (formally translated as p(ψ|ϕ)) is explained
as the ratio of probability that both ϕ and ψ are true, divided by the probability
that ψ is true, p(ϕ∧ψ)
p(ψ)
, and provided that p(ψ) is greater than 0.5
The conditional probability approach developed by Stalnaker (1970) suggests that
conditionals be read as conditional probabilities. In other words, on Stalnaker’s
account, \If ϕ then ψ’ would be read as \ψ, given ϕ’. Accordingly, p(if ϕ then ψ)
is equal to p(ψ|ϕ). Put in a slogan that has become familiar, the probability of the
conditional is measured by the conditional probability.
Lewis (1973) opposes Stalnaker’s account of conditional probability, proving that
there is no proposition such that its probability is equal to the conditional prob-
ability.6 In particular, Lewis argues, there is no conditional whose probability is
measured by the conditional probability.
Adams (1975) offers a slightly different account of conditionals, that is aimed to avoid
Lewis’ objection to Stalnaker’s account. In fact, Adams argues that the conditional
probability measures the assertability of the conditional, rather than its probability.7
5See Read (1995) for a detailed discussion of theories of conditional.
6Lewis’ argument against Stalnaker’s thesis is often referred to as the triviality argument.
7See also Edgington (2008) for a nice summary of Adams’ theory of conditionals.
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In addition, Adams shows that an argument, Γ ∴ A, is valid iff the improbability of
A8 is smaller than or equal to the sum of the improbabilities of the propositions in
Γ. In Adams’ words:
Given a probability function p for a factual language L, and a
formula ϕ of L, the uncertainty of ϕ relative to p is the number
up(ϕ) = 1 - p(ϕ). The uncertainty of ϕ measures the degree to
which ϕ is regarded as unlikely. Two easily demonstrable facts
about uncertainty as here characterized are that if ϕ entails ψ then
up(ψ) is no greater than up(ϕ), and that up(ϕ1 & ... & ϕn) is no
greater than the sum of the uncertainties up(ϕi), for i = 1, ..., n.
Combined, the foregoing imply that if a factual formula is a logical
consequence of a finite set of such formulas, then the uncertainty of
the consequence is no greater than the sum of the uncertainties of
the premises. (Adams (1975): 49)
According to Adams’ definition of validity, classically valid arguments are valid also
probabilistically, provided that they have a non-conditional conclusion. Most no-
tably, some classically valid inferential rules are valid in Adams’ logic, such as ϕ,
ϕ→ψ |= ψ (Modus Ponens), ϕ→ψ, ¬ψ |= ¬ϕ (Modus Tollens), and ϕ ∨ ψ, ϕ → χ,
ψ → χ |= χ (∨-Elimination, or Reasoning by cases).9 On the other hand, Adams’
conditional doesn’t validate many inference schemata having a conditional conclu-
sion, such as ψ ∴ ϕ → ψ, ¬ϕ ∴ ϕ → ψ, and Conditional Proof.
With Conditional Proof invalid, some classical theorems can’t be proven. For in-
stance, ϕ→ψ a` ¬ψ → ¬ϕ (Contraposition) is not a thorem in Adams’ system.
Reformulated in conditional probability terms, if Contraposition held, the probabil-
ity of ψ|ϕ would be equal to the probability of ¬ϕ|¬ψ. However, p(ψ|ϕ) 6= p(¬ϕ|¬ψ).
Consider also the following sentence: \If it should rain, it will not rain heavily’. The
sentence doesn’t intuitively imply its contrapositive, \If it will rain heavily, it should
not rain’.10
8The improbability of A is equal to 1 - p(A).
9Here and in the remainder, I use → to denote Adams’ conditional.
10It can be argued that the \if’ in the weather counterexample should be rather interpreted as an
\even if’.
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It is important that we keep in mind these facts about probabilistic validity, because
they are crucial to the discussion in the next section.
5.4. Conditionals in the selection task
It is now time to go back to the responses to the selection task. In the first section,
we had seen that there are mainly two ways to react to the selection task’s results:
either you admit that rationality and logic sometimes go separate ways (I dubbed this
option RationalityOrLogic), or you think that logic is an indispensable component
of rationality (Rationality&Logic, in my slang).
Within the Rationality&Logic group, either you bite the bullet and admit that hu-
mans are irrational, or you hold tight to the idea that humans are rational. If you go
for the latter, you have two options: you can choose to show that the selection task
is not a reliable piece of evidence, or you can argue that the conditional in the task
is erroneously identified as material implication. I have called the latter strategy the
Wrong Conditional Reply.
According to this strategy, it is wrong to assume that the conditional claim in the
test is a material implication. First of all, one could argue, material implication is an
inadequate account of the conditional and it has been proven to be wrong (Stalnaker,
Adams, and many others thought so, for example). Clearly, if you are convinced that
conditionals are not truth-functional and you presuppose that humans do reason
according to material implication, which is an inadequate account of the conditional
by your lights, you are implying that human reasoning is rather hopeless. But, if
the results of the selection task show anything, they show that the tested subjects
don’t apply material implication come what may. Therefore, your concern about
people applying the wrong conditional, i.e. material implication, is ungrounded.
In addition, if you are a non-truth-functionalist about conditionals, you cannot be
assuming that humans should reason according to material implication, otherwise
you would expect that humans conform to a wrong standard of reasoning.
On the other hand, one could suppose that the results of the selection task actually
show that the tested subjects didn’t read the conditional in the task as a material
implication, but rather as a conditional probability. If it were so, the subjects would
have intepreted the conditional claim in the task as something similar to \Determine
p(even number on one side/vowel on other side)’. This interpretation of the condi-
tional claim would justify part of the responses to the selection task. To see this,
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suppose you want to determine the probability of a card having an even number on
one side given that it has a vowel on the other side. Without a doubt, you choose
the card having a vowel on its visible side, i.e. A, in our example.
However, the conditional probabilistic interpretation apparently doesn’t give you a
reason to turn the card with an odd number on it, as Contraposition fails with the
probabilistic conditional. Therefore, conditional probability could explain why the
tested subjects didn’t choose to turn the 7, along with the A.
Nonetheless, it does matter what account of conditional probability the Wrong Con-
ditional Reply is ready to support. Some accounts of conditional probability, such as
Stalnaker’s, are subject to important criticism. In particular, Stalnaker’s view has
been disproved by Lewis’ triviality argument. Consequently, granted that Stalnaker’s
conditional probability account is wrong, assuming that humans reason according to
conditional probability à la Stalnaker would take one straight to the conclusion that
human reasoning is structurally wrong. In such a scenario, the conditional proba-
bility reading of the conditional claim in the selection task wouldn’t be in a better
position than the material implication reading.
Clearly, a sensible choice of the conditional is crucial for the Wrong Conditional
Reply to be effective. According to Duca (2009), the upshot of the selection task is
indeed to show that human reasoning doesn’t conform to material implication. Duca
argues that Wason’s results show that humans read the conditional claim in the test
as an Adamsonian conditional probability.
In fact, the rule that the subjects tested fail to apply in the four cards task is Con-
traposition, i.e. ϕ → ψ a` ¬ψ → ¬ϕ. As we have seen, Contraposition holds with
material implication, but it is not valid according to Adams’ definition of probabilis-
tic validity. Therefore, the subjects tested in Wason’s experiment cannot be blamed
for not applying a rule that is not valid in the theory of conditionals they use.
Duca adds that, unlike Contraposition, Modus Tollens (classically and probabilis-
tically valid) is not among the rules that the tested subjects fail to apply. The
reason for this is simple. The four cards task asks to test (therefore, to disprove) a
conditional claim. As we know, Modus Tollens says that ϕ→ ψ, ¬ψ |= ¬ϕ.
However, in the selection task, the tested subjects are provided only with the con-
ditional premise of the rule (i.e. ϕ → ψ). As the second premise of Modus Tollens,
i.e, ¬ψ, is missing from the input, the subjects are not to blame for not applying the
rule.
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As there are many criticisms showing that material implication is not the best theory
of conditionals, Duca concludes that the tested subjects are in fact rational to not
apply Contraposition. The subjects read the conditional in the test as a probabilis-
tic conditional, and their interpretation of the conditional is right. Therefore, the
subjects don’t commit any reasoning error.
This hardly seems to be the end of the story, though. In fact, there is a consideration
to be made about any theory rejecting Contraposition, and another consideration
which is specifically about the version of the Wrong Conditional Reply discussed.
First, a theory that denies the validity of Contraposition should also explain why
others have thought Contraposition to be valid. A theory rejecting Contraposition
might even admit that some applications of Contraposition are right, but it should
provide an explanation about why it could be sometimes right to apply Contraposi-
tion.
In addition, there is another problem, that affects specifically the Wrong Conditional
Reply. The Wrong Conditional thesis needs the results of the test to be consistent
across the different versions of the selection task. Therefore, showing that people
don’t apply Contraposition in the vowel-even number task because they read the
conditional as a probabilistic conditional is not enough to confirm the thesis.
In a famous alternative version of the selection task due to Griggs and Cox (1982),
people are given a test having the same underlying structure as the four-card task.
However, instead of letters and number, the cards describe concrete situations, such
as \Drinks beer’, \Drinks soda’, \Is 21 years old’, \Is 16 years old’, and the claim to test
refers to a concrete situation as well, such as \If someone drinks alcohol, they must
be over 18 years old’. As it happens, most people responded to this version of the
selection task applying Contraposition (according to the testers, this was the correct
answer), and the result of Griggs & Cox’s experiment has been taken to suggest that
the subjects tested intepret the conditional claim of the selection task contextually
to the way the selection task is presented.
What the Wrong Conditional thesis doesn’t explain is why people did apply Contra-
position in Griggs & Cox’s version of the selection task. On the contrary, it seems
that trying to prove that people apply consistently the same conditional across the
versions of the test ends up in a deadlock. But let’s follow Duca’s suggestion a bit
further, and let’s suppose for a moment that we agree with Duca that the subjects
interpreted the conditional claim as a probabilistic conditional in the vowel-even
number version. Then, we should admit that people apply Contraposition anyway
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in the underage-drinking version of the selection task. Let’s concede that Contrapo-
sition is not valid with material implication exclusively, so we don’t need to conclude
that people read the conditional claim as an instance of material implication in the
underage-drinking version of the test. Nonetheless, the experimental results would
point out that the tested subjects are not consistent with respect to the application
of the rule.
Furthermore, we have seen that Duca argues that it would not be rational to ap-
ply Contraposition in the selection task (Duca considers the vowel-even number test
specifically). Then, either Griggs & Cox’s test can be shown to provide weak evi-
dence (for example, having methodological flaws, or similar reasons), or the Wrong
Conditional response is committed to the irrationality thesis anyway.
If avoiding Contraposition is rational, yet people apply Contraposition in the alter-
native versions of the test, either (i) people could be blamed for giving an irrational
response to the task in the alternative versions, or (ii) the theory rejecting Contra-
position acknowledges correct applications of Contraposition, and needs to provide
an explanation of these exceptions.
What Griggs & Cox’s results show at first sight is that the subjects tested don’t seem
to intepret the conditional consistently over the different selection tasks. Therefore,
the Wrong Conditional Reply is not an effective strategy to defend the Rational-
ity&Logic view, unless it provides a plausible way to explain the exceptions, namely,
the applications of Contrapositions.
There is still another option to be discussed: the irrationality thesis claims that
people are irrational because they fail to apply Contraposition in the original version
of the task. Nonetheless, we have seen that people apply Contraposition in the
underage-drinking version of the test, which Griggs & Cox consider the right answer.
If we are to show that people are irrational even though they seem to act rationally
on some occasions, such as the underage-drinking test, we must prove that acting
rationally occasionally is not enough to define human agents as rational, after all.
The irrationality thesis is addressed more in detail in the next section, and some
possible responses to it are examined.
5.5. Errors of reasoning and their explanation
Experimental psychology has shown that human agents display a significant deviance
from deductive laws in their reasoning. Wason’s selection task is probably among
the most famous examples of how human reasoning can go wrong in deductive tasks,
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although it was originally designed to test Piaget’s theory that people reason accord-
ing to an innate mental logic (that becomes fully developed around the age of 14)
that happens to be classical logic.
However, the experimental results seem to show quite the opposite. The selection
task was taken to show that human agents often fail to reason deductively. The ques-
tion that stems from such evidence is: Can an agent make mistakes systematically in
performing deductive reasoning and still be considered a rational agent? Moreover,
performance in reasoning tasks includes a mix of correct reasoning and errors. How
to account for that? The mistakes may be due to processing limitations, inaccurate
heuristics, or comprehension difficulties. Wason interpreted the results as hinting
at something more systematic and substantial about reasoning errors, namely that
human agents are mostly irrational.
Nonetheless, this might sound as too harsh a conclusion. A charitable reading of
Wason’s conclusion could go along the following lines: we should draw a distinction
between arationality and irrationality, and we could think of the notions of arational
and irrational as mirroring the meanings of amoral and immoral in ethics. I will
explain the reader the meaning of the latter pair of words in order to draw the parallel
with arationality and irrationality.
An agent is (i) amoral if she is indifferent towards moral principles; (ii) an agent
is immoral if she intentionally violates moral principles. For example, a person
suffering from cognitive disorders who doesn’t show empathy toward other human
beings cannot be considered immoral. Such a person is considered amoral because
she is not intentionally violating moral principles or social conventions; in fact, she
is just failing to realize other people’s needs and what behaviour is appropriate to
meet those needs. Another case where people show amorality rather than immorality
is when they deliberately suspend their moral considerations. For instance, when a
scientist pursues her research without considering whether it will have good or bad
consequences, she acts amorally. On the contrary, when a scientist is aware that her
research will have a negative impact on her community or on the environment, but
she carries on nonetheless, she is acting immorally.
Likewise, we could think of an agent as (i) arational if she reasons in a way that
doesn’t comply with the principles of rationality; we could think of an agent as (ii)
irrational if she violates rationality principles consciously. In common usage, irra-
tional is often used in a way that resembles the meaning of arational, which can
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explain why Wason concluded that human agents are irrational. However, as vio-
lating the principles of rationality intentionally is presumably something that agents
don’t do often, attributing irrationality to the people tested would be inaccurate. It
is much more plausible that the subjects engaged in the reasoning task fail to see
what rule they are expected to apply or, in other words, that they act arationally
rather than irrationally.
The arationality hypothesis relies on an assumption: that we espouse the material
implication reading of the conditional claim in the selection task. In fact, if we didn’t
take the material reading to be the correct one, we wouldn’t ask whether the subjects
tested exhibit the “symptoms” of irrationality or not.
So far, we have considered some of the views that can be attributed to the stance I
labelled Rationality&Logic. In the remainder of this section, I briefly describe some
of the theories that could be grouped under the RationalityOrLogic label.
5.5.1 Rationality Or Logic
As we know, the selection test has raised many questions on how its results should
be interpreted. Wason’s test has been used as supporting evidence for a variety
of theses, and the very fact that the test apparently justifies diametrically opposed
theories has even cast doubts on the reliability of the selection task itself.
O’Brien (1995) divides the reactions to Wason’s experiment results into two large
categories: on one side, the mental-logic theorists deny that the outcome of the
selection task has any particular relevance to the Mental Logic, and refuse to take the
experimental results at face value; on the other side, the bias theorists use Wason’s
task to prove that our reasoning abilities are content-sensitive. For example, the
bias theory argues that the outcome of the selection task is unsuccessful when the
prompt provided to the agents is abstract, whereas the agents conform to deductive
laws when the test is presented in a less abstract and more familiar frame.
On the other hand, Evans and Over (1997) argue for a dual system explanation of
the selection task’s results, according to which we should distinguish two types of
rationality, labelled Rationality1 and Rationality2.
The duties of the two rationality systems are described below:
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Rationality1 Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting in a way
that is generally reliable and efficient for achieving one’s goals. This type
of rationality doesn’t require much cognitive effort from the agent, and
the actions pertaining to Rationality1 could follow behavioural patterns
that the agent is not fully aware of.
Rationality2 Thinking, speaking, reasoning, making a decision, or acting when one
has a principled way, often sanctioned by a normative theory, for what
one does. Rationality2 is more demanding for the agent as it requires a
conscious cognitive effort.
In this framework, reasoning errors detected by deductive tasks, such as the selection
task, are taken to be a failure of Rationality2. As this view assumes that the two
kinds of rationality are completely separate, according to Evans and Over (1997),
failing to pick the correct options in a deductive task doesn’t imply that human
agents are not rational tout court, but that they are not rational2.
Although I am not committed to the frame suggested by Evans and Over, it should
be pointed out that whatever the correct definition of rationality may be, the irra-
tionality thesis doesn’t seem to be the correct response to the results of the selection
task, even if we endorse the material reading of the conditional in the experiment.
In the remainder, I sketch a summary of the psychological theories of reasoning that
have been presented in the literature. Every subsection on the main theories of
reasoning addresses also how the theory discussed replies to the challenge provided
by the selection task and its versions.
5.5.2 An initial distinction in the study of reasoning: psychometrics and
experimental psychology
Study of high-level cognition has originally been divided into two groups: psychomet-
rics and experimental psychology. Both of them were developed at the beginning of
the twentieth century and they have maintained separate paths until recently, when
their complementarity started to be appreciated.
Psychometrics consists in the measurement of mental traits and, more famously,
intelligence. The study of psychometrics has tried to isolate factors that were broadly
associated with intelligence. Among such factors were the so-called factor I and
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factor D, which stand for \induction’ and \deduction’, respectively. Unfortunately,
the methodology applied in psychometrics showed its faults when it became clear that
psychometric tests didn’t show any significant evidence supporting the existence of
factors I and D. In fact, the experiments weren’t sampled broadly enough for the
resulting factors to reappear in further testing. In addition, the factors yielded by the
psychometric tests were found to correspond to processes that were highly dependent
on individuals.
On the other hand, the study of reasoning in experimental psychology follows many
streams. The main theories of reasoning are:
a. Mental logic: rational agents reason conforming to inferential rules similar to those
of classical propositional logic. This view can be attributed to Piaget (1972b,a), who
claimed that the adult cognitive status is characterised by the ability of using sym-
bols and abstract operations (the so-called \formal operation stage’ of the cognitive
development).
b. Rational agents’ deductive abilities are content-sensitive, as argued in Cosmides
(1989, 2005); reasoning in humans follows certain patterns determined by cognitive
biases, as argued by ?Kahneman (2011).
c. Mental models : rational agents reason according to mental representations of
possible situations, as held by ?Johnson-Laird (2006).
d. Rational agents compute probabilities, as argued by Oaksford and Chater (2007)
and Oaksford et al. (2008).
As mentioned earlier, Wason’s selection task has been advocated as supporting ev-
idence for different theories. Specifically, bias theory, mental model theory and the
probabilistic-mind theory all claim the selection task as evidence in their favour,
respectively.
Now, I want to discuss a bit more in detail the four competing parties in the psy-
chology of reasoning. I will start with bias theory, then I will discuss mental models,
mental logic and, last, the probabilistic mind theory.
5.5.3 Bias theory
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Bias theory holds that human agents follow cognitive biases (especially confirmation
biases) in their reasoning. For example, real agents tend to favour information that
confirm their previous hypotheses (as concluded by Wason (1968)).11
A different branch of the bias theory distinguishes different levels in human cognitive
architecture. In the study of human reasoning faculties, two levels have been indi-
viduated: (i) an algorithmic level that is responsible for computational processes and
information processing; (ii) an intentional level that is not concerned with computa-
tion but rather with the goal of computation. Stanovich (2008) argues that errors in
deductive tasks are due to the triggering of a set of autonomous processes12 at the
algorithmic level that we might identify as characteristic of heuristics. The response
suggested from the autonomous processes can be overridden, and this is in fact what
happens in a minority of cases (less than 10% of the responses on the selection task),
and when the tested subjects are told what went wrong with their responses.
The overriding of the autonomous process is carried out by the cognitive operation
of decoupling. Decoupling of cognitive representations consists in representing a
belief as separate from the state-of-the-world it is representing. This is, among other
things, what makes decoupling essential for hypothetical reasoning. Overriding the
autonomous-process-primed response results in complying with the normative stance
that requires that agents stick to decoupling of cognitive representations (decoupling
is considered an algorithmic process). This is true even though sometimes failing
to decouple triggers autonomous algorithmic processes that happen to result in the
correct response to a test. For instance, when people respond to the underage-
drinking task applying Contraposition,13 they might be doing so because they don’t
detach the hypothetical reasoning from the frame the task is presented within. People
are used to complying with the laws of the state they live in or, at least, they know
that they can be punished for not abiding by those laws, and the underage-drinking
example includes prohibitions that are familiar to them. Therefore, they respond
correctly to Griggs & Cox’s version of the test.
However, Stanovich argues that there is more than the failure of decoupling to explain
the high rate of reasoning errors in deduction tasks. Individuals have epistemic values
11Although Wason took this to imply that reasoning biases are a sign of the irrationality of human
agents.
12The processes in question are characterized by their ability to bring about a quick, mandatory re-
sponse that doesn’t depend on input from high-level systems and doesn’t load the central processing
capacity.
13Which is the correct response, according to the experimenters.
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and norms that are processed at the intentional cognitive level, and that are often
arranged as thinking dispositions, i.e. dispositions to, e.g. privilege beliefs already
possessed over new beliefs (confirmation biases), or rather to challenge beliefs already
held in favour of new beliefs. These thinking dispositions can predict argument
evaluation skills, and they can lead to different responses in individuals with an
equal algorithmic capacity.
Stanovich argues also against the widespread view that reasoning errors are to be
attributed to a divorce between competence and performance in human reasoning.
The competence/performance advocates assume that errors in the performance are
random, whereas Stanovich (2008) argues that the epistemic norms at the intentional
level are responsible for errors in most of the cases. Is this like saying that human
agents have a principled way to go wrong on deductive tasks? In short, yes.
Stanovich’s theory seems to be confirmed by evidence in syllogistic reasoning exper-
iments. The following test was run on college students and was constituted of some
examples of syllogisms, with the tested subjects asked to tell whether the syllogisms
in question were valid or not. One of the syllogisms presented was:
All living things need water
Roses need water
Therefore, roses are living things.
Around 70% of the students deemed the syllogism as valid, as reported in Stanovich
(2008). However, when the terms of the syllogism were replaced as follows:
All insects need oxygen
Mice need oxygen
Therefore, mice are insects,
a substantial number of the students who deemed the previous syllogism valid, con-
sidered the second syllogism invalid.14 In line with Stanovich, the outcome of the test
can be taken to show that most of the students who responded to the task were com-
plying with a possible epistemic norm such as \Stick to reality as much as you can’,
formulated at the intentional level. Or, according to a different intepretation of the
14Experimental data reported in Stanovich (2008).
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syllogism task’s results, individuals might be inclined to think that if an argument
has true premises and a true conclusion, it must be a sound argument.
We have discussed dispositions to reason or act in certain ways because of some
cognitive processes taking place at the intentional level. Now, let’s turn to the more
general study of biases, which is not concerned directly with intentions but recognizes
that dispositions play an important role in reasoning. Generally speaking, biases have
been the object of a systematic study since the 1970’s. Especially after Wason’s work
on the selection task, the notion of confirmation (or matching) bias was developed
to explain why people responded to the task in the ways we have already seen. In
particular, Evans and Lynch (1973) suggested that people tend to choose to turn
cards A and 4 because they tend to match the values named in the conditional claim
\If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side’
when they try to verify the claim.
The most famous studies in bias theory have been produced by Kahneman and Tver-
sky. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) especially analyze judgment under uncertainty
and argue that the biases that people display when they reason about the probability
of an event can be grouped under three main classes. The categories in question are
dubbed Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring.
Here is a brief description for each of the biases classes:
Representativeness
Kahneman & Tversky explain that when people are asked about how likely is that a
certain event will occur, or how likely is that an object belongs to a class, they apply
a heuristic that can be called representativeness heuristic. In this heuristic, people
often make use of stereotypes, as in an example cited by Kahneman & Tversky:
[...] consider an individual who has been described by a former
neighbor as follows: “Steve is very shy and withdrawn, invariably
helpful, but with little interest in people, or in the world of reality.
A meek and tidy soul, he has a need for order and structure, and a
passion for detail.” How do people assess the probability that Steve
is engaged in a particular occupation from a list of possibilities (for
example, farmer, salesman, airline pilot, librarian, or physician)?
How do people order these occupations from most to least likely?
In the representativeness heuristic, the probability that Steve is a
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librarian, for example, is assessed by the degree to which he is repre-
sentative of, or similar to, the stereotype of a librarian. (Kahneman
(2011): 954)
Strikingly, the use of stereotypes overrides numerical facts. In our example, it is
statistically more likely that Steve is a farmer (or a salesman) because there are
more people employed as farmers (or salesmen) than people working as librarians.
• Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes. People engaged in an expected
probability task often neglect the base/rate data coming from previous oc-
currences. In other words, when subjects are provided with information that
activates expectations about an event, E, the information triggering the ex-
pectations trumps the information about the frequency of E occurring in
the past. However, people tend to take prior probabilities into consideration
when they are not provided with other information that activate expecta-
tions about E.
• Insensitivity to sample size. When people are asked to give a judgment on
a property appearing in a sample, they apply representativeness heuristic.
Given certain information about the probability distribution of a parameter,
such as the height of male adults, the subjects tested tend to esteem the
probability distribution of the relevant parameter in exactly the same way,
regardless of sample size. Kahneman & Tversky mention a test to exemplify
the bias:
Consider the following example:
Imagine an urn filled with balls, of which 2/3 are of one color and
1/3 of another. One individual has drawn 5 balls from the urn,
and found that 4 were red and 1 was white. Another individual
has drawn 20 balls and found that 12 were red and 8 were white.
Which of the two individuals should feel more confident that the
urn contains 2/3 red balls and 1/3 white balls, rather than the
opposite? What odds should each individual give?
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In this problem, the correct posterior odds are 8 to 1 for the 4:1
sample and 16 to 1 for the 12:8 sample, assuming equal prior prob-
abilities. However, most people feel that the first sample provides
much stronger evidence for the hypothesis that the urn is predomi-
nantly red, because the proportion of red balls is larger in the first
than in the second sample. (Kahneman (2011): 964)
The answers given to the task reveals that people tend to ignore the statistical fact
that a deviance from average is more likely to be found in a smaller sample than in a
larger sample. In addition, other tests have highlighted that people’s responses seem
to be unaffected by clauses that make the importance of sample size explicit.
• Misconception of chance. The bias of misconceiving chance can be seen
as a special case of insensitivity to sample size. People expect random
sequences of events to display the same features, regardless of the length of
the sequence. For example, people looking at a roulette wheel spinning, will
expect black after a long sequence of red, or they will expect red after a long
sequence of black.15 In other words, people expect the essential features of an
event are represented uniformly, both locally and globally. In our example,
subjects know that the odds that the roulette stops on black are equal to
the odds of it stopping on red, so they expect an equal distribution of red
and black even in a short sequence of spins.
• Insensitivity to predictability. People engaged in predictions about, e.g. the
performance of a person, or the future profit of a company, tend to ad-
just their judgment tune to pieces of information that are irrelevant to the
prediction. In a test reported by Kahneman & Tversky:
subjects were presented with several paragraphs, each describing the
performance of a student teacher during a particular practice lesson.
Some subjects were asked to evaluate the quality of the lesson de-
scribed in the paragraph in percentile scores, relative to a specified
population. Other subjects were asked to predict, also in percentile
scores, the standing of each student teacher 5 years after the practice
15Example taken from Kahneman and Tversky (1974).
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lesson. The judgments made under the two conditions were identical.
That is, the prediction of a remote criterion (success of a teacher after
5 years) was identical to the evaluation of the information on which the
prediction was based (the quality of the practice lesson). The students
who made these predictions were undoubtedly aware of the limited
predictability of teaching competence on the basis of a single trial les-
son 5 years earlier; nevertheless, their predictions were as extreme as
their evaluations. (Kahneman (2011): 970)
• Illusion of validity. In predicting a future event, people tend to overrate the
importance of the match between the input information and the prediction
output. The example of Steve the librarian shows that the role of a good fit
between the input information and the prediction outcome is valued as of
primary importance by people.
• Misconception of regression. Regression toward the mean is a statistical
phenomenon that if a variable displays extreme parameters on its first mea-
surement, it will display a smaller deviance from the average on its second
measurement. Although the phenomenon is well known, Kahneman & Tver-
sky claim that people don’t find it likely to occur in many contexts where
regression does occur. Otherwise, if people realize that regression occurs,
they tend to give wrong explanations for it. For example, people tend to give
causal explanations of regression phenomena (that are purely statistical, so
causation is not involved). An example reported by Kahneman & Tversky:
In a discussion of flight training, experienced instructors noted that
praise for an exceptionally smooth landing is typically followed by a
poorer landing on the next try, while harsh criticism after a rough
landing is usually followed by an improvement on the next try. The
instructors concluded that verbal rewards are detrimental to learning,
while verbal punishments are beneficial, contrary to accepted psycho-
logical doctrine. (Kahneman (2011): 975)
Availability
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The biases of availability occur when people implicitly correlate the importance of
the evidence provided by a sample, and the ease to retrieve the sample. In other
words, the easier is to think of a sample, the more important the evidence the sample
provides is deemed. Under the \availability biases’ group, four categories of biases
can be distinguished.
• Biases due to the retrievability of instances. When people are asked to judge
the size of a group, their judgment is often influenced by the ease to recall
members of the group. For example, in an experiment people heard a list of
famous men and women, and were asked to assess whether the list included
more famous men or more famous women. Some of the lists would contain
names of women that were relatively more famous than the men, and other
lists would contain names of men that were relatively more famous than the
men. The subjects tested erroneously assessed the gender ratio in the lists
on the basis of the number of popular names they could recall. (Kahneman
(2011))
• Biases due to the effectiveness of a search set. People find some methods for
retrieving instances of classes easier to apply than others. Accordingly, peo-
ple tend to think that the easier search sets contain more instances than the
more difficult search sets. Below is reported an experiment that highlights
how the bias affects the ability to judge the size of a class.
Suppose one samples a word (of three letters or more) at random
from an English text. Is it more likely that the word starts with r or
that r is the third letter? People approach this problem by recalling
words that begin with r (road) and words that have r in the third
position (car) and assess the relative frequency by the ease with
which words of the two types come to mind. Because it is much
easier to search for words by their first letter than by their third
letter, most people judge words that begin with a given consonant to
be more numerous than words in which the same consonant appears
in the third position. They do so even for consonants, such as r or
k, that are more frequent in the third position than in the first.
(Kahneman (2011): 980)
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• Biases of imaginability. When a subject needs to imagine (instead of recall)
instances of a class, she tends to correlate the frequency of the class with the
ease to imagine instances of it. Therefore, classes whose members are easier
to construct are judged as more frequently instanced than classes whose
members are harder to imagine.
• Illusory correlation. When asked to judge the frequency of co-occurring
events, people tend to overestimate the frequency whenever the events are
linked by an intuitive or cultural strong association. In an experiment, orig-
inally conducted by Chapman & Chapman, and reported in Kahneman and
Tversky (1974), people were presented with drawings made by hypotheti-
cal mental patients and the diagnosis corresponding to the patients. The
subjects tested tended to overestimate the frequency of events traditionally
correlated somehow, such as the patient’s suspiciousness and characteristic
drawing of the eyes.
Adjustment and Anchoring
The phenomenon of anchoring occurs when people try to estimate a quantity. More
in detail, agents start from an initial value - which is a readily available number
(the anchor) - and set an interval including the anchor to reach a plausible answer.
Experiments show that people don’t shift too far away from the original anchor,
letting the anchor bias their prediction.
• Insufficient adjustment. Anchoring can happen when the initial value is
suggested by the test prompt or when subjects base their judgment on in-
complete computations. Sometimes the anchoring effect has an insufficient
adjustment as its by-product, as in the following experiment.
Two groups of high school students estimated, within 5 seconds,
a numerical expression that was written on the blackboard. One
group estimated the product
8×7×6×5×4×3×2×1
while another group estimated the product
1×2×3×4×5×6 ×7×8
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To rapidly answer such questions, people may perform a few steps
of computation and estimate the product by extrapolation or ad-
justment. Because adjustments are typically insufficient, this pro-
cedure should lead to underestimation. Furthermore, because the
result of the first few steps of multiplication (performed from left
to right) is higher in the descending sequence than in the ascend-
ing sequence, the former expression should be judged larger than
the latter. Both predictions were confirmed. The median estimate
for the ascending sequence was 512, while the median estimate for
the descending sequence was 2,250. The correct answer is 40,320.
(Kahneman (2011): 988)
• Biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events. People have
been shown to judge erroneously the probability of conjunction or disjunc-
tion of events. The experiment dubbed \Linda the bank teller’ has been
taken to show that bias theory explains errors in iductive tasks. The experi-
ment was first presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1983). It goes roughly
as follows: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues
of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. Which is more probable? 1) Linda is a bank teller, or 2)
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement? Although the
probability of option 1 is significantly higher than the probability of option
2, 90% of the subjects tested chose option 2. Generally speaking, people
have been found to ‘overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and
to underestimate the probability of disjunctive events.’ (Kahneman (2011):
990)
• Anchoring in the assessment of subjective probability distributions. When
asked about their confidence about a certain value, people tend to deviate
from what decision theorists call proper calibration.
A judge is properly (or externally) calibrated in a set of problems if
exactly Π% of the true values of the assessed quantities falls below
his stated values of X. For example, the true values should fall below
X 01 for 1% of the quantities and above X 99 for 1% of the quantities.
5.5. ERRORS OF REASONING AND THEIR EXPLANATION 125
Thus, the true values should fall in the confidence interval between
X 01 and X 99 on 98% of the problems. (Kahneman (2011): 429)
However, people don’t usually apply the rule of proper calibration. Studies have
shown that both naïve and non-naïve subjects judge roughly 30% of the cases they
are asked to assess as smaller than X 01 or greater than X 99.
In other words, people tend to be overconfident about their probability judgments.
General considerations about bias theory
As we have seen, bias theory applied to high-level reasoning tries to determine, for
example, how variations in the presentation of the arguments affect the individual
ability to detect, or to generate, deductively correct conclusions.
Bias theory results are meant to show that reasoning is affected by biases in a sys-
tematic and substantial way. Biases are heuristic tools common to many subjects
of the species homo sapiens and that could have developed over time, perhaps for
evolutionary reasons. Heuristics can be seen as cognitive shortcuts involuntarily used
to avoid the overload of our limited capacity of information storage and retrieval,
memory and cognitive power.
Although the main concern of Kahneman and Tversky (1974) is probabilistic rea-
soning, as shown by the biases discussed, the general picture Kahneman & Tversky
argue for can be extended to explain errors in deductive reasoning tests, such as the
selection task. Kahneman & Tversky suggest a dual process (or dual system) account
of reasoning.
System 1 guides our thought by default; it is automatic and quick, it relies on heuris-
tics and it is scarcely accurate. System 1 is responsible for the biases in our intuitions.
On the other hand, System 2 is slow and accurate, but it requires cognitive effort.
System 2 can correct the immediate responses given by System 1.
From a bias theoretic point of view, the majority responses to Wason’s selection
task can be seen as an instance of matching bias. The matching bias is a heuristic
that favours lexical matching over formal reasoning. In other words, people engaged
in a deductive reasoning task tend to deem as relevant cases whose lexical content
matches the content of the rules they are asked to confirm. For example, in the
original version of the selection task, people associate the claim they are asked to
test, i.e. ‘If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other
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side’, with card A and card 4. This could explain why a significant portion of people
answer to the task indicating that cards A and 4 should be both turned over.
However, it has been argued (e.g. by Rips (1994)) that the bias theory’s predictive
power is unsatisfactory, because it explains only a relatively small portion of the
cases. For instance, the predictions of the so-called atmosphere effect16 account
for only the 44% of the tested cases. However, it can be replied that cognitive
biases still explain a significant portion of reasoning errors in inductive reasoning
experiments, and that the error theory provided by bias theory can explain errors in
deductive reasoning experiments as well, such as the selection task. The substantial
difference in the responses given by people for the different versions of the selection
task seems to support the hypothesis that the way the problem is formulated changes
the way people read the conditional claim in the task, such as in the underage-
drinking example.
5.5.4 Mental model theory
The famous thesis stated in Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) is that no existing for-
mal calculus correctly models human inferences, and no purely formal system would
succeed in doing so. However, it is contentious whether reasoning processes in the
human mind are more sensitive to the syntactic features of arguments, or to their
semantic features. Mental logic supporters argue that in human reasoning the syn-
tactic aspect is prominent over the semantic aspect. Notably, Johnson-Laird (1983)
argues for the opposite view, i.e. that the semantic content trumps the syntactic
aspect of arguments. Johnson-Laird’s thesis would apparently be confirmed by var-
ious experiments on deductive reasoning, where the subjects are asked to engage in
tasks involving conditionals and their performances vary significantly depending on
the content of the arguments presented, such as in the syllogism examples in the
previous subsection.
Mental model theory argues that people reason envisioning possibilities. In other
words, mental models are representations of situations (that can be real or not) and
they are usually constructed to predict events. In a reasoning task, the premises are
represented as the starting possibilities in a representation (model). Subsequently,
16The atmosphere effect is described as the triggering effect that certain situations have on produc-
ing particular behaviours, even when the behaviours triggered are inappropriate or pointless, such
as gesturing when talking over the telephone.
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the agent draws a conclusion on the basis of the possibilites envisioned. If a coun-
terexample of the conclusion can be imagined, starting from the same premises, the
conclusion is rejected.
In addition, mental model theory holds a dual-process view of human reasoning.
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009) explains the point about the dual-process account
with the example of a conditional, \If she played a game then she didn’t play music’.
Process 1 (the quick-response system) triggers envisaging the model corresponding
to the clauses that are explicitly stated in the conditional. Therefore, the agent
immediately represents the situation played a game - didn’t play music.
It takes more time to get a response from Process 2 (the slow-reasoning system), that
enables the agent to represent all the possibilites compatible with the conditional
claim. Relying on working memory, Process 2 make explicit the possibilities played a
game - didn’t play music, didn’t play a game - played music, and didn’t play a game
- didn’t play music.
The bedrock of mental model theory is summarized in Johnson-Laird (2008) as fol-
lows:
(1) Mental models are the bulk of reasoning and they are representations of
possibilities.
(2) Mental models are usually iconic, which means that their structure maps
the structure of the possibility represented.
(3) People consider mental models one at a time, to not overload their working
memory.
(4) Mental models can be combined by conjoining possibilities compatible with
the different premises.
(5) Mental models are guided by the so-called principle of truth: mental models
represent only true possibilities and omit false ones.
(6) The interpretation of connectives is strongly influenced by semantic and
pragmatic content.
(7) Different reasoning strategies are developed on an individual basis.
As already mentioned, reasoning consists of envisioning possibilities, and the possi-
bilities are represented iconically. So, for example, if you tell me that your car is
parked in front of the entrance door, I imagine one of the many possible situations
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where there is a car roughly in front of the door, perhaps with our cars parked next
to each other. As there are many possible combinations that could represent the
situation described, I imagine the possibility that has traits common roughly to all
the possible situations.
Envisioning a possibility on the basis of some premises can also take the agent to
draw a conclusion that hadn’t been stated, as in the example reported by Johnson-
Laird (2008). If you tell me \The cup is on the right of the saucer’ and \The spoon
is on the left of the saucer’, I will envisage the row of items spoon-saucer-cup (left
to right) and I will draw the conclusion that the saucer is in the middle, without it
having been stated in the premises. (Johnson-Laird (2008): 208) Therefore, mental
models don’t represent only what is explicitly stated in the premises.
On the other hand, it is much more demanding to envision multiple possibilites.
The process of representing multiple models relies on working memory, which has
limited capacity, and makes more difficult to represent conjunctions, disjunctions,
or conditional claims than atomic sentences. We have seen that mental models
don’t reflect exclusively what is explicitly stated in the assertions. This is true
also for representations of composite assertions, with \or’, \and’, and \if’. Models
representing disjunctions, conjunctions, and conditional claims represent situations
that are possible given the assertions, as in the already cited example about the
football game.
One thing to remember about mental models is that in a combination of possibilities
like a disjunction, the individual clauses are represented only when they are true. For
example, consider the sentence \The broadcast isn’t on the radio or it’s on cable TV’
in Johnson-Laird (2008): 209. The example yields three possible mental models,
namely not radio-cable TV, radio-cable TV, not radio-not cable TV. However, as
people represent only true clauses in their models, in the actual representations, the
false clauses will likely be omitted, therefore people will tend to envision not radio-
cable TV, cable TV, not radio. The principle that pushes one to omit representations
of false clauses from one’s mental models is called by Johnson-Laird principle of
truth. The principle of truth plays a role in economizing working memory, which
is easily overloaded. Unfortunately, envisioning only true possibilities brings about
some illusory inferences in our reasoning, i.e. logically invalid inferences that look as
valid in light of the mental models applied.
But what about the mental representation of conditional claims, such as the selection
task?
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Johnson-Laird explains the response of the subjects tested in Wason’s selection task
pointing out that it is the proof that mental logic doesn’t capture hypothetical human
reasoning nor human reasoning in general. According to Johnson-Laird, the subjects’
choice cannot ultimately be ascribed to the way the problem is formulated in the
experiment. They argue that in the selection task, the incapability of most of the
subjects tested to give the correct answer about the cards that need to be turned
over, i.e. arguably, A and 7, can be explained in terms of mental models. Johnson-
Laird argues that people represent the original version of the selection task as an
abstract model, where the salient choices on the basis of the conditional claim given
(\If a card has a vowel on one side, it has an even number on the other side’) are cards
A and 4. In the four cards experiment, people give the wrong response because they
follow the principle of truth, which guides agents to envisage only the true claims
and to leave the false claims aside. Therefore, to verify the conditional claim in the
task, the subjects envision a model where the conditional claim is true, i.e. where
the card has an A on one side and a 4 on the other.
An alternative version of the selection task that was reported for instance by Johnson-
Laird (2008) and originally described by Wason and Shapiro (1971), was the first
attempt to reformulate the experiment manipulating its content to test whether it
affected the reasoning performance of the tested subjects. There, the subjects were
asked to verify the claim \Every time I go to Manchester I travel by train’. The cards
presented for the test had, respectively, \Manchester’, \Leeds’, \train’, \car’, on their
visible sides. As in the original version of the selection task, the subjects were asked
to turn over the cards necessary to test the claim. As people were found to be more
inclined to choose \Manchester’ and \car’ than they were to turn over \A’ and \7’ in
the original version of the selection task, the results of the test with manipulated
content seemed to show that reasoning is sensitive to content.
However, mental model theory needs to explain more carefully why people have
given correct answers to the alternative version of the selection task. We have seen
that according to mental model theory, such a case would be a corroboration of
the thesis that people are sensitive to the semantic and pragmatic content of the
claims they are reasoning about. Nonetheless, model theory is not clear on why the
tested subjects stick to the truth principle when they perform the vowel/even number
task, but they are more inclined to overrun the principle when they perform the
Manchester/train task. If the principle of truth underlies the general representation
of models, people should envision the case where the conditional claim is true in both
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of the tests. Therefore, they should pick the options \Manchester’ and \train’, rather
than \Manchester’ and \car’.
In response to the difference in people’s answers to the different tests, the mental
model theory stresses that the context a conditional claim refers to can significantly
change the way people represent the corresponding possibilities. As mentioned by
Byrne and Johnson-Laird (2009), conditional claims like \If she played a game then
she didn’t play soccer’ trigger responses depending also on the knowledge the agent
has. In our example, the possibilities represented are only two, i.e. played a game
- didn’t play soccer, and didn’t play a game - didn’t play soccer. The agent doesn’t
envisage the model didn’t play a game - played soccer if she knows that soccer is a
game. From examples like the soccer game, mental model theory concludes that con-
ditionals are not truth-functional, as the interpretation of conditional claims doesn’t
depend exclusively on the truth value of the clauses in the conditional claims. On the
contrary, the interpretation of conditional claims is sensitive to extra-formal features,
such as the meaning and the context the claims refer to, or the knowledge the agent
has about the situation described by the claim.
When mental models are affected by the agent’s knowledge, as we have seen in the
example \If she played a game then she didn’t play soccer’, the phenomenon is known
as pragmatic modulation. As Johnson-Laird explains,
Consider this inference, for example:
If Pat entered the elevator then Viv got out one floor up.
Pat entered on the second floor.
Therefore, Viv got out on the third floor.
You envisage a possibility in which Pat entered the elevator on the
second floor, Viv was already in it, the two of them traveled up
together to the next floor up, the third floor, and then Viv got out.
You infer this sequence of events from your knowledge of how ele-
vators work. In such cases, pragmatic modulation adds information
about temporal and spatial relations between the events referred to
in a conditional [...] (Johnson-Laird (2008): 214)
The effect of knowledge on mental models has been shown to speed up the reason-
ing process sometimes, and to hinder reasoning other times. For instance, when a
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reasoning task involves content known to the agent, sometimes the application of
some inference rules, such as Modus Tollens, can be facilitated by the content of the
premises, as in the example (reported in Johnson-Laird (2008))
If Bill is in Rio de Janeiro then he is in Brazil.
Bill is not in Brazil.
From the premises, the subjects tested easily concluded \Bill is not in Rio de Janeiro’,
which is correctly yielded by an application of Modus Tollens to the premises.
On the other hand, the content of the premises hinders the application of Modus
Tollens in other cases, as in the example
If Bill is in Brazil then he is not in Rio de Janeiro.
Bill is in Rio de Janeiro.
From the premises, people are not inclined to infer \Bill is not in Brazil’, despite its
being a logically valid conclusion.
From the observations that mental models are affected by meaning, context and
knowledge, Johnson-Laird concludes that the interpretation that people give of the
connectives is not truth-functional. Moreover, mental model theory takes into ac-
count that different people have different reasoning strategies, where a reasoning
strategy is defined as \a systematic sequence of elementary steps that an individual
follows in making an inference.’ (Johnson-Laird (2008): 216)
In sum, what mental model theory tries to show is that people rely on representations
of possibilities when they reason and that effortful processes, such as envisaging more
than one model, are kept to a minimum. The principle of truth enables the cognitive
system to reason saving working memory, but it is responsible for some reasoning
errors, such as the response of the majority of people in the original selection task.
Both bias theory and mental model theory oppose mental logic theory, that was
apparently disproved by Wason’s experiment. I haven’t discussed the mental logic
theory in detail yet, and it is now time to address it.
5.5.5 Mental logic theory
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I summarized the main tenet of mental logic in 5.2 and mentioned that the results of
the selection task has been read as disconfirming the plausibility of the mental logic
theory. However, mental logic hasn’t faded out completely after Piaget’s work, and
some have tried to counter the evidence from Wason’s selection task showing that
mental logic still is a plausible theory of reasoning. In relatively recent work, Rips
argues that human reasoning follows some basic rules that display many similarities
with natural deduction rules.17 Certainly the experimental results we have discussed
have led psychologists to draw the conclusion that human reasoning doesn’t follow
a logical structure but, according to Rips (1994), psychologists have judged those
results hastily. To Rips, psychologists have largely overlooked the variety of logics
developed in the last decades (logics that take notions like knowledge, belief, temporal
precedence and succession, etc., into account). Consequently, psychologists have too
hastily deemed the subjects in the tests illogical whenever those subjects failed to
give a response conforming to classical logic.
Whereas the crucial notion in mental model theory was the notion of mental model,
the crucial notion in mental logic theory is that of mental proof. As Rips explains,
I assume that when people confront a problem that calls for deduc-
tion they attempt to solve it by generating in working memory a
set of sentences linking the premises or givens of the problem to the
conclusion or solution. Each link in this network embodies an in-
ference rule that the individual recognizes as intuitively sound and
that provides some control on search. Taken together, this network
of sentences then provides a bridge between the premises and the
conclusion that explains why the conclusion follows. (Rips (2008):
191)
Mental logic theory’s fundamental claim is that people, although they may be not al-
ways successful in performing a mental proof correctly, nonetheless always engage in
attempts to accomplish mental proofs when reasoning deductively. The mental logic
theory has been interpreted as an attempt to restore psychologism about logic from
17 See Rips (1994, 2008).
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the psychologist’s side, while a philosophical attempt to restore psychologism about
logic has been made by Hanna (2006), who has argued in favour of a mild (Kan-
tian) psychologism about logic. Hanna argues that human agents have a protological
faculty and his main thesis is constituted by two subtheses: i) logic is cognitively
constructed by rational animals, and ii) rational human animals are logical animals.
In the same spirit, Rips argues that people are provided with a basic inference system
that includes some rules. The inferential rules are activated in the system’s working
memory whenever the agent needs to evaluate an argument or to draw a conclusion
from some premises. In the former case (assessing an argument), the inferential
system will work backwards, starting from the conclusion and trying to construct
a mental proof by applying the inferential rules to the premises. In the latter case
(drawing a conclusion from some premises), the inferential system will work forward,
applying the rules to the premises available.
But how could reasoning go wrong, then? Mental logic replies that deductive reason-
ing errors, such as those in performing the original selection task, show that people
lack the mental rule corresponding to Modus Tollens, which would enable them to
respond correctly to the test. However, this reply is not convincing for a number
of reasons. Were it true that humans have certain mental rules, e.g. Modus Po-
nens, but not others, e.g. Modus Tollens, wouldn’t explain why people give correct
answers when they perform alternative versions of the selection task, such as the
underage-drinking test.
Moreover, Rips argues that psychologists have hastily judged mental logic wrong
in light of the experimental evidence overlooking the non-classical logics that have
been developed in the last decades. However, Rips doesn’t support his thesis with a
comparison of the experimental results with the non-classical logics available, leaving
it ultimately unconfirmed.
In the last decades, the mental logic supporters and the mental model advocates have
been opposing parties in a lively debate. However, Stenning (2002) argues that the
dispute between the mental model and the mental logic approaches can’t be resolved
on empirical grounds. According to Stenning, the reasoning processes modeled within
one system can be emulated within each of the other systems. Therefore, Stenning
argues, the two theories are formally equivalent with regard to the cases studied.
Not all the theories of reasoning agree that deductive logic is the normative standard
for reasoning. One such exception is the probabilistic theory of the mind, which
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I am now going to discuss. We will see how it can be considered the inductivist
counterpart of the mental logic approach, to some extent.
5.5.6 Probabilistic theories of the mind
The probabilistic theory of the mind, as formulated by Oaksford and Chater (2007),
holds that cognition needs to be understood in terms of probability theory. The
reason for such a claim is simple: ordinary reasoning is usually carried out in a
context of uncertainty and is concerned with practical action on the basis of partial
or unconfirmed information, which doesn’t make applying deductive logic a feasible
option for human agents.
One of the immediate questions about the probability approach is: if we opt for a
probability theory of the mind, should we understand the probabilistic approach in
terms of frequency or in terms of subjective probabilities? From a frequentist point of
view, probability calculus can only be applied where frequencies (i.e. repeated events)
occur, so a frequentist account would be of no help with regard to the probability
of unrepeated events. However, as real agents seem to have degrees of belief about
unrepeated events, the subjective account of probabilities (i.e. Bayesianism) would
be a more sensible choice.
Oaksford & Chater stress that the results of the selection task have erroneously been
interpreted as showing that humans are irrational because the test evaluates the
responses against classical logic. In fact, the probabilistic theory of mind argues that
what other theories of reasoning (most notably, mental model theory and mental
logic theory) deem as reasoning errors, are not real reasoning mistakes. The context
common to our everyday reasoning is uncertain, and human reasoning needs to be
suited to deal with uncertainty accordingly. Therefore, people are used to reasoning
with inferences as though they were defeasible; consequently, human reasoning is
non-monotonic, i.e. from Γ ` A it doesn’t follow that Γ ∪ {B} ` A.
According to Oaksford & Chater, this explains the majority of answers given to the
selection task. In fact, Oaksford & Chater argue, the responses given to the selection
task are compatible with an interpretation of the conditional claim in Wason’s task
in terms of conditional probability.
How should experimental results, such as the selection task and the Linda test, be
interpreted according to probabilism? If probabilism replaces deductive logic in a
5.5. ERRORS OF REASONING AND THEIR EXPLANATION 135
theory of reasoning, Oaksford & Chater still need to explain why people seem to get
probabilistic reasoning wrong.
To the evidence provided by studies on reasoning biases, such as Kahneman & Tver-
sky’s, Oaksford & Chater reply that
Our accounts of human reasoning are framed at the computational
level, that is, they characterise what is being computed not how
(although we do provide a process account in terms of probabilis-
tic heuristics for syllogistic reasoning). That people’s behaviour
well approximates the norms provided by these models, which are
thereby descriptively adequate, does not necessarily mean that peo-
ple are doing complex probabilistic computations in their heads.
(Oaksford et al. (2008): 385)
In sum, Oaksford & Chater argue that the selection task and similar tests show just
that the wrong normative standard has been applied in the study of reasoning.
However, there is still a problem with the probabilistic theory of reasoning. In section
5.4, we discussed an attempt to explain the experimental results from the selection
task in terms of conditional probability. There, we argued that such a response
needs to be tested against a wider collection of evidence. For example, versions
of the selection task with manipulated content, such as the underage-drinking test,
have shown that people do apply Contraposition. Therefore, in the manipulated
versions of the test, people don’t appear to read the conditional claim in the test as
a conditional probability.
The same worry arises with Oaksford & Chater’s view of reasoning. The probabilistic
mind theory explains a small number of versions of the selection task. As Oaksford
& Chater stress, the theory aims at drawing a normative theory of reasoning, argu-
ing that reasoning needs to be evaluated against Bayesianism, rather than against
classical logic.
However, if changing the normative standard explains unproblematically the evi-
dence from the original version of the selection task and takes the failure to apply
contraposition as optimally rational, it also raises a problem. In fact, the responses
to other versions of the selection task where people don’t appear to reason probabilis-
tically count as reasoning errors on the probabilistic account. Once such evidence is
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acknowledged, it becomes unclear why one should prefer Bayesianism over deductive
(or even classical) logic as a normative standard for reasoning.
5.6. Criticisms of the selection task and conclusion
Two main criticisms can be moved against the layout of the selection task.
A criticism of the selection task could move from a methodological consideration
about the selection task. It has been pointed out that the selection task relies on
fallibilism and on the hypothetico-deductive model as a normative standard. However
- the skeptic might stress - the hypothetico-deductive model is currently deemed as
outdated in the philosophy of science, with the result that its use to assess the
deductive abilities of human agents might be seen as inadequate. To this objection,
one could reply that it is not obviously relevant. In fact, tested subjects have proved
to give responses conforming to falsificationism on alternative versions of the selection
tasks, such as the underage-drinking test reported in Griggs and Cox (1982).
Second, one can question whether a test that presupposes material implication as the
bulk of correct responses overlooks the existence of non-classical logics and of non-
material conditionals. This argument could be supported for example by modern
mental logic theory (as it is presented for example by Rips (1994, 2008)), which
stresses the importance of taking into account non-classical logics, and by Oaksford
& Chater’s probabilistic theory of mind, which holds that the conditional claim in
the test should rationally be read probabilistically.
However, this criticism seems to miss the point in two important respects. First, the
rule that the tested subjects fail to apply (i.e. Contraposition) is not an exclusive
feature of material implication; on the contrary, contraposition is endorsed by many
non-classical accounts of the conditional as well.
Second, evidence from alternative versions of the selection task has shown that people
don’t seem to read coherently the conditional claim across the different formulations
of the test. Therefore, arguing that the normative standard for conditional reasoning
should be non-contrapositive is not in a better position than arguing that conditional
reasoning should be contrapositive.
Therefore, what we called the Wrong Conditional Reply to the selection task is not
a successful way to rescue the view that reasoning logically is a necessary feature of
rationality (we dubbed this view Rationality&Logic). If we agree that the selection
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task and its alternative versions are valuable as psychological evidence, we must
conclude either that deductive reasoning is not indispensable for rationality, or that




Logical norms and the epistemic paradoxes
Abstract. Some of the current attempts to account for the normativity of logic
try to formulate epistemic norms in a conditional form, such as the principles dis-
cussed in MacFarlane’s In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative For Thought?
(2004) and Restall’s Multiple Conclusions (2005). The main desideratum for these
principles is that they provide a plausible way to explain the connection between
valid arguments and informal reasoning, i.e. reasoning that could be attributed to
a rational agent.
In this chapter, I draw a distinction between logical laws and logical norms, then
I show that none of the logical norms discussed is able to both (i) satisfy the
desideratum and (ii) provide requirements for rational belief.
The norms I take into consideration are the normative requirements discussed
by Broome in his article Normative Requirements (1999), the bridge principles
presented by MacFarlane, and the principle discussed by Restall.
I make my assumptions explicit, then I proceed to considering the Preface and the
Lottery Paradox and test the logical norms against them, showing that the norms
formulated as requirements for belief don’t provide rationally plausible principles.
The logical norms formulated as reasons for belief fare better with the epistemic
paradoxes than their strictly prescriptive counterparts. However, it can be argued
that they don’t have sufficient constraining power on our beliefs.
Therefore, none of the bridge principles is able to both (i) provide a plausible way
to connect valid arguments and informal reasoning, and (ii) provide requirements
for rational belief.
In the last section of the chapter, I argue that the kind of normativity logical norms
belong to is much weaker than the normative requirements and the analogous
principles would suggest.
What is the normative force of logical norms? Some of the current attempts to ac-
count for the normativity of logic try to formulate epistemic norms in a conditional
form, such as the principles discussed in MacFarlane’s In What Sense (If Any) Is
Logic Normative For Thought? (2004) and Restall’s Multiple Conclusions (2005).
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The main desideratum for these principles is that they provide a plausible way to ex-
plain the connection between valid arguments and informal reasoning, i.e. reasoning
that could be attributed to a rational agent.
In this chapter, I first present a classification of norms drawn from Glüer andWikforss
(2010), then I draw a distinction between logical laws and logical norms, and show
that none of the logical norms discussed is able to both (i) satisfy the desideratum and
(ii) provide requirements for rational belief. The norms I take into consideration are
the normative requirements presented by Broome’s Normative Requirements (1999),
the bridge principles discussed by MacFarlane (2004), and the principle discussed by
Restall 2005.
Most of the principles I consider share a common form, that is:
If Γ |= ∆ , then you ought/are permitted/have reason to believe/not
disbelieve [the disjunction of the propositions in ∆ if you believe all
the propositions in Γ].
I first consider an instance of the Preface Paradox and test the logical norms against
it, showing that the logical norms formulated as requirements for belief don’t provide
rationally plausible principles.
It may seem at first that the Preface Paradox calls for either of the following options:
(i) dismissing the Agglomeration Principle (i.e. Bp ∧ Bq → B (p ∧ q)), or (ii)
dismissing the logical norms in trouble, and the probabilistic solution to the paradox
has been assumed to provide reason to reject the first option.
However, I subsequently discuss the Lottery Paradox and show how the probabilistic
solution to the Lottery Paradox gives one ground to reject even a weaker version of
Agglomeration, which I call Weak Agglomeration (Bp ∧ Bq → ¬ Disbelieve(p∧q)).
I highlight that Weak Agglomeration is equivalent to the logical norms in trouble.
The logical norms formulated as reasons for belief fare better with the epistemic
paradoxes than their strictly prescriptive counterparts. However, it can be argued
that they don’t have sufficient constraining power on our beliefs.
Therefore, none of the bridge principles is able to both (i) provide a plausible way
to connect valid arguments and informal reasoning, and (ii) provide requirements for
rational belief.
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In the last section of the chapter, I consider the classification of norms again and
argue that the kind of normativity logical norms exhibit is much weaker than the
normative requirements and the analogous principles would suggest.
6.1. Logical laws and logical norms
When we talk about the laws of nature (e.g. thermodynamic principles, chemical
bonding laws, etc.), we presume that an extended effort has been necessary to ab-
stract those laws from observations of real phenomena.
For instance, the First Law of Thermodynamics - i.e. \The increase in internal energy
of a closed system is equal to the difference of the heat supplied to the system and
the work done by it’ - describes the correlation between internal energy, temperature
and work of a physical system. If any measurements reported data conflicting with
the First Law of Thermodynamics, and the scientific community agreed that the
measurements are reliable, the data would cast substantial doubt on the law.
In other words, the laws of thermodynamics are not laws in the sense that they
have the power to, say, prohibit that heat flow spontaneously from a colder location
to a hotter location the same way as a law of a state has the power to prohibit
cultivating marijuana. Like the other laws of nature, the laws of thermodynamics
are the outcome of a long series of observations of natural phenomena and the result
of a progressive dismissal of unconfirmed hypotheses about those phenomena.
The laws of nature spell out both the conditions for a phenomenon to occur and
what a phenomenon is. For instance, the mere perception of a lightning doesn’t
tell us much about the nature of lightnings. It isn’t until we learn that lightnings
are electrostatic discharges cloud-to-cloud or cloud-to-ground that we know what is
going on when we see a flash in a stormy sky.
On the other hand, the laws of a state (e.g. written rules about speed limits, laws
about smoking in work places, etc.) are seldom concerned with explaining or clari-
fying the actions they regulate. Laws about what is legal and what is illegal have a
constraining power on the citizens’ behaviour. Unlike the First Law of Thermody-
namics, the law that prohibits selling alcohol to underage people is not called into
question if a boy of fifteen manages to buy some beer, and so violates the law.
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In Normalese, laws of this type are sometimes called norms for action. They are
usually norms that have an end independent of themselves; for example, legal con-
straints are enforced to guarantee that some rights be protected, or to ensure that
people don’t damage their own and others’ health.
Frege explains the distinction between descriptive and normative laws in the Intro-
duction to his Grundgesetze (Frege (2013) : xv), where he characterizes the former
as laws describing the regularities in the world, and the latter as laws prescribing a
course of action or providing a standard against which we judge what we do or what
we think.1
Unlike laws with descriptive/explanatory power, such as the laws of nature, logical
laws are typically taken to exert a normative pull on agents. However, a realist
could oppose a characterization of logical laws as merely normative laws. In fact, if
we agreed with her that the core logical notions, such as validity and consequence,
are about facts and are mind-independent, the laws of logic would deserve to be
acknowledged as descriptive laws, as well. This is exactly the position held by Frege,
who argues that logical laws are in fact both normative and descriptive.
Although the issue of the status of logical laws is beyond the focus of this chapter,
I want to clear the field from the ambiguities that could arise from the realist-
antirealist dispute about the status of logical laws. To this extent, in the remainder
I use logical laws to refer to the laws of propositional and predicate logic, such as the
Law of Excluded Middle, with no regard to their normative role on thought; and I
use logical norms to refer to the principles that connect deductively valid arguments
to reasoning, giving a normative twist to logical laws.
What I mean by logical norm encompasses, e.g. the bridge principles discussed in
MacFarlane (2004), but also other principles that are meant to provide necessary
requirements for rational belief, such as the principle outlined in Restall (2005).
I hope to show that logical norms that try to map valid arguments to rational rea-
soning, such as the bridge principles presented in MacFarlane (2004), fail to provide
necessary requirements for rationality. To this extent, I first present a taxonomy of
norms, borrowed in part from the classification found in Glüer and Wikforss (2010),
which I slightly modify to better account for the normativity of logic. Next, I apply
instances of the Preface and the Lottery Paradoxes to put to the test the logical
norms I discuss in section 6.3. In the last part of the chapter, I ask how logical
1See the discussion on Frege’s account of laws in MacFarlane (2002).
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norms fit into the taxonomy of norms, and I argue what kind of norms logical norms
are.
6.2. Categories of norms
Extensive work has been done on norms, but we need to figure out what kind of nor-
mativity logical norms have. A general distinction between the manifold of norms
will come in handy in this endeavour. In their entry on meaning and content nor-
mativity, Glüer and Wikforss (2010) distinguish several types of norms. Before we
discuss the taxonomy of norms, it is worth pointing out what we will leave aside in
our discussion, as Glüer and Wikforss (2010) themselves do in the entry.
The literature on normativity has seen two large parties opposing each other regard-
ing the status of norms. On one side, cognitivists argue that norms are factual and
mind-independent so, in other words, cognitivists are realists about norms. On the
other side, many non-cognitivists argue that normative statements are not factual,
therefore they don’t have truth conditions.2
A classification of norms can be drawn independently of one’s views about the meta-
physical status of norms. Therefore, we won’t need to get into the debate on the
factuality of norms for the purposes of this chapter. The main distinction between
norms that is reported in Glüer and Wikforss (2010) is between norms for action and
norms of being.
As the names suggest, norms for action regard what should be done. In this sense,
norms for action can be considered directive norms because they are supposed to
guide or direct our actions. On the other hand, norms of being are norms that can
be used to evaluate phenomena or behaviours. Norms of being are evaluative because
they provide a standard against which a situation can be assessed.
This distinction between norms for action and norms of being resembles the distinc-
tion between the first-person and third-person use of norms mentioned by Pollock
(1987). According to Pollock, a norm is used in a third-person way when it is ap-
plied to judge someone else’s behaviour, skills or capacities. A norm is used in a
first-person way when it is applied to guide and direct our own actions, as in sorting
out what word we should use in a specific context.
In effect, the correspondence between the first-person use of norms and the norms
for action on one hand, and between the third-person use of norms and the norms of
2However, this is not true of some non-cognitivists, like Field, Gibbard, and Blackburn, who think
that normative statements have truth conditions or something closely resembling truth conditions.
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being on the other, seems to be close to a case of synonymy, more than a resemblance.
Therefore, in the remainder, we could harmlessly replace norms for action with first-
person norms, and norms of being with third-person norms.
The classification presented in Glüer and Wikforss (2010) is specifically concerned
with the norms for action, and it includes a large family of subcategories of those
norms. In effect, norms for action can be subdivided into four main categories: let’s
begin by discussing the first two.
Norms for action can be instrumental or non-instrumental. Instrumental norms are
directed toward accomplishing something and they depend upon the agent’s goal, as
in \I should run everyday to be able to run the London marathon’, or as in \I should
open the window to let some fresh air in’.
Non-instrumental norms, on the other hand, are not functional to make the agent
attain a goal, as in \You shouldn’t talk during a play’. Non-instrumental norms can
be constitutive rules or prescriptions. We will come back to this in a moment.
Before we discuss the subdivision of non-instrumental norms, we need to mention two
more categories the norms for action are divided into. Besides being instrumental
or not, norms for action can be prima facie or categorical. The difference between
these two kinds of norms lies in their normative strength. Categorical norms are
obligations that don’t admit conflicting obligations. Therefore, categorical norms
cannot be overridden by other norms. On the other hand, prima facie norms are
compatible with other norms prescribing opposite actions. Prima facie norms can be
overridden, given certain conditions, as in \You shouldn’t overtake a car on its left’3
(not enforced when the car before yours is turning right), or as in \You should keep
secrets’ (not enforced when a serial killer tells you about her crimes, for instance).
Let’s go back to non-instrumental norms. We have seen that they can be prescriptive
or constitutive norms. Let’s discuss constitutive norms first. Constitutive norms (or
rules) regulate activities that owe their existence to the norms themselves. For exam-
ple, rugby rules are constitutive because the game of rugby wouldn’t exist without
them. An example of a constitutive rule is \In the game of rugby, grounding the
ball in the opposition ingoal area counts as scoring a try’. On the other hand, a
prescriptive norm is a norm that could be formulated as an obligation, a prohibition,
or a permission to do something. According to Glüer and Wikforss (2010), the main
feature of prescriptions is that they can be expressed in deontic language.
3Assuming that you drive in the UK.
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In turn, prescriptions can be conditional or unconditional. Conditional prescriptions
are prescriptive norms that become enforced when a specified condition occurs, as in
the already mentioned example \You shouldn’t talk during a play’. In the example,
the condition that you are attending a play enforces the norm that you should keep
quiet. Another example of conditional prescription is \If someone holds the door for
you, you should thank them’. Unconditional prescriptions, on the other hand, don’t
have any enforcement conditions. Some examples are \You should comply with the
laws’, or \You should donate to charities’.
With the categories of normativity in mind, let’s turn to discuss the logical norms
that will be examined and put to the test later.
6.3. Logical norms...
Some relatively recent accounts of the normativity of logic, such as Broome (1999),
MacFarlane (2004), and Restall (2005) attempt to formulate logical norms in a con-
ditional fashion. The main desideratum for such logical norms is that they provide
a plausible way of explaining the connection between deductively valid arguments,
and informal reasoning, i.e. reasoning that could be attributed to a rational agent.4
Most of the logical norms (bridge principles and similar norms) share a common
form:
If Γ |= ∆ , then you ought/are permitted/have reason to [be-
lieve/not disbelieve the disjunction of the propositions in ∆ if you
believe all the propositions in Γ].
In the following, I will consider Broome’s normative requirements, MacFarlane’s
bridge principles, and what I call the Consequence Principle, and I will argue that
these logical norms either (i) don’t meet the desideratum, or (ii) don’t provide re-
quirements for belief.5
Let’s start with Broome’s normative requirements.
6.3.1 Normative requirements
4I stick with the meaning of \informal reasoning’ discussed by Harman (1986). Harman identifies
reasoning with reasoned change in view, which, he argues, cannot be attained by applying logic
alone.
5Not to be confused with recommendations for belief, as we will see later.
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The basis for the views on the normativity of logic we discuss in this chapter have
been laid by Broome, who has argued that normative requirements need to be dis-
tinguished from reasons. According to Broome (1999), the fundamental difference
between \having a normative requirement to ϕ’ and \having a reason to ϕ’ is that a
reason to ϕ is pro tanto. This means that having a reason to ϕ is compatible with
having a reason to not-ϕ. More recently, Broome has defined pro tanto reasons as
‘something that plays the for-F [where F is an action] role in a weighing explanation
of why N [where N is an agent] ought to F, or in a weighing explanation of why N
ought not to F, or in a weighing explanation of why it is not the case that N ought
to F and not the case that N ought not to F.’ (Broome (2013): 53)6
On the other hand, having a normative requirement to ϕ implies that you have an
obligation to ϕ. Broome argues that normative requirements are best represented
as wide-scope obligations. For example, if you have a normative requirement over
a conditional statement, ϕ → ψ, the normative requirement you have shouldn’t be
expressed as ϕ→ Oψ, but it should rather be formalized as O(ϕ→ ψ) (which could
be informally read as \You ought to see to it that if ϕ, then ψ’).
According to Broome (1999), logical consequence imposes normative requirements on
rational beliefs, i.e. an agent has a normative requirement to believe the conclusion
of an argument if she believes its premises. In other words, whenever it is obvious
that Γ |= A, an agent S has a normative requirement to believe A provided that she
believes all the propositions in Γ.
As we have seen in the third chapter, there is a quick argument explaining why Broom
thinks that it would be a mistake to read normative requirements as narrow-scope
obligations, i.e. Γ → OA. Consider A |= A, which is a theorem of (virtually) any
logic. If the normative requirements were narrow-scoped, we would have that \If you
believe A, you ought to believe A’. However, one could just be wrong in believing A,
so the mere fact of believing A shouldn’t suffice to enforce an obligation to believe
A.
Therefore, the correct formalization of the requirement is wide-scoped, i.e. O(Γ →
A), that can be informally read as \You ought to see to it that if you believe all
the propositions in Γ, you believe A’. Broome’s argument in favour of wide-scope
6Although more recent discussion on normativity distinguishes pro tanto reasons and pro toto
reasons, where the latter are defined by Broome (2013) as reasons explaining why you ought to do
something.
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requirements hasn’t gone unchallenged 7 but, for the purpose of this chapter, I will
leave the debate about wide-scope and narrow-scope requirements aside. The ulti-
mate goal of this chapter is to test some logical norms that have been formulated
explicitly in the literature and test their plausibility.
Besides the normative requirements and the Consequence Principle (presented in
6.3.3), I also discuss the bridge principles introduced by MacFarlane (2004), which
are the object of the next subsection. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus
especially on the principles MacFarlane argues for, leaving the remaining principles
aside.
6.3.2 MacFarlane on bridge principles
MacFarlane (2004) distinguishes eighteen bridge principles. The bridge principles
are classified on the basis of their
(i) deontic operator (ought to/permitted to/has reason to);
(ii) scope of the deontic operator;
(iii) affirmative/negative form.
The general form of the bridge principles is
If A, B |= C, then [normative claim about believing A, B, and C -
nested conditional].
The three main families of bridge principles are classified on the basis of their deontic
operator’s scope. Below, the scope of the deontic operators in the different families
of principles is coloured in red.
• C principles:8 If A, B |= C, then if you believe A and you believe B, you
ought/are permitted/have reason to believe/not disbelieve C .
7 For example, Kolodny (2005) argues that it is not straightforward that rationality requirements
should take the wide scope and shows how the arguments for wide-scope requirements are ultimately
unsuccessful.
8\C’ stands for \consequent’ of the nested conditional.
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• B principles:9 If A, B |= C, then if you ought/are permitted/have reason
to believe A and to believe B, you ought/are permitted/have reason to be-
lieve/not disbelieve C .
• W principles:10 If A, B |= C, then you ought/are permitted/have reason to
see to it that if you believe A and you believe B, you believe/not disbelieve
C .
Every family includes six principles, i.e. an affirmative and a negative principle for
each deontic operator.
Before we go on with our discussion of the logical norms, it will be worth spending
a few words explaining what the difference is between not-believing that p and dis-
believing that p. We have seen that the possible propositional attitudes concerning
belief are believing, not-believing, and disbelieving. Now, let p be the proposition
\Lincoln was shot in 1865’.
If we say that an agent doesn’t believe that p, we mean that the agent fails to believe
that Lincoln was shot in 1865. However, the agent not believing that p doesn’t imply
that the agent believes that Lincoln was not shot in 1865, for example because she
might just feel unsure about the year of Lincoln’s death. In other words, the agent
might be lacking the belief that p as well as the belief that not-p, or she might be
(voluntarily) withholding belief that p. Therefore, the negation isn’t imported from
the agent’s attitude (not believing that p) to the proposition itself (believing that
not-p).
On the other hand, when we say that an agent disbelieves p, we mean that the agent
believes that p is false or, in other words, that the agent believes not-p. In our
example, if the agent disbelieves p, she believes that Lincoln wasn’t shot in 1865.11
Now, it is crucial that we understand what happens when we negate these proposi-
tional attitudes. Let’s start with not-believing p: saying that it is not true that the
agent doesn’t believe that p just means that the agent believes p. Double negation
makes it the case that not-not-belief that p is equivalent to belief that p.
9\B’ stands for \both’ the antecedent and the consequent of the nested conditional.
10\W’ stands for \whole’ nested conditional.
11It is worth pointing out that there is a well known pragmatic-linguistic phenomenon, the so-called
Neg-Raising phenomenon, that affects the use of negations, as when we express disbelief about p
by saying that we don’t believe that p.
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The story is different for disbelieving p. If we say that an agent doesn’t disbelieve
p, it means that the agent doesn’t reject p, which is not equivalent to believing (or
accepting p). Not-disbelieving p rules out only the possibility of rejecting p, but it
doesn’t prevent one from suspending one’s judgment about p.
That said, we can now go back to the bridge principles, where the notions of disbe-
lieving and not-disbelieving are employed frequently.
As we have seen in the third chapter, MacFarlane argues that most of the eighteen
principles don’t withstand scrutiny. For the purpose of this chapter, I don’t examine
MacFarlane’s argument again nor survey all the principles.12 I limit myself to remind
the reader that MacFarlane takes his argument to show that the following three
principles are the best options:
Wo- If A, B |= C, then you ought to see to it that if you believe A and believe
B, you don’t disbelieve C;
Wr+ If A, B |= C, then you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and
believe B, you believe C;
Wr- If A, B |= C, then you have reason to see to it that if you believe A and
believe B, you don’t disbelieve C.
However, MacFarlane seems to be worried that the Wr ’s are perhaps too weak, as
they give only reasons - and not obligations - to believe the conclusion of an argument
provided that one believes its premises. But, we might ask, is there a reason for not
liking reasons? In a sense, reasons are more complicated to handle than permissions
and obligations: unlike the traditional deontic operators, reasons come in degrees
of strength, they often need to be weighed against each other, and their strength is
dependent on the context. However, reasons can be applied to situations requiring
norms that are more finely-grained than obligations and permissions, which explains
why we could prefer reasons over other deontic operators in spite of their complexity.
6.3.3 Restall on logical norms
In addition to truth and falsity, some paraconsistent logics admit another truth-value,
i.e. both true and false. According to these logics, that p is false doesn’t preclude that
12I will leave aside the -k principles, i.e. the bridge principles where the agent knows or believes
the antecedent, as I don’t think they make much difference for the purposes of the discussion.
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p be also true. The Liar Paradox sentence is a famous example of a sentence taking
the value both true and false (propositions taking the third value are sometimes called
‘gluts’). Therefore, from a paraconsistent point of view, believing that a proposition,
p, is false doesn’t imply that p is disbelieved. For this reason, whereas Broome
and MacFarlane discuss logical norms concerning believing and disbelieving, Greg
Restall explains informally how logical consequence is usually taken to constrain the
acceptance and rejection of beliefs.
The relevant passage is the following:
As we have seen, a one-premise, one-conclusion argument from A
to B constrains acceptance/rejection by ruling out accepting A and
rejecting B. This explanation of the grip of valid argument has
the advantage of symmetry. A valid argument from A to B does
not, except by force of habit, have to be read as establishing the
conclusion. If the conclusion is unbelievable, then it could just as
well be read as undermining the premise. (Restall (2005): 204)
A straightforward way to regiment the principle formulated informally in the passage
is:
If A ` B, you ought not both accept A and reject B.
The principle could be formulated as a wide-scoped norm (similarly to Wo-), i.e.
A ` B ⇒ O ¬ (Acc(A) ∧ Rej (B)), and I call this the Consequence Principle in the
remainder of this chapter.
Now, it should be noticed that the logical norms presented differ substantially with
respect to the deontic operator they include. We have seen that the normative re-
quirements, Wo- and what I have called the Consequence Principle share an operator
(ought) that is typical of prescriptions in a strict sense.
On the other hand, Wr+ and Wr - share a deontic operator (have reason to) which
brings about a weaker constraint. Following Broome (1999), we might call the latter
constraints recommendations.
However, although ought is widely accepted as a deontic operator, it is more con-
tentious whether have reason to can legitimately be deemed a deontic operator. The
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dubious status of reasons casts a general suspicion on recommendations. In addition
to the general doubts on the status of recommendations, there are also specific wor-
ries about recommendations as logical norms. For instance, Broome (1999) argues
that recommendations are too weak to capture the normative constraints imposed
by logical consequence on thought.
In the last section of this chapter, the issue of the normativity of logic will be ad-
dressed directly. There, we will have enough material to make a general point about
the normativity of logic, no matter what form they take in particular.
In the remainder, I consider two well-known epistemic paradoxes and put the logical
norms presented to the test against them. By the end of the next section, it will
become clear that the prescriptions in a strict sense and the recommendations deal
in a very different way with the epistemic paradoxes.
6.4. ... and their problems
Before I set up the tests, there are some points that need to be set straight. First,
the assumptions of our discussion in the remainder of the chapter need to be made
explicit and, second, there are some distinctions that need to be highlighted.
There is an old debate between those who think that beliefs are an all-or-nothing
sort of propositional attitude, and those who argue that beliefs come in degrees.
According to the latter, our doxastic states vary in strength, and the thesis may seem
intuitive as we experience having varying degrees of certainty about propositions.
However, there is a difference between the naïve view that we have degrees of belief,
and the more radical view that beliefs respect the so-called Lockean Thesis, which
has been discussed extensively by Foley (1993). The Lockean Thesis, which is our
first assumption, can be summarized as:
An agent, A, believes a proposition, p, if and only if A has subjective
evidence that p is equal to or greater than a certain degree of belief
(usually identified as 0.5 or greater).
Contrary to the naïve view on degrees of belief, the Lockean Thesis could be seen as
having a metaphysical import, because it defines beliefs as states where an agent is
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confident about a proposition above a certain threshold level; in this sense, the Lock-
ean Thesis reduces categorical (or qualitative) beliefs to credences (or quantitative
beliefs).
However, as credences are often taken to conform to the constraints of probabilistic
coherence, some (e.g. Frankish 2009) have objected that the Lockean Thesis needs
to be rejected because it flies in the face of the Agglomeration Principle, or Closure
under Conjunction. Agglomeration fails whenever believing a proposition, p, and be-
lieving another proposition, q, doesn’t result in believing the conjunction p ∧ q. As
it happens, having sufficient confidence in a proposition, p, and sufficient confidence
in another proposition, q, doesn’t guarantee that we have sufficient confidence in the
conjunction, p ∧ q. Therefore, endorsing the Lockean Thesis rules out Agglomera-
tion. To this criticism we can reply that, by the end of the section, it will become
clear that there is no obvious reason why we should want to keep Agglomeration.
The second assumption is that I understand the statement \There is at least one false
sentence in the set of sentences, S ’ as being equivalent to \The conjunction of all the
sentences in S is false’.
Besides the assumptions I make in this chapter, I should also specify that the work
presented in the current section is related to work done by Christensen (2004) on
deductive cogency and epistemic rationality. Whereas Christensen’s book addresses
general constraints of deductive cogency, in the present chapter the epistemic para-
doxes are used to test specific logical norms that are meant to be rationality require-
ments.
We would soon get into trouble if, referring to rationality requirements, we didn’t
specify what kind of rationality and rationality requirements we are talking about
here. To this extent, Christensen (2004) comes in handy once again. Christensen13
differentiates rationality into three orthogonal pairs: epistemic-pragmatic, synchronic-
diachronic, and local-global. Christensen doesn’t give definitions for each of the terms
in the pairs, but he gives examples of how the corresponding forms of rationality could
be manifested. Below, I try to sketch some informal definitions for each of the terms
in the pairs, and I hope that I don’t diverge too much from Christensen’s insight.
Let’s discuss the epistemic-pragmatic dichotomy first. Epistemic rationality is a
standard prescribing that one’s beliefs conform to some epistemic criteria and, most
notably, the criterion would rather be the possession of evidence. On the other
13Christensen (2004): 4-11.
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hand, pragmatic rationality aims at maximizing one’s expected utility, as in Pascal’s
Wager.14
For example, suppose you are a detective conducting an investigation into a murder.
Due to the scarcity of evidence, you cannot prove that the victim’s wife committed
the murder, although you are inclined to think that the wife would somehow benefit
from her husband’s death. Epistemic rationality doesn’t allow that you believe that
the wife murdered her husband.
But now, suppose that the police has been investigating the crime for a while without
any tangible results. The good name of the local police department has been called
into question by the press and by the public opinion. Then, the police chief starts
to put pressure on you, asking you to find out who the killer is, with more and more
insistency. According to pragmatic rationality, you might want to reveal the name
of the victim’s wife as the main suspect to soothe the general discontent with the
investigations.
It is not uncommon to endorse that epistemic rationality can be reduced to instru-
mental rationality,15 but for our purposes, it will suffice to make clear the distinction
between the two.
Now, let’s turn to the synchronic-diachronic dichotomy. Diachronic rationality gov-
erns the way beliefs are constrained over time (for example, it constrains belief re-
vision), whereas synchronic rationality governs the way beliefs are constrained at a
certain point in time (i.e. simultaneously).
Last comes the distinction between local and global rationality. The difference be-
tween the two is a matter of quantity. Whereas local rationality governs the way
individual beliefs are connected to others, global rationality governs the way beliefs
are connected to other beliefs in general or, in other words, holistically.
That said, let’s spend a few words on what kinds of rationality we are going to deal
with in our discussion: the rationality requirements imposed by logic on our beliefs
are general and they don’t have to do with our expected utility, so what we want to
find out is whether they guarantee global and epistemic rationality.
On the other hand, the logical norms don’t prescribe nor suggest how to revise our
beliefs, therefore they are meant to preserve the synchronic rationality of our beliefs.
14Pragmatic rationality is often called instrumental rationality.
15For example, Nozick (1993) holds this view. See Kelly (2003) for a critical discussion of the
reductionist view.
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In the next subsection, we are going to look at the logical norms under the lens of
epistemic, global and synchronic rationality.
6.4.1 Simone’s manuscript
Consider the following Preface-paradox-like scenario.16 Simone is about to publish
a book on antibiotic-resistant bacteria, and she believes each of the propositions in
her manuscript. However, due to her past experience, her awareness of being fallible,
etc., Simone believes that there is at least one error in her manuscript.
The scenario tells us that Simone believes the propositions p1, p2, ..., pi in her
manuscript. By Adjunction, p1, p2, ..., pi |= p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi.
However, Simone thinks that there is at least one error in her book, i.e. she also
believes ¬(p1∧p2∧ ...∧pi). It seems intuitively reasonable for Simone to believe that
each of the propositions in her manuscript is true - she has run lab tests, she has
strong evidence for each of the propositions, etc. It also seems intuitively reasonable
for Simone to believe that there is at least one mistake in her book - she realizes that
she has made mistakes in the past, she is aware that her colleagues’ papers usually
contain errors, etc.
Let’s now examine how the logical norms deal with the Preface example. What I do
in the remainder of the section is to consider normative requirements, MacFarlane’s
bridge principles, and the Consequence Principle in turn, to answer the question
\Is what the logical norms require Simone to believe in fact reasonable for her to
believe?’. Answering this question will help determine whether the logical norms
discussed meet their desideratum.
I start the Preface test considering how the logical norms fare in a full-belief scenario,
then I will turn to discussing the same scenario in terms of credences. Moreover, as
normative requirements and Wo- are both wide-scope obligations, I consider them
together in my analysis.17 According to the normative requirements and to Wo-,
Simone is expected to meet the following requirement:
16The Preface Paradox was discussed for the first time by Makinson (1965).
17Normative requirements are quite charitably treated the same way as Wo-. In fact, Broome (1999)
describes the requirements in a way that actually justifies their translation as instances of Wo+
(Wo+ reads \If A, B |= C, then you ought to see to it that if you believe A and believe B, you
believe C ’), with the proviso that the antecedent, i.e. \If A, B |= C ’, is obvious. In general, Wo+
fails to be a plausible principle because ordinary agents lack logical omniscience. In the case of
Broome’s normative requirements, I don’t think that the entailment relation being obvious makes
much difference with respect to the Preface and the Lottery paradoxes.
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Normative requirements, Wo-: Simone ought to see to it that if she
believes p1, p2, ..., pi, she doesn’t disbelieve p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi.
However, Simone believes that there is at least one error in her manuscript, i.e.
Simone disbelieves p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi, so Wo- and the normative requirements impose
an obligation that would be unreasonable for Simone to meet. So, Wo- and normative
requirements don’t meet the desideratum of logical norms in general, because they
don’t connect a valid argument, p1, p2, ..., pi |= p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi, and informal
reasoning in a plausible way.
Now, I examine the Consequence Principle and determine whether it fares any better,
providing a reasonable requirement to Simone.
According to my formulation of the Consequence Principle, we should expect the
following requirement to be enforced:
Consequence Principle: Simone ought not both accept p1, p2, ...,
pi, and reject p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi.
Upon replacing the pair accept-reject with the pair believe-disbelieve, the Conse-
quence Principle looks much like Wo-. The requirement that the principle imposes
seems to fare like Wo- and Broome’s normative requirements, too - it prohibits Si-
mone to accept each of the propositions in her book and accept that there is at least
an error somewhere in her manuscript (i.e. reject p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi). However, it
seems reasonable that Simone believes each of the propositions in her manuscript
and still refuses to believe their conjunction. So, similarly to Wo-, the Consequence
Principle doesn’t satisfy the general desideratum of logical norms.
Now, we have only two principles left to examine: Wr+ and Wr -. According to the
Wr ’s, Simone’s case would be subject to the following norms:
Wr+: Simone has reason to see to it that if she believes p1, p2, ...,
pi, she believes p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi;
Wr-: Simone has reason to see to it that if she believes p1, p2, ...,
pi, she doesn’t disbelieve p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi.
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The Wr ’s don’t impose an obligation to believe each of the propositions and their
conjunction - they just say that Simone has a pro tanto reason to see that if she
believes each of the propositions in her book, she believes (doesn’t disbelieve) their
conjunction. Therefore, the Wr ’s are not threatened by there being other epistemic
norms, such as epistemic modesty, recommending an opposite course of action, so
they fare better than Wo- and the normative requirements.
However, it might be objected that the Wr ’s don’t have the belief-constraining power
that we would expect from a logical norm. For example, Broome (1999) argues that,
provided that p |= q, \if you do believe p and yet do not believe q, you are not entirely
as you ought to be. So the relation is strict, which means it cannot be the reasons
relation.’ (Broome (1999): 403). For the purpose of this chapter, I don’t delve into
the debate on the pros and cons of reasons. For now, I just acknowledge that there
are concerns about reasons being not sufficiently strong to describe the normativity
of logic on thought.
Let’s consider now the possible responses to the Preface example. A quite immediate
reply to the Preface paradox is that it is not a real paradox. In fact, it could be
solved separating first-order beliefs from second-order beliefs. In our example, the
first-order beliefs are Simone’s beliefs in each of the propositions in her manuscript,
whereas the second-order belief is Simone’s modest claim that there is at least one
error in her book.
However, as Christensen (2004) puts it, the point about first- and second-order beliefs
shouldn’t be taken as conclusive against the Preface case:
This line seems unpromising to me. For it seems clear that an au-
thor who knew what she had said in the body of her book could re-
alize that this conjunction was materially equivalent to the second-
order claim of inerrancy for the body of the book. Once she has
accepted the equivalence, closure will take her from the conjunction
to the second-order claim. (Christensen (2004): 37)
Just consider the conjunction of all the propositions in Simone’s book, p1 ∧ p2 ∧
...∧ pi. If Simone believes the conjunction of the propositions in her book, she must
believe that her book contains only true statements, which is already a second-order
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belief. In fact, it would seem unnatural that Simone could believe p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi
and not believe that her book is error-free.
The inconsistency between Simone’s beliefs still remains. What other candidates
could be dismissed, then?
So far, we have found that the logical norms in trouble with the Preface Paradox are
Wo-, the normative requirements, and the Consequence Principle. Therefore, one
option could be to dismiss the troublesome logical norms.
There is another option, though. One might rather decide to dismiss the Agglomer-
ation Principle (also called Closure under Conjunction), i.e. Bϕ, Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ).
The Agglomeration Principle can be read as a descriptive principle or as a normative
principle. As a descriptive principle, Agglomeration says that whenever an agent be-
lieves proposition ϕ and believes ψ, she believes ϕ∧ψ. The descriptive reading of the
Agglomeration Principle, besides not being very interesting from an epistemological
point of view, doesn’t seem very plausible. On the other hand, the normative read-
ing of Agglomeration says that rationality requires that if an agent believes ϕ and
believes ψ, she believes ϕ∧ ψ. Following Broome’s general analysis of requirements,
I formalize Agglomeration as a wide-scoped obligation: O((Bϕ ∧ Bψ)→ B(ϕ∧ψ)).
Now, it is relatively uncontroversial that the descriptive version of Agglomeration
fails, but it might not be as uncontroversial that the normative version of Agglom-
eration fails as well. Therefore, if our aim is to rescue the logical norms in trouble, a
possible reply to the Preface Paradox could be to give up the normative reading of
Agglomeration.
Furthermore, this option seems to be supported by probabilism. Suppose that Si-
mone’s manuscript is conveniently constituted of a hundred propositions, p1, ..., p100,
and that Simone has strong evidence for each of them. To keep the math simple, let’s
say that she believes each of the propositions to degree 0.99 and that the propositions
are independent. Consequently, according to Bayesianism, given that the probability
of the conjunction of independent propositions is given by the product of their indi-
vidual probabilities, the credence with respect to p1∧ ...∧ p100 is 0.99100 = 0.36618 -
well below the threshold for accepting p1∧ ...∧ p100.
However, let’s concede that it is not straightforward that having a credence of 0.366
with respect to p1∧ ...∧ p100 implies that one disbelieves p1∧ ...∧ p100. For example,
consider a Lockean belief system with a rather high threshold for belief, i.e. we
18For the sake of simplicity, I am assuming that the propositions are independent.
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say that Simone believes a proposition, p, whenever her credence that p is equal or
greater than 0.7. As Simone’s credence with respect to p1∧ ...∧ p100 is 0.366, her
credence with respect to ¬(p1∧ ...∧ p100) is 0.634, which is below the threshold. In
such a case, giving up Agglomeration doesn’t commit one to reject Wo- nor any of
the other logical norms in trouble.19
I will show that giving up the Agglomeration Principle is not enough to save the
logical norms in trouble, though. In the next section, I use a probabilistic solution
to the Lottery Paradox to show why this is the case.
6.4.2 The lottery
In the following, I set up a typical Lottery Paradox scenario, then I consider how
each of the logical norms deal with it.20
Suppose that a fair lottery has 1,000 tickets and exactly one winning ticket among
them. It is rational to believe that some ticket will be the winning one.
Now, suppose that you have a ticket from the lottery. Given the odds, it seems
perfectly reasonable for you to believe that it is very unlikely that you have the
winning ticket.
Let p1 stand for \This is the winning ticket’ and ¬p1 stand for \It is not the case that
this is the winning ticket’.
Then, assuming a Lockean view, as the odds that your ticket is the winning one are
very low (1/1,000), you are justified to believe ¬p1.
In fact, given that there is exactly one winning ticket out of a thousand, it is reason-
able for you to also believe ¬p2, ..., ¬p1000. By Adjunction, we have that ¬p1,¬p2,
..., ¬p1000 |= ¬p1∧¬p2 ∧...∧¬p1000 and, by De Morgan’s Law, ¬p1∧¬p2 ∧...∧¬p1000
is equivalent to ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ...∨ p1000), so ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000 entails that there is no
winning ticket.
Now, let’s examine again each of the logical norms to determine whether what they
require you to believe is in fact reasonable for you to believe.
19If we set up a Preface scenario where the book contains 1,000 propositions, Simone would have
a much lower credence in their conjunction (indeed, it would approximate to 0) and, in turn,
Simone would have a credence in the negation of the conjunction that largely exceeds the threshold.
Therefore, we could well claim that Simone disbelieves the conjunction of all the propositions in
her manuscript. However, I want to show that even conceding a favourable case to our opponent
won’t help their view.
20The Lottery Paradox was first discussed in Kyburg (1961).
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According to the normative requirements and Wo-, you are expected to meet the
following requirement:
Normative requirements, Wo-: You ought to see to it that if you
believe ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000, you don’t disbelieve ¬(p1∨p2∨...∨p1000).
However, you do know that some ticket is the winning one. So, as in the Preface
Paradox case, Wo- and the normative requirements don’t seem to prescribe a rea-
sonable epistemic requirement, so failing to meet the main desideratum of logical
norms.
The situation is not very different with the Consequence Principle, which gives the
following requirement:
Consequence Principle: You ought not both accept ¬p1,¬p2, ...,
¬p1000, and reject ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000).
The principle seems to fare likeWo- and Broome’s normative requirements in the Lot-
tery case, too. In fact, the Consequence Principle prohibits you to accept ¬p1,¬p2,
..., ¬p1000 and reject that there is no winning ticket, which doesn’t seem reasonable.
On the other hand, Wr+ and Wr - impose slacker constraints in the Lottery case:
Wr+: You have reason to see to it that if you believe ¬p1,¬p2, ...,
¬p1000, you believe ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000);
Wr -: You have reason to see to it that if you believe ¬p1,¬p2, ...,
¬p1000, you don’t disbelieve ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000).
The Wr ’s don’t impose an obligation to believe each of the negated propositions
and to believe that there is no winning ticket - they just say that you have a pro
tanto reason to see that if you believe each of ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000, you believe (don’t
disbelieve) that there is no winning ticket. As such, the Wr ’s fare better than Wo-
and the normative requirements. As with the Preface case, it might be objected that
reasons don’t have as much deontic force as we would expect from a logical norm.
Again, I leave this issue open for the moment.
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From the Lottery Paradox test, it turns out that Wo-, the normative requirements
and the Consequence Principle fail to meet the general desideratum of logical norms,
because they don’t express plausible ways to connect valid arguments and informal
reasoning. On the other hand, Wr+ and Wr - satisfy the desideratum but they
impose much weaker constraints on belief.
Again, two paths can be pursued to deal with the Lottery test. Similarly to the
Preface case, the first option is to give up the logical norms in trouble.
The second option - i.e. rejecting Agglomeration - could prima facie seem a feasible
way out in the Lottery case, too. One might be tempted to support the choice of
dismissing Agglomeration by appealing to probabilism again. However, this time
resorting to probabilism commits one to rejecting more than just the Agglomeration
Principle.
Consider a weaker version of the Agglomeration Principle, which I call Weak Ag-
glomeration:
Weak Agglomeration: O(Bϕ, Bψ → ¬Dis(ϕ ∧ ψ)).
The Lottery case appears to be a counterexample even to Weak Agglomeration. In
fact, as we have seen, given the odds of the lottery it is reasonable for you to believe
an instance of the proposition \This is not the winning ticket’ for each of the tickets
from the raffle. However, you know that the lottery is fair and that there is exactly
one winning ticket, therefore it is equally reasonable for you to reject that there are
no winning tickets.
Similarly to the Preface Paradox, Bayesianism doesn’t help to rescue the logical
norms in the Lottery case. To see the point, consider the following solution to the
Lottery Paradox:
p1, p2, ..., p1000 are not mutually independent, as ticket 1, ticket 2, ..., ticket 1000
are tickets from the same lottery and the probability of (p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) ∨
¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) is equal to 1. In fact, for the principles of probabilism, any
logical tautology gets assigned value 1 as, according to probabilism, the probability
of a disjunction, ϕ ∨ ψ, with mutually inconsistent disjuncts is equal to the sum of
the disjuncts’ probabilities. In other words, p(ϕ ∨ ψ) = p(ϕ) + p(ψ).
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So, we know that the probability of (p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) ∨ ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) is
equal to 1; therefore, p(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) + p(¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000)) = 1.21
But we also know that there is exactly one winning ticket, i.e. we know that the
probability of (p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) is equal to 1. Therefore, the probability of
¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ...∨ p1000) (and indeed, of ¬p1 ∧¬p2 ∧...∧¬p1000) must be 1 - 1 = 0. Put
in probabilistic jargon, ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000 exhaust the probabilistic space.
Now, let’s go back to the Preface example. A quick look at Bayesianism had shown
that the probability of the conjunction of all the propositions in Simone’s manuscript
(which was 0.366, as we had seen) cannot guarantee that Simone believes p1 ∧ p2
∧ ...∧ p100. However, we have seen how the propositional attitude of not-believing
(or failing to believe) a proposition, p, is not the same as the propositional attitude
of disbelieving a proposition, p. We conceded that Simone not believing p1 ∧ p2
∧ ...∧ p100 doesn’t mean that Simone disbelieves p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ p100, provided our
Lockean belief system has a threshold of at least 0.7. As far as the Preface case is
concerned, Bayesianism really seems to reconcile the need to reject Agglomeration
with the need to keep the prescriptive logical norms.
However, the Bayesian solution to the Lottery Paradox shows that rejecting the
Agglomeration Principle is not sufficient to save the principles in trouble. This time,
the solution to the Lottery says, the probability for ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000) - i.e. the
probability that there is no winning ticket - is 0. In other words, it must be plainly
false that no ticket will win the lottery.22 Therefore, this time you are perfectly
justified in disbelieving (or rejecting) that no ticket will win the lottery. But this is
exactly the opposite of what the logical norms (except Wr+, Wr -) prescribe to you
to do.
In fact, as we have seen, Wo-, normative requirements, and the Consequence Princi-
ple require you to see to it that if you believe ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000, you don’t disbe-
lieve/reject ¬p1 ∧¬p2 ∧...∧¬p1000. But here the logical norms seem to conflict with
probabilism, because probabilism requires that you assign probability 0 to ¬p1∧¬p2
∧... ∧ ¬p1000.
Notice that the normative reading of Weak Agglomeration is just an instance of Wo-.
Therefore, the option of rejecting Weak Agglomeration and retaining Wo- is closed
21The notation used here might be confusing. The occurrences of p before the parentheses de-
note \the degree of probability of’, whereas the occurrences of p inside the parentheses denote
propositions.
22Here, I am assuming that the agent knows that there is exactly one winning ticket.
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off now, showing that there is no immediate way we can get away with rejecting
Agglomeration and Weak Agglomeration to rescue the logical norms in trouble.
Some, e.g. Kolodny (2005), oppose the view that rationality requirements have wide
scope. For the sake of the argument, let’s consider the possibility that Agglomeration
is actually a narrow-scope requirement, i.e. (Bϕ ∧ Bψ) → OB(ϕ ∧ ψ)).
Narrow-scope Agglomeration says that, for instance, if you believe ¬p1,¬p2, ...,
¬p1000, you ought to believe that there is no winning ticket. We can narrow down the
scope also in Weak Agglomeration, so that it becomes (Bϕ ∧ Bψ)→ O¬Dis(ϕ∧ψ)).
Adapted to the Lottery example, narrow-scope Weak Agglomeration says that if you
believe ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000, you ought not disbelieve that there is no winning ticket.
Still, as ¬(p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ...∨ p1000) takes value 0, you have sufficient grounds to rationally
disbelieve that no ticket will win the lottery. Therefore, narrowing down the scope of
Agglomeration and Weak Agglomeration, respectively, doesn’t make them immune
to the counterexample.23
There is another possible way out of the stalemate that we haven’t explored, yet. It
is a much more radical solution than rejecting Agglomeration, nonetheless it is worth
considering it. Instead of rejecting Agglomeration, which is the epistemic counterpart
of Adjunction, we could decide to reject Adjunction. Dismissing Adjunction, we
would prevent the Preface Paradox.
In fact, consider once again Simone’s manuscript, consisting of a finite number of
propositions, p1, p2, ..., pi. If Adjunction doesn’t hold, we would have that p1, p2,
..., pi 2 p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi. Therefore, Simone’s belief that there is at least one
mistake in her manuscript, which we translated as ¬ (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi), wouldn’t be
inconsistent with the conjunction p1 ∧ p2 ∧ ...∧ pi, classically entailed by Simone’s
belief in each of the propositions in her book.
Clearly, rejecting Adjunction would also stop the Lottery Paradox. There, we saw
that considering that each of the ticket, in turn, is hardly going to win the lottery,
¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000, entails that no ticket will win the lottery, ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬p1000.
However, rejecting Adjunction, we have that ¬p1,¬p2, ..., ¬p1000 2 ¬p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧
¬p1000. Therefore, our belief that there is some winning ticket, p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ... ∨ p1000,
doesn’t bring about any paradox.
Hence, it looks like rejecting Adjunction might be the way to go to cope with the
epistemic paradoxes. The examples of non-adjunctive logic that come to mind first
23There are also independent concerns with narrow-scoped principles, as I mentioned.
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are Rescher and Manor’s paraconsistent non-adjunctive logic,24 which allows to con-
join the premises unless they are inconsistent. But, although non-adjunctive logics
are effective in blocking the paradoxes, they are subject to the independent worries
common to paraconsistent logics, which would require thorough discussion, so we
won’t consider the option of rejecting Adjunction in this chapter.
In this chapter, we have seen that logical norms, similarly to epistemic norms, are
meant to maximize rationality. However, logical and epistemic norms are sometimes
in tension, and following logical norms alone doesn’t guarantee that the resulting
beliefs will be rational. For the purpose of this chapter, our aim is to prove that,
given certain assumptions, some logical norms are not plausible, as they prescribe
that we believe what we shouldn’t rationally believe, e.g. that the Lottery doesn’t
have a winning ticket. In particular, in this section I have shown that normative
requirements, Wo-, and the Consequence Principle don’t withstand the Preface nor
the Lottery case. Wr+ and Wr - fare better than the other norms but there is concern
that they might be too weak. Therefore, if we concede that there are credences (and
something like the Lockean Thesis), we cannot also have prescriptive logical norms.
In the next section, I try to determine what category of normativity logic falls under.
I draw from the taxonomy of norms discussed in Glüer and Wikforss (2010) and then
I determine under what category the normative role of logic can be classified.
6.5. Types of normativity
As we have seen in the previous sections, logical norms are a very peculiar kind of
norms. They can come in different varieties and normative strength, according to
the deontic operators they employ, the scope of the deontic operator, etc.
After our long discussion of the logical norms, the reader might have lost track of all
the subdivisions norms are classified into. To help the reader remember which labels
means what, here is a summary of the classification of norms according to Glüer and
Wikforss (2010).
1.: Norms for action: these norms are about what to do. Legal constraints
are an example of such norms;
24See Rescher and Manor (1971)
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2.: Norms of being : these norms are similar to evaluations, i.e. they are
about what state of affairs are valuable and ought to obtain.
Among the norms for action, there are several subcategories:
1.1: Instrumental norms : these norms are contingent upon the agent’s goal.
For example, \I should run every day to be able to run the London marathon’;
1.2: Non-instrumental norms : these norms are not contingent upon the
agent’s goal. Moral constraints are usually taken to exemplify this category
of norms, such as \You should always help a person in need’;
1.3: Prima facie norms : these rules can be overridden by other rules. For
example, \You shouldn’t overtake a car on its left’ (assuming that you drive
in the UK);
1.4: Categorical norms : these rules can’t be overridden.
Non-instrumental norms can be divided into subcategories as well:
1.2.1: Prescriptions : these norms can be formulated with an ought ;
1.2.2: Constitutive rules : in these norms, the action subject to the norm
owes its existence to the norm. The rules of games are an example of such
norms.
Prescriptions can be:
1.2.1.1: Conditional, such as \If someone holds the door for you, you should
thank them’;
1.2.1.2: Unconditional, such as \You should donate to charity’.
In addition to this, the deontic operator in the conditional prescriptions can have
wide scope or narrow scope.
As we have seen in the previous sections, logical norms are a very peculiar kind of
norms: they can come in different varieties and normative strength, according to the
deontic operators they bear, the scope of the deontic operator, etc. Logical norms
6.5. TYPES OF NORMATIVITY 165
are often formulated as norms for action. In fact, they are supposed to regulate how
we ought, have reason to or, at least, how we shouldn’t, reason.
In turn, according to the taxonomy, norms for action can be instrumental or non-
instrumental. As logical norms are not contingent upon the agent’s goals, they seem
to fall under the latter category. However, there is an important sense in which the
distinction between instrumental and non-instrumental norms as it is formulated in
Glüer and Wikforss (2010) doesn’t do justice to logical norms.
To see this, I consider the distinction between the evaluative and the directive sense
of ought introduced by Thomson (2008). As Elqayam and Evans (2011) have pointed
out, there is a third sense of ought, i.e. the functional sense. The functional ought
is relative to - among other things - biological functions, as in \Heart ought to pump
the blood’, and doesn’t have a deontic character. Functional ought ’s just describe
what the proper function of an entity (such as an organ) should be.
Unlike the functional use of ought, the evaluative and the directive ought’s have a
deontic meaning. The evaluative ought is appropriate to express moral claims, such
as \You ought to tell the truth’, whereas the directive ought is meant to recommend
a certain course of action to reach an end, as in \You ought to fold a sheet this
way’ (supposing you want to make a paper plane, for example). The latter example
especially shows that directive ought ’s are easily thought of as having an instrumental
meaning. As Elqayam and Evans (2011) acknowledge, the directive and evaluative
meanings of ought are often mixed in common discourse. Indeed, many moral claims
could be seen as including a mix of directive and evaluative ought ’s.
Although the difference between the directive ought and Glüer & Wikforss’ 25 in-
strumental norms doesn’t shine through the example \You ought to fold a sheet this
way’, it is important to see that a directive ought is not necessarily contingent upon
the immediate agent’s goal.
Consider the example \You ought to donate to Oxfam’. In this example, the ought
is evaluative because it is used to express that the action of donating to Oxfam is
valuable. However, the action of donating to Oxfam is not simply valuable in itself.
It is valuable because donating to Oxfam is supposed to be a means to, e.g. helping
people living in poverty around the world. Therefore, the use of ought in \You ought
25 Which I will call G&W in the following.
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to donate to Oxfam’ doesn’t seem merely evaluative, but it seems to be directive as
well.
The evaluative+directive use of ought is not accounted for by G&W, but I think that
their taxonomy could be fruitfully supplemented with the categories of the directive
and the evaluative ought, which are not meant to be mutually exclusive.
Now, to go back to our question, logical norms are not instrumental according to
the taxonomy outlined by Glüer and Wikforss (2010), but the logical norms I have
discussed in the previous sections are recognizable as directive norms nonetheless.
In fact, logical norms are meant to be epistemic norms aimed at maximizing the
rationality of our beliefs. For this reason, I think that portraying logical norms as
purely evaluative doesn’t do justice to their purpose. It is very plausible that logical
norms could be best located under the category evaluative+directive.
Going back to G&W’s taxonomy, the third category divides norms into prescriptions
and constitutive norms.
Now, if logical norms were constitutive of thought, we would have no mental process
identifiable as proper thought outside them. Although a similar view could perhaps
be attributed to Kant26 and Frege,27 the idea that agents need to comply with logical
laws if they are going to think at all seems far from reality. I hope to have shown
in the previous section that logical norms are not always successful in imposing an
obligation about what is rational to believe.
There is a last thing to point out. We have seen that we can draw an initial distinction
between norms that are prescriptive in a strict sense, and recommendations, and we
have also seen that G&W appear to use the label \prescriptive’ in a more general
way. In fact, G&W understand prescriptive norms to be norms that employ deontic
vocabulary. In other words, prescriptive norms can be formulated as obligations,
prohibitions, or permissions. Although reasons are not taken into account in G&W’s
26Kant thought that we cannot dispense from thinking logically, if we are to think at all. However,
it should be kept in mind that Kant’s idea of logic doesn’t have much to do with the current idea
of logic as a system consisting in a logical language, language-forming rules and inference rules (or
axioms, if so preferred).
27In his introduction to Grundgesetze, Frege writes: \Every law stating what is the case can be
conceived as prescriptive, one should think in accordance with it, and in that sense it is accordingly
a law of thought. This holds for geometrical and physical laws no less than for the logical. The
latter better deserve the title “laws of thought” only if thereby it is supposed to be said that they
are the most general laws, prescribing how to think wherever there is thinking at all.’ (Frege (2013):
xv)
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definition of prescriptive norms, it is really up to us to decide whether reasons deserve
a place in the deontic vocabulary or not.
Certainly, logical norms can be formulated as requirements, i.e. obligations. How-
ever, the examples with the epistemic paradoxes have shown that such logical norms
violate epistemic, global and synchronic rationality in some circumstances. There-
fore, if we want logical norms to be rationality-preserving principles, we’d better not
formulate them as obligations.
If reasons are not admitted in the deontic vocabulary, it is not clear what normative
category logical norms fall under. They are not constitutive norms, but they are not
prescriptive either. If reasons enter the deontic vocabulary, we could say that logical
norms are prescriptive in a broad sense, as they specify recommendations (reasons)
for belief.
If my analysis is correct, this implies three claims: (i) logical norms can be overridden
by other norms, giving us reason to put logical norms under the category of prima
facie norms; (ii) classifying logical norms as prima facie rules out that they can be
constitutive norms; (iii) in virtue of being non-constitutive, logical norms fall under
the category of prescriptive norms.
6.6. Conclusion
The logical norms that I have discussed in this chapter can look prima facie as an
attractive way to formulate the bulk of a strong theory of the normativity of logic.
Such a theory has it that conforming our beliefs to logical consequence constitutes a
necessary requirement for epistemic rationality.
However, we have seen that the epistemic paradoxes threaten a strong approach to
the normativity of logic. In particular, we have seen that the logical norms cannot
accommodate our intuitions about what a rational agent ought to believe in cases
such as the Preface Paradox and the Lottery Paradox. The logical norms formulated
as obligations (Wo-, normative requirements, and the Consequence Principle) can
only be held as prima facie norms. In other words, the attempts to provide logical
norms as necessary requirements for epistemic rationality are not successful.
We have seen that sometimes we judge the most rational course of action to be that
recommended by an epistemic norm, rather than that recommended by a logical
norm. For this reason, the logical norms formulated as recommendations (Wr+,
168 6. LOGICAL NORMS AND THE EPISTEMIC PARADOXES
Wr -) capture better the normativity of logic, because they leave room for other
rationality requirements and epistemic norms to be considered.
On the other hand, reasons are subject to some worries themselves. For instance,
some may object that reasons fail to provide logical norms that have the belief-
constraining power that we would expect from logical norms. Others may be con-
cerned about reasons not being real deontic operators. Therefore my conclusion, for
those who endorse these worries about reasons, is that none of the logical norms
presented is plausible at all.
Conclusion
Let’s consider the questions that opened the thesis once again: What normative
import does logic have on our reasoning? How do, and how should, logical norms
influence our rational thought? We can now answer these questions as follows: logic
has a weak influence on our reasoning, which resembles the normative power of
recommendations rather than that of obligations. To the second question, we can
reply that logical norms do not and should not always influence our thought in order
for it to be rational.
We have seen how this change in the perspective on the normativity of logic has
been the effect of other changes, namely the development of non-classical logics and,
especially, the realistic turn in the theories of rationality, which could be assimilated
to Copernican revolutions in their respective fields.
Philosophers are interested, among other things, in better understanding ourselves,
and the study of rationality from the point of view of real agents is a valuable way
of doing that. In theory, logic is what we have studied in our philosophy courses, or
what Peirce called logica docens, and it is (we like to think) infallible and invincible;
in practice, sometimes logic conflicts with independent epistemic requirements and
loses the match. I hope to have shown that this is something we shouldn’t be too
worried about.
The main characters of my thesis are logic, normativity, and rationality, whose in-
terplay defines the normativity of logic. For this reason, I devoted a chapter of my
thesis to each of them in order to prepare the ground for the discussion of logical nor-
mativity in the final chapter. Let me sum up the chapters and how they contributed
to the thesis.
The first chapter lays the basis for the rest of the thesis, focusing on the definitions
of logical validity and their problems. In addition, the chapter explores a non-
traditional account of validity, and rejects it. The second chapter asks whether logic
is a priori and whether it provides a priori norms for reasoning, arguing that logic
does provide norms for reasoning we are a priori entitled to apply. The third chapter
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delves into one of the most detailed accounts of the normativity of logic currently on
the market, laying the basis for the final chapter. The fourth chapter addresses some
theories of rationality that focus on real agents, rather than on ideal agents; I assume
the characterization of ‘rationality’ provided by the theories discussed in the fourth
chapter in my analysis of logical normativity in the final chapter. The fifth chapter
discusses the main results in the psychology of reasoning, which demonstrate that
the theory of rationality discussed in the fourth chapter is very plausible. Finally, the
sixth and final chapter goes back to the issue of the normativity of logic. There, I ask
whether there are any logical norms that provide a plausible way to connect formal
logic to informal reasoning, i.e. reasoning that is rational in the sense discussed in
the fourth chapter.
In detail, in the first chapter, I argued against primitivism about validity. First, we
saw that validity can be defined in different ways and it can even be left undefined, as
in Field (forthcoming). The competing accounts of validity are the model-theoretic,
the proof-theoretic, the deflationist, and what we called the primitivist account of
validity, which has been defended by Field. Every theory of validity suffers from
particular problems but, in the first chapter, I addressed specifically the primitivist
account because it has the claim that because of the problems besetting all other
accounts, it has to be right in not burdening validity with an analysis that is doomed
to fail.
I argued that, given all the considerations, the primitivist account is not in a better
position than the other accounts of validity. The primitivist’s formula was found to
return results outside the [0, 1] interval, and I argued that the account raises serious
concerns, one of which is common to the model-theoretic view of validity. Then,
I suggested a definitional approach to validity very similar in spirit to Field’s and
found that it didn’t appear to fare worse than the primitivist account of validity. I
concluded that, if there are no strong reasons to endorse a justification reductionist
account of validity, neither are there to prefer (FV) over the model- and proof-
theoretic accounts of validity.
In the second chapter, I asked whether logic is a priori, and concluded that a falli-
bilist apriorism is the most plausible option. The traditional definition of a priori
knowledge claims that some proposition is known a priori iff it is known (or justified)
independently of experience. However, we saw that the definition raised questions
about what ‘indepedently of experience’ means. I first addressed the role of a posteri-
ori evidence on a priori knowledge, and I surveyed some positions on the relevance of
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empirical evidence to the a priori, explaining what characteristics empirical evidence
should have to deprive the knowledge of its a priori status. Next, I introduced Put-
nam’s empiricism and I summarized the main replies to it. Subsequently, I discussed
the positive and the negative accounts of the a priori. The positive definitions of the
a priori specify what is needed in the entitlement of a proposition, p, in order for p to
be known a priori. In contrast, the negative characterizations of the a priori specify
what needs to be absent from the entitlement to believe p, for p to be known a priori.
I discussed the negative accounts first, focusing especially on Field’s apriorism, his
fallibilist view on the a priori, and the thesis that we have a default entitlement to
apply logical norms. Next, I addressed the positive characterizations of the a priori:
(i) as knowledge gained through rational intuition, as discussed e.g. by BonJour and
by Bealer, and (ii) as knowledge that is true and justified in virtue of language alone,
as discussed e.g. by Boghossian. Subsequently, we focused on the debate between
the empiricist fallibilism promoted by Bueno and the aprioristic fallibilism endorsed
by Field, and I argued that Bueno’s criticism of Field’s apriorism are not conclusive.
In the last part of the chapter, I examined Williamson’s view on the apriori, which
holds that the distinction between a priori and a posteriori is not philosophically
meaningful. In response to Williamson’s argument, I rejected the main assumption
on which it relies. I concluded that the only position which bears scrutiny is Field’s
aprioristic fallibilism, which holds that logical rules enjoy a default justification and
that we are entitled by default to use them.
In the third chapter, I addressed the most promising of all current theories of the nor-
mativity of logic, i.e. MacFarlane’s, which is particularly relevant to the last chapter
of the thesis. I first discussed the interplay between the formality of logic, which
MacFarlane addresses in his doctoral dissertation, and the issue of the normativity
of logic, which MacFarlane addresses in a more recent paper. Then, I discussed the
bridge principles introduced in MacFarlane (2004), agreeing with MacFarlane that
some of them (dubbed Wr+, Wr-, and Wo-) describe prima facie plausible ways of
framing the constraints imposed by logic on informal reasoning. Next, I analyzed
the deontic operators used in the bridge principles, distinguished five senses of ought
and made a hypothesis about the sense in which ought is employed in Wo-. Finally,
I argued that one of the operators included in the bridge principles (i.e. has reason
to) could be made sense of through the minimal deontic logic developed in Chellas
(1974, 1980).
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In the fourth chapter, I discussed at length the theories of rationality that provide the
theoretical background for the later chapters (Cherniak (1986) and Harman (1986)),
which I called the minimal rationality views. They focus on the study of rationality
with regard to real agents; both the approaches take into account the cognitive, tem-
poral and memory limitations of human agents. We saw that, although intuitively
appealing, the distinction between proof (or argument) and reasoning was not suc-
cesfully shown by Harman’s argument. In spite of this, I kept the distinction as a
significant one, since it addresses two different mental processes that are crucial for
the debate on the normativity of logic. The last section of the chapter introduced
Peirce’s account of logica docens and logica utens, and I suggested that logica utens
could be equivalent to what the psychology of reasoning has called mental logic.
The fifth chapter focused on the psychology of reasoning. We saw that until the late
1960’s, the mainstream view of the psychology of reasoning held that human reason-
ing follows roughly the same principles as formal logic (often referred to as Mental
Logic Theory). In 1966, Peter Wason developed his famous selection task to test
people’s deductive reasoning skills, and the results of his test became a knock-down
counterexample to Mental Logic. After discussing the selection task, I distinguished
the main reactions to the experimental results and focused on a particular strategy to
rescue the core idea underlying Mental Logic, which I called the Wrong Conditional
Reply. We saw that the alternative versions of the selection task with manipulated
semantic content provide evidence against the Wrong Conditional Reply. Then, I
discussed the main theories of reasoning and how they explain the experimental re-
sults. In the last section, I argued that if we agree that the selection task and its
alternative versions are valuable psychological evidence, we should conclude either
that deductive reasoning is not indispensable for rationality, or that the responses
given by people to the task show that they are often arational, rather than irrational.
In the sixth and final chapter, I addressed the normativity of logic, discussing some
principles presented by Broome (1999), MacFarlane (2004), and Restall (2005). We
saw that the main desideratum of the principles is that they provide a plausible
way to explain the connection between valid arguments and informal reasoning, i.e.
reasoning that could be attributed to rational agents. First, I drew a distinction
between logical laws and logical norms, then I discussed the principles and put them
to the test against the Preface and the Lottery paradoxes. I argued that the logical
norms formulated as reasons for belief dealt better with the epistemic paradoxes
than their strictly prescriptive counterparts. However, I pointed out that it has been
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argued that reasons don’t have sufficient constraining power on our beliefs. I argued
that none of the bridge principles is able to both (i) provide a plausible way to
connect valid arguments and informal reasoning, and (ii) provide requirements for
rational belief. Then, we saw that logical norms fall under the category of prima
facie norms, which still retain prescriptive power (in the broad sense of ‘prescriptive’
mentioned in the chapter).
To sum up, in my thesis, I have argued that the normativity of logic is of a weak
sort, which can be assimilated to the normative force of reasons, provided that we
are ready to include them within our set of deontic operators. In the fourth chapter,
I suggested two interpretations of the thesis dubbed (ILR): (i) Logical entailment
imposes obligations on what we should believe in order for us to think rationally, or
(ii) Logical entailment gives us recommendations for what we should believe in order
for us to think rationally.
In light of the final chapter, we can see that the two intepretations of (ILR) have
different fates: (i) is ruled out by the the epistemic paradoxes examples, whereas
(ii) remains plausible after the Preface and the Lottery tests. Was Harman right or
wrong, then? It really depends on what we take (ILR) to mean. If, as I suspect,
(ILR) amounts to (i), then Harman was right.
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